# Melammu Workshop Tartu 2019

## Programme and abstracts

**Friday, 7 June**

**8.45 Registration**
**9.00–9.20 Opening**

**Levant and Mesopotamia. Chair: Raz Kletter**

**9.20–10.00 Ayelet Gilboa** (Haifa), From Ugarit to Tyre via Dor: An outline of Commercial hubs along the Levantine coast through the 13th to 9th centuries BCE

**10.00–10.40 Tim Harrison** (Toronto), Continuity and Change in the Early Iron Age Northern Levant

10.40–11.00 Coffee pause

**Chair: Peeter Espak**

**11.00–11.40 Vladimir Sazonov** (Tartu) / **Sebastian Fink** (Helsinki), The 12th century collapse and Assyria: turning point or "usual crisis"

**11.40–12.20 Joanna Töyräänvuori** (Helsinki), Rebuilding Society: Changes in the Political Organisation of Northern Syria following the Bronze Age Collapse

12.20–14.00 Lunch

**Phoenicia and Palestine. Chair: Amar Annus**

**14.00–14.40 Carol Bell** (London), Reflections on the westward expansion of the Phoenicians in the Early Iron Age: the search for silver and technology transfer

**14.40–15.20 Andres Nõmmik** (Helsinki), Differences in the development of the Early Iron Age cities in Philistia

**15.20–16.00 Łukasz Niesiołowski-Spano** (Warsaw), Canaan in the Early Iron Age: Different strategies and circumstances. The case of the Sea Peoples, Canaanites, and Israelites (ca. 1150–850)

16.00–16.20 Coffee pause

**16.20–17.00 Urmas Nõmmik** (Tartu), Any Use of Biblical Sources? Biblical Narrative Texts and Early Iron Age Political Relations in Israel

**17.00–17.40 Raz Kletter** (Helsinki), The Case of Judah

19.00 Reception

**Saturday, 8 June**

**Cyprus and Aegean. Chair: Ivo Volt**

**9.00–9.40 Maria Iacovou** (Univ. of Cyprus), The Cyprus response "from within": A region specific landscape approach to the island's political geography (12th–6th c. BC)

**9.40–10.20 Saro Wallace** (Manchester), Exploring crisis technologies: insights from Crete

**10.20–11.00 Julien Zurbach** (Paris), Forms and means of labor mobilization from palaces to city-states: a view from the fields and a view from the workshops

11.00–11.20 Coffee pause

**11.20–12.00 Mait Kõiv** (Tartu), From collapse to monarchy: the social and political developments in the Argive plain in the 12th–6th centuries BC

**12.00–12.40 Hans van Wees** (London), 'Aristocrats' and slaves: the (re-)emergence of a stratified society in the eighth century BC

12.40–14.20 Lunch

**Aegean and Western Mediterranean. Chair: Raz Kletter**

**14.20–15.00 Kurt Raaflaub** (Providence), A Greek Response to Collapse, Crisis, and Recovery: The Invention of Citizen-Communities

**15.00–15.40 Corinna Riva** (London), Sovereign power, agricultural production and sacrifice in the Archaic city-states of Southern Tyrrhenian Etruria

15.40–16.00 Coffee pause

**16.00–16.40 Kathryn Lomas** (Durham), Inscriptions and public display: Literacy and representations of power in south-east Italy

**16.40–17.20 End discussion. Chair: Mait Kõiv, Raz Kletter, Urmas Nõmmik**


**Sunday, 9 June**

**8.00 Bus trip to Tallinn**

# Abstracts
(in alphabetical order)

**Carol Bell** (London), Reflections on the westward expansion of the Phoenicians in the Early Iron Age: the search for silver and technology transfer

Cities on the Levantine coast in the area known as Phoenicia suffered none of the destruction experienced to the north or south at the end of the Late Bronze Age. Having emerged unscathed from this period of upheaval, the distributed, city state, power structure of the region was well suited towards facilitating continuity in long distance maritime ventures to acquire metals unavailable locally in exchange for timber, wine and other locally sourced products. This paper integrates the conclusions of a recent reanalysis of compositional and lead isotope legacy data from early silver hoards in the Southern Levant by Jonathan Wood, alongside other archaeological evidence of trade. In addition to receiving silver from Anatolia, at least by the second half of the 10th Century BCE, we believe that Tel Dor in Phoenicia was an important receiver of silver smelted from jarosite ores from both Cyprus and Iberia. We further suggest that the technology to mine and smelt jarositic ores in Iberia, as well as the ability to cupellate silver from argentiferous lead, may have arrived from Cyprus on Phoenician maritime expeditions.

**Sebastian Fink** (Helsinki) / **Vladimir Sazonov** (Tartu), The 12th century collapse and Assyria: turning point or "usual crisis"

While the Bronze Age collapse dramatically changed the (geo)political situation in the Eastern Mediterranean and brought an end to many political formations, Assyria managed to survive this crisis. We are going to have a close look at Assyria at the time of the crisis, describe how Assyria was affected by it and try to establish how Assyrian ideology was affected by this crisis.

In order to do that we will give three case studies. At first will discuss the main points of the imperial ideology of Tukulti-Ninurta I (ca. 1233–1197 BCE) who brought Assyria to a hitherto unknown height of power. After a long reign he was overthrown by his son and the Empire faced a deep political and economic crisis.

With Tiglath-Pileser I (ca. 1114–1076 BCE) Assyria rose to power again, but only to fall into a long stagnation after his reign. This crisis was only overcome by the successful politics of ambitious Neo-Assyrian kings (Ashur-Dan II, Adad-nerari II, Tukulti-Ninurta II, Ashurnasirpal II) in the 10th/9th century BC.

The "Bronze Age Collapse" was by no means the only crisis that Assyria had to face. However, with this comparative study we try to establish which effect these crisis had on royal ideology, to what extent they caused innovation or, to the contrary, if they fostered the wish for stability and the recourse on real or imagined traditional values and beliefs.

**Ayelet Gilboa** (Haifa), From Ugarit to Tyre via Dor: An outline of commercial hubs along the Levantine coast through the 13th to 9th centuries BCE

As opposed to some traditional views, it is nowadays clear that the centuries following the Late Bronze Age collapse did <u>not</u> signal a total cessation of cross-Mediterranean traffic and exchange of goods, though these were certainly much diminished in scope and conducted in different socio- political environments. The identities of the agents of early Iron Age Mediterranean trade – between roughly 1150–850 BCE – have been much debated. On the Levantine side, early Iron Age commercial enterprises are almost unanimously accredited to 'the Phoenicians', fore and foremost the Tyrians, who are perceived as the immediate and prime economic beneficiaries of the Bronze Age collapse. For the Iron Age, scholarly literature thus sees 'Phoenicia' and Lebanon (usually specifically southern Lebanon) as co-terminus. In this paper I will try to present a more nuanced view of the development of commercial supremacies along the coast of the Levant. It is mainly based on the results of more than three decades of excavations at Tel Dor and on related research.

**Tim Harrison** (Toronto), Continuity and change in the Early Iron Age Northern Levant

It is conventional wisdom that the collapse of the great territorial states of the Late Bronze Age, and with them the demise of the extensive interregional trade networks that fueled their wealth and power, ushered

in a prolonged 'Dark Age', an era marked by cultural devolution, political fragmentation, and ethnic strife throughout the Eastern Mediterranean. The results of recent archaeological fieldwork, however, have begun to challenge this understanding, and a new, emerging consensus suggests a considerably more complex reality marked by both continuity and change. The North Orontes Valley played an important role during this transitional era. In the preceding Middle and Late Bronze Ages (ca. 2000–1200 BCE), the region was controlled by the Kingdom of Mukiš, ruled from Alalakh, located at the modern site of Tell Atchana, situated at the northern bend of the Orontes River. In the latter part of the Late Bronze Age, however, Alalakh came under the control of the Hittite empire-builder, Suppiluliuma, and his successors appear to have incorporated the kingdom into the Hittite Empire until its collapse at the end of the thirteenth century (ca. 1200 BCE). What caused this demise, and what happened during the ensuing centuries of the Early Iron Age, continues to draw considerable scholarly interest. Recent epigraphic discoveries and archaeological excavations point to the rise of a powerful Neo-Hittite state, identified as the 'Land of Palastin', with Kunulua, its royal city, located a few hundred meters from Alalakh at nearby Tell Tayinat. The results of the ongoing Tayinat Archaeological Project (TAP) investigations reveal a remarkably affluent community actively interacting with a wide spectrum of regions and communities throughout the Eastern Mediterranean. The evidence from Early Iron Age Tayinat also highlights the distinctively local, regional character of its cultural development, and the need for a more nuanced treatment of the considerable regional variability evident in the Eastern Mediterranean during this formative period that recognizes the diversity of relational networks, communities and cultural identities being forged in the generation of a new social and economic order.

**Maria Iacovou** (Univ. of Cyprus) The Cyprus response "from within": A region specific landscape approach to the island's political geography (12th – 6th c. BC)

The oft-repeated motto that Late Cypriot (LC) IIC, i.e. the 13th c. BC, saw the climax of urban developments in Cyprus is a cliché that, even when used with caution, creates the wrong impression with regard to the island's political identity in the second millennium BC, and leads to even more problematic assumptions. An array of material data considered as evidence of urbanization appear in a dozen or more sites around the island, but no two of these sites share the same set of urban features; nor is it likely that all these sites had been central places of distinct economic territories. Regional differences become more pronounced in LC IIC – even more so in LC IIIA (i.e. the 12th c. BC) – and they lead to one inescapable conclusion: irrespectively of how it was perceived by its royal clients around the east Mediterranean, the *Alashiya* of the cuneiform textual records had never functioned as a true central state 'at home'. As a matter of fact, if Cyprus had been placed under central control by an island-wide leader, the 12th-century crisis would have devastated the island's economy. Instead, and despite the fact that certain urban centres did succumb and were abandoned (but not destroyed), it would seem that the crisis had an overall beneficial effect. LC IIIA, a transformative horizon, straddles between the old and the new world order, but from then to the end of the Cypro-Archaic period (12th – 6th c BC), the incessant ebb and flow of the island's political geography begins to respond to patterns of which the most pronounced is the 'vendetta' between inland and coastal central places over the island's precious resources.
There are no generic interpretations that can stand up to the steadily increasing spatial and chronological data from the different regions of the island; a holistic approach to the Cypriot phenomenon, as well as to episodes related with the Mediterranean wide crisis, requires that we should have the stamina to study each region separately and diachronically. Hence, an alternative title for this contribution would have been, "From nebulous island polities in the Late Cypriot to veritable micro-states in the Cypro-Archaic: intra island socio-political transformations".

**Raz Kletter** (Helsinki), The Case of Judah

Drawing a trajectory for the area of Judah from the Late Bronze to the Late Iron periods is fraught with practical and methodological issues. There is no "Judah" before the Kingdom of Judah. For certain periods in this range of time data is so scarce that reconstruction becomes mere guesswork. For the Iron Age, readings of biblical sources colour our historical and archaeological conclusions, creating circles of dependence and uncertainty. Leaving aside the much overestimated debate about early Iron II chronologies, we would discuss the thriving later Iron II Kingdom of Judah in the 8th–7th centuries BC vs. the very few, minor Late-Bronze and Iron 1 sites. What case of "reformation" is this, and do demography, economy, 'centralization', or migration illuminate the case of Judah?

**Mait Kõiv** (Tartu), From collapse to monarchy: the social and political developments in the Argive plain in the 12th–6th centuries BC

The plain of Argos in the Peloponnese (southern Greece) was the heartland of the Bronze Age Mycenaean civilisation and preserved its importance in the Greek world during the following periods. The fairly abundant and well researched archaeological evidence for the Early Iron Age and the considerable literary data concerning the Archaic period (8th–6th century BC) allows tracing the lines of development after the 12th-century collapse. We witness both a change of power relations between the communities on the plain where the Late Bronze Age pre-eminence of Mycenae and Tiryns was replaced by the hegemony of Argos, probably established during the Archaic period. On the other hand, the evidence indicates changes in the internal structure of the communities, both immediately after the 12th century collapse and during the following Early Iron Age and the Archaic era. The inter- and intracommunity developments were probably linked and will be considered in mutual connection. It will be suggested that the collapse of the palace society strengthened the collegial principles of the political organisation, based on the restriction of the social hierarchies after the collapse, while the new increase of the elite power during the 8th century produced the rise of monarchy in Argos, the formation of the polis under the dynastic power, and the establishment of the hegemony of Argos over the surrounding pain. The paper will explore the social and economic background of this development.

**Kathryn Lomas** (Durham) Inscriptions and public display: Literacy and representations of power in south-east Italy

Ancient sources almost universally describe south-east Italy as a region of three ethnic groups which formed the main political units of the region, and which are envisaged as an area of three chiefdoms, ruled by what the sources term 'kings'. Until relatively recently, modern followed their lead. This model, however, poses significant problems when we try to integrate it with an archaeological record in which one of the most important features is the development of state societies. Recent research has also suggested that ethnic and cultural frontiers within the region may have evolved over time, and that new ethnic and cultural boundaries may have developed or hardened in the 6th–4th centuries, changing the political landscape and power structures of the region. This paper explores ethnic, state/political and cultural boundaries in south-east Italy through the medium of epigraphy. It examines the ways in which inscriptions, and changes in the epigraphic habit, may have been used to delimit or record different types of space in the 6th–5th centuries BC and examines their role as evidence for different types of collective identity and the boundaries between them.

**Łukasz Niesiołowski-Spanò** (Warsaw), Canaan in the Early Iron Age: Different strategies and circumstances. The case of the Sea Peoples, Canaanites, and Israelites (ca. 1150–850)

Large number of new data appeared, in resent decades, allowing the reconstruction of social, and political situation in the Southern Levant in the beginning of Iron Age. This paper will focus on different circumstances and different strategies undertaken by the groups, designed by the sources as the Israelites (in some archaeological texts as proto-Israelites), the Canaanites, and the Sea Peoples – mostly the Philistines and the Danites.

On the one hand, the history of the groups emerging in the early Iron Age: the Philistines, the Danites and the (proto-)Israelites shall be reviewed. The fact of large differences, or even opposite cultural backgrounds of these groups may shed light on the differences I their settlement profile, and culture.

On the other hand, history of the Canaanites – aboriginal population of Canaan, largely silenced in our sources, has to be studied in contrast to the groups of newcomers and other groups recently emerged from the social melting pot of the region, in early Iron Age (e.g. Israelites).

The aim of the paper is to present the synthetic approach to the socio-political history of the population of the Southern Levant in the period predating the kingdom of Israel.

**Andres Nõmmik** (Helsinki), Differences in the development of the Early Iron Age cities in Philistia

The Eastern Mediterranean area went through a series of changes in the 12th century affecting several regions. One of these was the Southern Levant and the area, which in the later Old Testament narrative became the central location of the Philistines. Four sites in this region, which existed already in the Late Bronze Age, show signs of new material culture, which seems to reflect a migration from the areas further west (like the Aegean or Cyprus).

These settlements – Ashkelon, Ashdod, Gath and Ekron - were all settled around the same time. However, already the settlement process itself shows differences and peaceful as well as violent settlement processes can be distinguished. Certain differences continued to exist during the Early Iron Age, at least some that can be seen in the archaeological material.

This paper will look into these differences of settlement process and the Early Iron Age development, to see, what kind of notable differences can be attested between these cities of Philistia in the Early Iron Age and what could be the reasons for these distinctions. The paper discusses the data from settlement processes, signs of administration and differences between certain items of material culture. Some variations could be accidental, but some depend on the specifics of the location or possibly even on somewhat different origin of the settling groups.

**Urmas Nõmmik** (Tartu), Any use of Biblical sources? Biblical narrative texts and Early Iron Age political relations in Israel

Generally, the dating of Hebrew Biblical texts has undergone a major shift from the end of the second millennium and begin of the first millennium to the second half of the first millennium BCE. After a thorough redaction critical analysis of texts and intensive debates, there still remain texts resp. fragments that precede the Neo-Babylonian or even Neo-Assyrian domination in Syria and Palestine. However, the historical value of these fragments, small narratives and narrative cycles is still debatable. Prior to asking about the connection of the stories to real historical events, one has to understand their connection to established motifs and motif clusters belonging to distinct settings. The early narrative texts in the Bible predominantly belong to the court tradition where the identity of the dynasty and the monarchic ideals are reflected from a distinct perspective. Among specific topics, problematic relations to the closest neighbours strike the eye. The paper discusses the question what can be concluded from texts, such as the Isaac-Abimelech story in Genesis 26 or the Saul cycle in 1Samuel 9-14 about the historical relations of the Israelites and Judahites to the Philistines.

**Kurt Raaflaub** (Providence), A Greek response to collapse, crisis, and recovery: The invention of citizen-communities

Too often we still speak of "Greece" and "the Greeks," as if Greece had been one country with a homogeneous culture and shared institutions. We know, of course, that particularly the north of the Balkan peninsula (Thessaly and Macedonia) differed markedly from its central and southern sections both geographically and politically, and that its northwestern part again shows substantial differences. Yet these "different areas" are frequently ignored ("Macedonian Studies," for example, are a distinct category of scholarship), and what most of us mean by our reductionist understanding of "ancient Greece" are the central and southern parts and the coasts surrounding the Aegean. From the eighth to the sixth century, this area, together with vast coastal sections along the Mediterranean and the Black Sea that were settled by emigration, indeed developed, despite a wide range of variations, a certain homogeneity that was based on a form of community called *polis*. Recent research has made us fully aware that the *polis* was not a "city-state" but a "citizen-state" or "citizen community," a *Bürgergemeinde*, and that the number of *poleis* eventually amounted to c. 1,500. Apart from a few exceptionally large and dominant ones, most of these *poleis* were small, but all were independent and fiercely determined to keep it that way. (Partially similar communities developed in Italy; for reasons of space and time, I do not pursue these parallels here.)

In the sixth and fifth centuries, a relatively small minority of these *poleis* introduced a form of government they called *dēmokratia*, in which power was generally shared by all citizens, irrespective of birth, wealth, status, education, etc. Most of the other *poleis* were "oligarchic" in one way or other (usually bestowing active political rights to the landowning citizens qualified to serve in the army, but excluding the lower-class citizens not qualified to serve). Even so, they all shared three crucial

characteristics: (1) communal decisions, legislation, and jurisdiction were entrusted, in early forms of popular sovereignty, to a collective of citizens (the number of which depended on community size and constitution); (2) rule by both an exceedingly narrow oligarchy and an individual were considered "tyrannical" and incompatible with a free *polis*; (3) despite the importance of gods in communal cults and popular beliefs, politics and political thought were essentially disconnected from the sphere of the divine.

We can date the "breakthrough period" when these features began to be realized roughly to the late seventh and early sixth centuries. At the time, I posit, they were unique: no precedents or parallels are known in the entire ancient world, from Near Eastern societies to early China. Their introduction also marks a rupture in a cultural *koinē* in which some political features (especially patterns of political thought and the roles of councils and assemblies) had been widely shared among Near Eastern, Israelite, and Greek societies. Henceforth in the sphere of politics Greek *polis* societies pursued a path that deviated increasingly from that of their eastern neighbors and enabled them to develop forms of political thought and action that even today underlie the ways we think and do politics.

My paper has two purposes. (1) I want to substantiate both my claims about a partial early Iron Age east-west *koinē* in political thought and action, and those about the break-away from this *koinē* in the world of archaic Greek *poleis*. (2) I want to explore possible answers to important questions that are raised by these claims. The main problem on which I will focus is why and how the early archaic Greeks found a response to collapse, crisis, and recovery in an unprecedented form of community that placed power in the hands of a collective of citizens. The framework within which I will try to find answers is given by a number of what I consider facts (although my formulation of these facts is certainly too general and debate is still ongoing on several of them): (a) The recovery at the end of the "Dark Ages" in Greece did not include the restoration of the type of royal power and territorial kingdoms that the "Mycenaean" society in the late Bronze Age had shared with the ancient Near East. By contrast, despite setbacks and some irreversible destructions, after the "great collapse" the socio-political structures of the Near East continued without fundamental changes. (b) In Greece continuity through the Dark Ages is visible in various spheres of life (such as aspects of material culture or religion) but much less so, if at all, in other spheres (such as, in particular, communal and political structures). (c) Various forms of egalitarianism were characteristic of the Greek *polis* from early on, and it was in the polis that the development toward popular sovereignty took place that we observe in the "breakthrough period" mentioned above. Conversely, upon current knowledge, fairly frequent attestations of "collective governance" in the ancient Near East did not develop into the forms of popular sovereignty that are typical of the Greek *polis*.

## Corinna Riva (London), Sovereign power, agricultural production and sacrifice in the Archaic city-states of Southern Tyrrhenian Etruria

Religious cult in Archaic Etruria is often examined from a political angle, which gives precedence to the power of elites and/or tyrannical power, seen as determining local choices of non-local mythological figures and/or narratives displayed in sanctuary and other public or semi-public contexts. The adoption of Herakles as the mythological hero of choice for Tyrrhenian tyrants who exploited Herakles-related myths to legitimise their power exemplifies this interpretative angle. Building on this scholarship, I wish to examine the nature of this power by focusing on sacrificial practices and their role in aiding the establishment of sovereign power, as well as on violence, intrinsic of both sacrifice and of this power. Juxtaposing evidence from sanctuary and funerary elite contexts, from the 7thto the 6thcenturies BC, will furthermore enable me to trace an evolution of violence itself seen through the negotiation, if not manipulation, of cultural difference as a form of social, i.e. elite, power. Lastly, I wish to examine these transformations in relation to our evidence of changing agricultural production. My contribution therefore wishes to cover the following themes proposed by the workshop organisers: the economic basis of the elite power (2); the legimiation of power, the mutual relation of power ideologies and socio-political systems (6); the effects of cultural contacts and inter-state relations on internal development (7).

## Joanna Töyräänvuori (Helsinki), Rebuilding society: Changes in the political organisation of Northern Syria following the Bronze Age collapse

The Bronze Age collapse caused a number of changes in both the political organisation and its underlying ideology in the northern Syrian area. Where prior to the collapse political power had been centralized and local rulers had deferred to more powerful masters even to the level of the Great Kings of the Hittites and the Egyptians, in the post-collapse landscape government was atomized, settlements ruralized, and independent petty kingdoms flourished. One of the disappearing symbols of authority in the area were the

weapons of the Storm god of Aleppo, the last mentions of which are found in Luwian inscriptions of the 9th century. Following this time, the central cultic site of Aleppo, its divinity from which the Northern Syrian kings had derived their divine right to rule, and the weapons of this god that had been used to secure the political organisation of Northern Syrian kingdoms diminished in prominence, giving rise to new systems of governance where Syro-Hittite kings competed for alliances with the rising Neo-Assyrian Empire and ruled with the help of their ancestral deities.

### Saro Wallace (Manchester), Exploring crisis technologies: insights from Crete

We know the period from c. 1200 BC in the east Mediterranean is one of socioeconomic crisis: it is also one of cultural innovation. How do the two relate? Archaeological thought on process in this regard can be productively revisited using our increasingly detailed knowledge of the nature of this particular crisis, especially at regional level. Does crisis tend to produce technological regression as elites disappear and complex systems break down? Do moving populations have a predictably important role in transforming technology? And does crisis tend to provide a freeing-up space for innovation to occur? How do such patterns, if standard, relate to one another? And what do they say about the predictability of crisis as a process generally? Here I look at three levels of data resolution with the aim of addressing these questions: the wider Mediterranean crisis context, the particular cultural responses seen in the Aegean, and individual patterns of cultural change (including technologies of settlement, ceramics, metals and clothworking) in the north Lasithi area of Crete, in partial connection to my work at the well-known crisis-founded town of Karfi.

### Hans van Wees (London), 'Aristocrats' and slaves: the (re-)emergence of a stratified society in the eighth century BC

The egalitarian material culture in the Greek world detected by some archaeologists from c. 750 BC onwards may not reflect egalitarianism across entire communities but only within an elite, and could be evidence for the (re-)emergence of a stratified society in the eighth century. At the same time, the spread of chattel slavery, traditionally dated to c. 600 BC in Greece, can plausibly be traced back much further, to c. 750 BC if not earlier. This paper will therefore argue that a key social and economic development of the mid-eighth century was the rise of a distinct 'leisure class', hand-in-hand with the rise of chattel slavery as a major form labour exploitation that provided this leisure class with most of its revenue.

### Julien Zurbach (Paris), Forms and means of labor mobilization from palaces to city-states: a view from the fields and a view from the workshops

The collapse of the palatial system shortly after 1200 in the Aegean and Anatolia has modified deeply the economic structures of elite power and the very nature of the social power of elites. I have argued that the post-collapse generation saw a redefinition of social domination through the merging of what remained of palatial aristocracy with the elite of the local communities. The Mycenaean palatial system was a centralized economy drawing resources from all parts of society towards the center. It remains hard to say if it was also redistributive: resources did go back from the palatial center to some definite groups like craftsmen and the military, but it is not clear if this is sufficient to make it a redistributive system. In any case, the palace had a series of means of control and mobilization of agricultural, but before all specialized workforce. We will try to follow the possible evolution of these means through to the early Archaic city-states, underlining how the survival, conservation and revival of old means in new contexts is a fundamental aspect of the rise of new elites.