

The Magical Key to the Path of Reasoning
Presentation of Collected Topics Which Reveal the Meaning
of the Texts on Valid Cognition

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I bow down to the lamas and to the Protector Manjushri.
Homage to the former scholars and adepts of the country of Superiors and Tibet,
The great beings Dignaga, Dharmakirti, and so forth
Who clarified with valid cognition the path of reasoning well spoken
By the Valid Teacher seeing the meaning of reality.

Here with respect to *The Presentation of Collected Topics Opening the Door to the Path of Reasoning*, there are three, *The Presentation of the Smaller Path of Reasoning*, *The Presentation of the Middling Path of Reasoning* and *The Presentation of the Greater Path of Reasoning*.

I. Explanation of the Small Path of Reasoning

A. Explanation of Colors – White, Red and So Forth

From among (the seven topics in) the small path of reasoning, regarding the first (A.) explanation of colors – white, red and so forth, from the three, (1.) refutation [of mistaken views], (2.) presentation [of our own system], and (3.) dispelling [objections], as for the first [refutation of mistaken views]:

1. Refutation of Mistaken Views

Debate A-1 (p.222)

If someone [a hypothetical Defender] says, "Whatever is a color is necessarily red," [the Sūtra School Challenger responds to him,] "It [absurdly] follows that the subject, the color of a white religious conch, is red because of being a color. You asserted the pervasion [that whatever is a color is necessarily red]."

If he says that the reason [that the color of a white religious conch is a color] is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject, the color of a white religious conch, is a color because of being white."

If he says the reason [that the color of a white religious conch is white] is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject, the color of a white religious conch, is white because of being one with the color of a white religious conch."

If he accepts the basic consequence [that the color of a white religious conch is red, the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject, the color of a white religious conch, is not red because of being white."

If he says there is no pervasion [i.e., even though it is true that the color of a white religious conch is white, it is not the case that whatever is white is necessarily not red, the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that there is pervasion [i.e., whatever is white is necessarily not red] because a common locus of the two, white and red, does not exist; because those two [white and red] are mutually exclusive."

Debate A-2 (p.224)

If someone [a hypothetical Defender] says, "Whatever is a color is necessarily white," [the Sūtra School Challenger responds to him,] "It [absurdly] follows that the subject, the color of the Buddha Amitayus, is white because of being a color. You asserted the pervasion [that whatever is a color is necessarily white]."

If he says that the reason [that the color of the Buddha Amitayus is a color] is not established [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject, the color of the Buddha Amitayus, is a color because of being suitable as a hue."

If he says there is no pervasion [i.e., even though it is true that the color of the Buddha Amitayus is suitable as a hue, it is not the case that whatever is suitable as a hue is necessarily a color, the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that there is pervasion in that [i.e., whatever is suitable as a hue is necessarily a color] because suitable as a hue is the definition of color."

If he accepts the basic consequence [that the color of the Buddha Amitayus is white, the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject, the color of the Buddha Amitayus, is not white because of being red."

If he says the reason [that the color of the Buddha Amitayus is red] is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject, the color of the Buddha Amitayus, is red because of being the isolate of the color of the Buddha Amitayus."

If he says that the reason [that the color of the Buddha Amitayus is the isolate of the color of the Buddha Amitayus] is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows with respect to the subject, the color of the Buddha Amitayus, that it is its own isolate because it is an established base."

Debate A-3 (p.231)

If someone [a hypothetical Defender] says, "Whatever is a color is necessarily yellow," [the Sūtra School Challenger responds to him,] "It [absurdly] follows that the subject, the color of a sapphire, is yellow [because of being a color]. You asserted the pervasion [that whatever is a color is necessarily yellow]."

If he says that the reason [that the color of a sapphire is a color] is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [the color of a sapphire] is [a color] because of being a primary color."

If he says that the reason [that the color of a sapphire is a primary color] is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [the color of a sapphire] is [a primary color] because of being one of the four—blue, yellow, white and red."

If he accepts the basic consequence [that the color of a sapphire is yellow, the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [the color of a sapphire] is not yellow because of being blue."

[If he says there is no pervasion, i.e., even though it is true that the color of a sapphire is blue, it is not the case that whatever is blue is necessarily not yellow, the Sūtra School Challenger responds, "It follows that] there is pervasion [i.e., whatever is blue is necessarily not yellow] because the two, blue and yellow, are mutually exclusive."

Debate A-4 (p.233)

If someone [a hypothetical Defender] says, "Whatever is a color is necessarily is necessarily blue," [the Sūtra School Challenger responds to him,] "It [absurdly] follows that the subject, the color of refined gold, is [blue] because of [being a color]. You asserted the pervasion [that whatever is a color is necessarily blue]."

If he says that the reason [that the color of refined gold is a color] is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [the color of refined gold is [a color] because of being an instance of color."

If he accepts the basic consequence [that the color of refined gold is blue, the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [the color of refined gold] is not blue because of being yellow."

If he says that the reason [that the color of refined gold is yellow] is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [the color of refined gold] is [yellow] because of being the color of refined gold."

If he says that the reason [that the color of refined gold is the color of refined gold] is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the color of refined gold is the color of refined gold because the color of refined gold exists."

Debate A-5 (p235)

If someone [a hypothetical Defender] says, "Whatever is a color is necessarily a primary color," [the Sūtra School Challenger responds to him,] "It [absurdly] follows that the subject, the color of

green Amoghasiddhi, is [a primary color] because of [being a color. You asserted the pervasion that whatever is a color is necessarily a primary color]."

If he says that the reason [that the color of green Amoghasiddhi is a color] is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [the color of green Amoghasiddhi] is [a color] because of being that subject.

If he accepts the basic consequence [that the color of green Amoghasiddhi is a primary color, the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [the color of green Amoghasiddhi] is not a primary color because of being a secondary color."

"It follows that [the color of green Amoghasiddhi is a secondary color] because of being the secondary color composed of the two, blue and yellow."

"It follows that [the color of green Amoghasiddhi is the secondary color composed of the two, blue and yellow] because of being green; because of being the color which is a mixture of blue and yellow."

"[There is] pervasion [i.e., whatever is a color which is a mixture of blue and yellow is necessarily green] because a mixture of blue and yellow is posited as green, a mixture of red and yellow is posited as orange, and a mixture of red and blue is posited as black."

Debate A-6 (p.238)

If someone [a hypothetical Defender] says, "Whatever is a secondary color is necessarily one of the eight secondary colors," [the Sūtra School Challenger responds to him,] "It [absurdly] follows that the subject, the color of orange Manjughosha, is one of the eight secondary colors because of being a secondary color. You asserted the pervasion [that whatever is a secondary color is necessarily one of the eight secondary colors]."

If he says that the reason [that the color of orange Manjughosha is a secondary color] is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject, the color of orange Manjughosha, is a secondary color because of being a secondary color composed of the two, red and yellow."

If he accepts the basic consequence [that the color of orange Manjughosha is one of the eight secondary colors, the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject, the color of orange Manjughosha, is not any of the eight secondary colors because of (1) not being any of the four colors – cloud, smoke, dust and mist – and (2) also not being any of the four colors – illumination, darkness, shadow and sunlight.

The reasons are established individually because of being one with the color of orange Manjughosha.

Debate A-7 (p244)

If someone [a hypothetical Defender] says, "Whatever is a form is necessarily a shape-form," [the Sūtra School Challenger responds to him,] "It [absurdly] follows that the subject, a color-form, is [a shape-form] because of [being a form]. You asserted the pervasion [that whatever is a form is necessarily a shape-form]."

If he says that the reason [that a color-form is a form] is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [a color-form] is [a form] because of being matter."

If he says that the reason [that a color-form is matter] is not established [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [a color-form] is [matter] because of being atomically established."

If he accepts the basic consequence [that a color form is a shape-form, the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [a color-form] is not a shape-form because of being one with a color-form."

If he says that the reason [that a color-form is one with a color-form] is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows with respect to the subject [a color-form] that it is one with itself because it is an existent."

Debate A-8 (p.246)

If someone [a hypothetical Defender] says, "Whatever is a form is necessarily a color-form," [the Sūtra School Challenger responds to him,] "It [absurdly] follows that the subject, a round form, is [a

color-form] because of [being a form]. You asserted the pervasion [that whatever is a form is necessarily a color-form]."

If he says that the reason [that a round form is a form] is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [a round form] is [a form] because of being a form source."

If he accepts the basic consequence [that a round form is a color-form, the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [a round form] is not a color-form because of not being a color."

"[It follows that] there is a pervasion [i.e., whatever is not a color is necessarily not a color-form] because color-form and color are mutually inclusive and the two, shape-form and shape, are mutually inclusive."

2. Presentation of Our Own System

There is a definition of a form because that which is suitable as a form is the definition of a form. The two, form and matter, are mutually inclusive. If forms are divided, there are five consisting of form-sources, sound-sources, odor-sources, taste-sources, and tangible-object-sources.

There is a definition of a form-source because an object apprehended by an eye consciousness is the definition of a form-source. If form-sources are divided, there are two because there are the two, shapes and colors.

There is a definition of a shape because that which is suitable to be shown as a shape is the definition of a shape. If [shapes] are divided, there are eight because there are the eight consisting of long, short, high, low, square, round, level and non-level forms. A square has four corners. A round [shape] is circular or spherical. Level is, for instance, a shape of even surface.

That which is suitable to be shown as a hue is the definition of a color. If colors are divided, there are two because there are the two, primary colors and secondary colors. If primary colors are divided, there are four because there are the four—blue, yellow, white and red. If secondary colors are divided, there are eight because there are the eight consisting of the colors of cloud, smoke dust, mist, illumination, darkness, shadow and sunlight which are secondary colors.

There is a definition of a sound-source because an object heard by an ear consciousness is the definition of a sound-source. If sounds are divided, there are two because there are the two, sounds caused by elements conjoined with consciousness and sounds caused by elements not conjoined with consciousness.

There is a definition of an odor-source because an object experienced by a nose consciousness is the definition of an odor-source. If odors are divided, there are two because there are the two, natural odors and manufactured odors.

There is a definition of a taste-source because an object experienced by a tongue consciousness is the definition of a taste-source. If tastes are divided, there are six because there are the six – sweet, sour, bitter, astringent, pungent and salty.

There is a definition of a tangible-object-source because an object experienced by a body consciousness is the definition of a tangible-object-source. If tangible objects are divided, there are two because there are the two, tangible objects which are elements and tangible objects arisen from the elements. If tangible objects which are elements are divided, there are four because the four – earth, water, fire and wind – are tangible objects which are elements. There is a definition of earth because hard and obstructive is the definition of earth. There is a definition of water because wet and moistening is the definition of water. There is a definition of fire because hot and burning is the definition of fire. There is a definition of wind because light and moving is the definition of wind. If tangible objects arisen from the elements are divided, there are seven because there are the seven consisting of smoothness, roughness, heaviness, lightness, cold, hunger and thirst which are tangible objects arisen from the elements.

3. Dispelling Objections

Debate A-9, (p253)

Someone [a hypothetical Challenger] might say, "It follows that the subject, a white religious conch, is a color because of being white."

If [another] says that the reason [that a white religious conch is white] is not established, [the hypothetical Challenger will respond,] "It follows that the subject [a white religious conch] is [white] because of being a white religious conch."

[To this the Sūtra School Defender responds,] the pervasion is opposite [i.e., whatever is a white religious conch is necessarily not white]."

Then [the proponent of Sūtra would become Challenger and fling these consequences] at him: "It [absurdly] follows that the subject, a white horse, is white because of being a white horse, The pervasion is parallel."

"You cannot accept the consequence [that a white horse is white] because of [the subject's] not being matter; because of being a person; because of being a horse."

Furthermore, [there is this fault with the hypothetical opponent's position:] "It [absurdly] follows that the subject, a white religious conch, is a color because of being white. You asserted the reason [that a white religious conch is white]."

If he accepts [that a white religious conch is a color, the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [a white religious conch] is not a color because of not being arisen from elements."

"It follows that [a white religious conch is not arisen from the elements] because of being an element; because of being a religious conch."

Debate A-10, (p.256)

Also, someone [a hypothetical Challenger] might say, "It follows the subject, wind, is arisen from the elements because of being one of the seven tangible objects arisen from the elements."

If [another] says that the reason [that wind is one of the seven tangible objects arisen from the elements] is not established, [the hypothetical Challenger will respond,] "It follows that the subject, wind, is one of the seven tangible objects arisen from the elements because of being the tangible object lightness."

"It follows that [wind is the tangible object lightness] because of being both a tangible object and light."

[To this the Sūtra School Defender responds,] "There is no pervasion [i.e., even though it is true that wind is both a tangible object and light, it is not the case that whatever is both a tangible object and light is necessarily the tangible object lightness]."

Extend this type of reasoning similarly to earth, water and fire.

Debate A-11, (p.258)

Someone [a hypothetical Challenger] might say, "It follows that the subject, object of knowledge, is a shape because of being one of the two, level or non-level."

[To this the Sūtra School Defender responds,] "there is no pervasion [i.e., even though it is true that object of knowledge is one of the two, level or non-level, it is not the case that whatever is one of the two, level or non-level, is necessarily a shape]."

If someone were to say that the reason [of the basic consequence, i.e., that object of knowledge is one of the two, level or non-level] is not established, [then the Proponent of Sūtra would become Challenger and respond to him,] "It follows that the subject, object of knowledge, is one of the two, level or non-level, because of being non-level."

If he says that the reason [that object of knowledge is non-level] is not established, [then the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject, object of knowledge, is non-level because of not being level."

If someone were to accept the basic consequence [that object of knowledge is a shape, the Sūtra School Challenger would respond to him,] "It follows that the subject, object of knowledge, is not a shape because of being a permanent phenomenon."

B. Explanation of the Presentation of Established Bases

Regarding the second [from among the seven topics in the small path of reasoning] (B.) explanation of the presentation of established bases, from the three, (1.) refutation [of mistaken views], (2.) presentation [of our own system], and (3.) dispelling [objections], as for the first [refutation of mistaken views]:

1. Refutation of Mistaken Views

Debate B-1 (p318)

If someone [a hypothetical Defender] says, "Whatever is an established base is necessarily a permanent phenomenon," [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject, a pot, is a permanent phenomenon because of being an established base. You asserted the pervasion."

If he says the reason [that a pot is an established base] is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [a pot] is [an established base] because of being established by a valid cognizer."

"[It follows that] there is pervasion [i.e., whatever is established by a valid cognizer is necessarily an established base] because that which is established by a valid cognizer is the definition of an established base."

If he accepts the basic consequence [that a pot is a permanent phenomenon, the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject a pot, is not a permanent phenomenon because of being an impermanent phenomenon."

If he says that the reason [that a pot is an impermanent phenomenon] is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [a pot] is [an impermanent phenomenon] because of being a momentary phenomenon."

"[It follows that] there is pervasion [i.e., whatever is a momentary phenomenon is necessarily an impermanent phenomenon] because a momentary phenomenon is the definition of an impermanent phenomenon."

"It follows that [a momentary phenomenon is the definition of an impermanent phenomenon] because that which is able to perform a function is the definition of a thing, a disintegrating phenomenon is the definition of a composed phenomenon, and a created phenomenon is the definition of a product."

Debate B-2 (p.322)

If someone [a hypothetical Defender] says, "Whatever is an existent is necessarily a functioning thing," [the Sūtra School Challenger responds to him,] "It [absurdly] follows that the subject, uncomposed space, is [a functioning thing] because of [being an existent]. You asserted the pervasion."

If he says that the reason [that uncomposed space is an existent] is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [uncomposed space] is [an existent] because of being observed by a valid cognizer."

If he says there is no pervasion [i.e., even though it is true that uncomposed space is observed by a valid cognizer, it is not the case that whatever is observed by a valid cognizer is necessarily an existent, the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that there is pervasion in that [i.e., whatever is observed by a valid cognizer is necessarily an existent] because that observed by a valid cognizer is the definition of an existent."

If he accepts the basic consequence [that uncomposed space is a functioning thing, the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [uncomposed space] is not a functioning thing because of being a non-thing."

If he says that the reason [that uncomposed space is a non-thing] is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [uncomposed space] is [a non-thing] because of being empty of the ability to perform a function."

"[It follows that] there is pervasion [i.e., whatever is empty of the ability to perform a function is necessarily a non-thing] because that which is empty of the ability to perform a function is the definition of a non-thing, that which is non-disintegrating is the definition of the uncomposed, and that which is non-created is the definition of a non-product."

Debate B-3 (p.327)

If someone [a hypothetical Defender] says, "Whatever are objects of knowledge are necessarily objects of knowledge which being [them] is possible," [the Sūtra School Challenger responds to him,] "It [absurdly] follows that the subjects, the two – a pillar and a pot, are [objects of knowledge of which being them is possible] because of [being objects of knowledge]."

If he says the reason [that the two – a pillar and a pot – are objects of knowledge] is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subjects [the two – a pillar and a pot] are [objects of knowledge] because of being existents."

"[It follows that] there is pervasion [i.e., whatever is an existent is necessarily an object of knowledge] because object of knowledge, existent, object of comprehension, and established base are mutually inclusive."

If he accepts the basic consequence [that the two – a pillar and a pot – are objects of knowledge of which being them is possible, the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subjects [the two – a pillar and a pot] are not objects of knowledge of which being [them] is possible because of being objects of knowledge of which being them is not possible."

If he says that the reason [that the two – a pillar and a pot – are objects of knowledge of which being them is not possible] is not established, the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subjects [the two—a pillar and a pot] are [objects of knowledge of which being them is not possible] because of (1) being objects of knowledge and (2) being them does not exist."

The second part of the reason [that being the two—a pillar and a pot—does not exist] is easy. If he says that the first part of the reason [that the two—a pillar and a pot—are objects of knowledge] is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subjects [the two—a pillar and a pot] are objects of knowledge because of being either one or different."

If he says that the reason [that the two – a pillar and a pot – are either one or different] is not established [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subjects [the two – a pillar and a pot] are [either one or different] because of being different.

If he says that the reason [that the two—a pillar and a pot—are different] is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subjects [the two—a pillar and a pot] are [different] because of being mutually different."

If he says that the reason [that the two – a pillar and a pot – are mutually different] is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the two – a pillar and a pot – are mutually different because a pillar is different from a pot and a pot is different from a pillar."

If he says that the first part of the reason [that a pillar is different from a pot] is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject, a pillar, is different from a pot because of (1) being an existent and (2) not being one with a pot."

Debate B-4 (p.352)

If someone [a hypothetical Defender] says, "Whatever is an existent is necessarily an existent of which being [it] is not possible,"[the Sūtra School Challenger responds to him,] "It [absurdly] follows that the subject, a functioning thing, is [an existent of which being it is not possible] because of [being an existent]. You asserted the pervasion."

If he says that the reason [that a functioning thing is an existent,] is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds to him,] "It follows that the subject [a functioning thing] is [an existent] because of being either a permanent phenomenon or a functioning thing; because of being a functioning thing."

If he accepts the basic consequence [that a functioning thing] is an existent of which being it is not possible, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [a functioning thing] is not an existent of which being it is not possible because of being an existent of which being it is possible."

If he says that the reason [that a functioning thing is an existent of which being it is possible] is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [a functioning thing] is [an existent of which being it is possible] because (1) [it] is an existent and (2) the three – matter, consciousness, and non-associated compositional factors are it.

If he says that the latter part of the reason [that the three – matter, consciousnesses, and non-associated compositional factors – are functioning things] is not established, [the Sūtra School

Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject, the three – matter, consciousnesses, and non-associated compositional factors, are functioning things because of (1) being existents and (2) not being permanent phenomena."

Debate B-5 (p.377)d

If someone [a hypothetical Defender] says, "Whatever is not a functioning thing is necessarily a permanent phenomenon," The Sūtra School Challenger responds to him,] "It [absurdly] follows that the subject, the horn of a rabbit, is [a permanent phenomenon] because of [not being a functioning thing]. You asserted the pervasion."

If he says that the reason [that the horn of a rabbit is not a functioning thing] is not established [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [the horn of a rabbit] is [not a functioning thing] because of being neither a permanent phenomenon nor a functioning thing."

If he says that the reason [that the horn of a rabbit is neither a permanent phenomenon nor a functioning thing] is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [the horn of a rabbit] is [neither a permanent phenomenon nor a functioning thing] because of not being an existent."

If he says that the reason [that the horn of a rabbit is not an existent] is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [the horn of a rabbit] is [not an existent] because of being a non-existent."

If he says that the reason [that the horn of a rabbit is a non-existent] is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [the horn of a rabbit] is [a non-existent] because of not being established by a valid cognizer."

If he accepts the basic consequence [that the horn of a rabbit is a permanent phenomenon, the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [the horn of a rabbit] is not a permanent phenomenon because of not being an existent."

If he says that the reason [that the horn of a rabbit is not an existent] is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [the horn of a rabbit] is [not an existent] because its entity does not exist."

If he says that the reason [that the entity of the horn of a rabbit does not exist] is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows with respect to the subject [the horn of a rabbit that its entity does not exist] because of not being something that holds its own entity."

If he says that the reason [that the horn of a rabbit is not something that holds its own entity] is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [the horn of a rabbit] is [not something that holds its own entity] because of not being a phenomenon."

"[It follows that] there is a pervasion [i.e., whatever is not a phenomenon is necessarily not something which holds its own entity] because that which holds its own entity is the definition of a phenomenon."

Debate B-6 (p.379)

If someone [a hypothetical Defender] says, "Whatever is a phenomenon is necessarily not a phenomenon that has a basis of negation," [the Sūtra School Challenger responds to him,] "It [absurdly] follows that the subject, a pot, is [not a phenomenon that has a basis of negation] because of [being a phenomenon]. You asserted the pervasion."

If he says that the reason [that a pot is a phenomenon] is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [a pot] is [a phenomenon] because of being a composed phenomenon."

If he says that the reason [that a pot is a composed phenomenon] is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [a pot] is [a composed phenomenon] because of being a functioning thing."

If he says that the reason [that a pot is a functioning thing] is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [a pot] is [a functioning thing] because of being able to perform a function."

If he says that the reason [that a pot is able to perform a function] is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [a pot] is [able to perform a function] because of being a bulbous flat-based phenomenon able to perform the function of holding water."

"It follows that [a pot is a bulbous flat-based phenomenon able to perform the function of holding water] because of being a pot."

"[It follows that] there is pervasion [i.e., whatever is a pot is necessarily a bulbous flat-based phenomenon able to perform the function of holding water] because that is the definition of a pot.

If he accepts the basic consequence [that a pot is not a phenomenon that has a basis of negation, the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [a pot] is a phenomenon that has a basis of negation because (1) there is a basis of its negation and (2) it is a phenomenon."

The second [part of the reason is] easy. If he says that the first part of the reason [that there is a basis of a pot's negation] is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that there is a basis of pot's negation because there is a place where there is no pot."

If he says that the reason [that there is a place where there is no pot] is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that [there is a place where there is no pot] because whatever is selfless is not necessarily [a place where] there is a pot."

Debate B-7 (p.382)

If someone [a hypothetical Defender] says, "Whatever is a specifically characterized phenomenon is necessarily a consciousness," [the Sūtra School Challenger responds to him,] "It [absurdly] follows that the subjects, the two—a material phenomenon and a consciousness, are [a consciousness] because of [being a specifically characterized phenomenon]. You asserted the pervasion.

If he says that the reason [that the two—a material phenomenon and a consciousness—are a specifically characterized phenomenon] is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subjects [the two—a material phenomenon and a consciousness] are [a specifically characterized phenomenon] because of being established for the appearance factor of a direct perceiver."

If he says that the reason [that the two—a material phenomenon and a consciousness—are established for the appearance factor of a direct perceiver] is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subjects [that the two—a material phenomenon and a consciousness] are [established for the appearance factor of a direct perceiver] because of being an appearing object of a direct perceiver."

If he says that the reason [that the two—a material phenomenon and a consciousness—are an appearing object of a direct perceiver] is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subjects [that the two – a material phenomenon and a consciousness] are [an appearing object of a direct perceiver] because of being a functioning thing."

"[It follows that] there is pervasion [i.e., whatever is a functioning thing is necessarily an appearing object of a direct perceiver] because appearing object of a direct perceiver and functioning thing are mutually inclusive and appearing object of a thought consciousness and permanent phenomenon are mutually inclusive."

If he accepts the basic consequence [that the two—a material phenomenon and a consciousness—are a consciousness, the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subjects [that the two—a material phenomenon and a consciousness] are not a consciousness because of being a non-associated compositional factor."

"[It follows that] there is pervasion [i.e., whatever is a non-associated compositional factor is necessarily not a consciousness] because the three—material phenomenon, consciousness, and non-associated compositional factor—are only mutually exclusive with each other."

Debate B-8 (p.386)

If someone [a hypothetical Defender] says, "Whatever is a hidden phenomenon is necessarily a generally characterized phenomenon," [the Sūtra School Challenger responds to him,] "It [absurdly] follows that the subject, a gold pot, is [a generally characterized phenomenon] because of [being a hidden phenomenon]. You asserted the pervasion."

If he says that the reason [that a gold pot is a hidden phenomenon] is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [a gold pot] is [a hidden phenomenon] because of being an object realized in a hidden manner by the thought consciousness apprehending it."

"[It follows that] there is pervasion [i.e., whatever is an object realized in a hidden manner by the thought consciousness apprehending it is necessarily a hidden phenomenon] because that is the definition of [a hidden phenomenon]."

If he says that the above reason [i.e., that a gold pot is an object realized in a hidden manner by the thought consciousness apprehending it] is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [a gold pot] is an object realized in a hidden manner by the thought consciousness apprehending it because of being an object of comprehension by the thought consciousness apprehending it."

If he says that the reason [that a gold pot is an object of comprehension by the thought consciousness apprehending it] is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [a gold pot] is [an object of comprehension by the thought consciousness apprehending it] because of being an established base."

If he accepts the basic consequence [that a gold pot is a generally characterized phenomenon, the Sūtra School Challenger respond,] "It follows that the subject [a gold pot] is not a generally characterized phenomenon because of being a specifically characterized phenomenon."

If he says that the reason [that a gold pot is a specifically characterized phenomenon] is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [a gold pot] is [a specifically characterized phenomenon] because of being a functioning thing."

"[It follows that] there is pervasion [i.e., whatever is a functioning thing is necessarily a specifically characterized phenomenon] because functioning thing, specifically characterized phenomenon, and ultimate truth are mutually inclusive and permanent phenomenon, generally characterized phenomenon, and conventional truth are mutually inclusive."

Debate B-9 (p.393)

If someone [a hypothetical Defender] says, "Whatever is a manifest phenomenon is necessarily not a hidden phenomenon," [the Sūtra School Challenger responds to him,] "It [absurdly] follows that the subject a pillar, is [not a hidden phenomenon] because of [being a manifest phenomenon]."

If he says that the reason [that a pillar is a manifest phenomenon] is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [a pillar] is [a manifest phenomenon] because of being an object explicitly realized by a direct valid cognizer."

"[It follows that] there is pervasion [i.e., whatever is an object explicitly realized by a direct valid cognizer is necessarily a manifest phenomenon] because an object explicitly realized by a direct valid cognizer is the definition of a manifest phenomenon."

If he says that the above reason [i.e., that a pillar is an object explicitly realized by a direct valid cognizer] is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [a pillar] is an object explicitly realized by a direct valid cognizer because of being a functioning thing."

If he accepts the basic consequence [that a pillar is not a hidden phenomenon, the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [a pillar] is a hidden phenomenon because of being an object realized in a hidden manner by the thought consciousness apprehending it."

The reason [that a pillar is an object realized in a hidden manner by the thought consciousness apprehending it] has been established.

2. Presentation of Our Own System

There is a definition of an established base because that which is established by a valid cognizer is [the definition of an established base]. If established bases are divided, there are two because there are the two, permanent phenomena and functioning things.

There is a definition of a permanent phenomenon because a common locus of a phenomenon and the non-momentary is the definition of a permanent phenomenon. If permanent phenomena are divided, there are two because there are the two, permanent phenomena of which being [them] is possible and permanent phenomena of which being [them] is not possible. There is something to be posited as a permanent phenomenon of which being [it] is possible because object of knowledge is such. There is something to be posited as a permanent phenomenon of which being [it] is not possible because the two – a permanent phenomenon and a functioning thing – are such.

There is a definition of a functioning thing because that which is able to perform a function is [the definition of a functioning thing]. If functioning things are divided, there are three because there are the three – matter [or material phenomena], consciousnesses, and non-associated compositional factors.

There is a definition of matter because that which is atomically established is [the definition of matter]. If matter is divided, there are two because there are the two, external matter and internal matter.

There is a definition of external matter because that which is atomically established and is not included within a being's continuum is [the definition of external matter]. There are illustrations because a pot, a pillar, and the four – earth, water, fire, and wind – are such.

There is a definition of internal matter because that which is atomically established and is included within a being's continuum is [the definition of internal matter]. There is an illustration because the contaminated form aggregate which is appropriated is such.

There is a definition of a consciousness because that which is clear and knowing is [the definition of a consciousness]. There is an illustration because an eye consciousness is such.

There is a definition of a non-associated compositional factor because a composed phenomenon which is neither matter nor a consciousness is [the definition of a non-associated compositional factor]. There are illustrations because functioning thing, impermanence, and persons – a horse, an ox, and so forth are such.

If established bases are divided in another way, there are two because there are the two, one and different. There is a definition of [a phenomenon which is] one because a phenomenon which is not diverse is [the definition of one]. There are illustrations because object of knowledge, permanent phenomenon, and functioning thing are individually such.

There is a definition of [phenomena which are] different because those phenomena which are diverse is [the definition of different]. There are illustrations because the two—a permanent phenomenon and a functioning thing, the two—a definition and a definiendum, the two—a pillar and a pot, and the two—a gold pot and a copper pot—are such.

If objects of knowledge are divided in another way, there are two because there are the two, specifically characterized phenomena and generally characterized phenomena. There is a definition of a specifically characterized phenomenon because a phenomenon which is established by way of its own character without being merely imputed by a term or a thought consciousness is [the definition of a specifically characterized phenomenon]. There is a definition of a generally characterized phenomenon because phenomenon that is merely imputed by a term or a thought consciousness and is not established as a specifically characterized phenomenon is the definition of a generally characterized phenomenon.

Furthermore, a phenomenon which is ultimately able to perform a function is the definition of an ultimate truth. A phenomenon which is ultimately unable to perform a function is the definition of a conventional truth.

3. Dispelling Objections

Debate B-10 (p.398)

Someone [a hypothetical Challenger] might say, "It follows that that which is suitable as an object of an awareness is not the definition of an object of knowledge because that which is suitable as an object of an awareness of which being [it] is possible is not the definition of an object of knowledge of which being [it] is possible."

[The Sūtra School Defender answers,] "There is no pervasion [i.e., even though it is true that that which is suitable as an object of an awareness of which being it is possible is not the definition of an object of knowledge of which being it is possible, this does not entail that that which is suitable as an object of an awareness is not the definition of an object of knowledge]."

"[It follows that there is no pervasion] because whatever is an established base is necessarily both suitable as an object of an awareness of which being [it] is possible and suitable as an object of awarenesses of which being [them] is not possible."

"[It follows that it is so] because whatever is an established base is necessarily an object of comprehension of both an omniscient consciousness of which being [it] is possible and omniscient consciousnesses of which being [them] is not possible."

Debate B-11 (p.402)

Also, someone [a hypothetical Challenger] might say, "It follows that there is a common locus of impermanent phenomenon and permanent phenomenon because sound is both an impermanent phenomenon and a permanent phenomenon."

[If another says that the reason – that sound is both an impermanent phenomenon and a permanent phenomenon – is not established, the hypothetical Challenger will respond,] "It follows that [sound is both an impermanent phenomenon and a permanent phenomenon] because (1) sound is an impermanent phenomenon and (2) a permanent phenomenon."

One give the answer, "The combined reason [i.e., that (1) sound is an impermanent phenomenon and (2) a permanent phenomenon] is not established."

Debate B-12 (p.404)

Also, someone [a hypothetical Challenger] might say, "It follows that the subject, uncomposed space, is an ultimate truth because of being established for the appearance factor of a direct perceiver."

If [another] says that the reason [that uncomposed space is established for the appearance factor of a direct perceiver] is not established, [the hypothetical Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [uncomposed space] is [established for the appearance factor of a direct perceiver] because of existing for the appearance factor of a direct perceiver."

If [another] says that the reason [that uncomposed space exists for the appearance factor of a direct perceiver] is not established, [the hypothetical Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [uncomposed space exists for the appearance factor of a direct perceiver] because of existing for the ascertainment factor of a direct perceiver."

[To this the Sūtra School Defender answers,] "There is no pervasion [i.e., even though it is true that uncomposed space exists for the ascertainment factor of a direct perceiver, it is not the case that whatever exists for the ascertainment factor of a direct perceiver necessarily exists for the appearance factor of a direct perceiver]."

[If someone were to say that the reason of the last consequence—that uncomposed space exists for the ascertainment factor of a direct perceiver—is not established, the Proponent of Sūtra would become Challenger and respond to him,] "The reason is established because of being an object of comprehension by a direct perceiver; because of being an object of comprehension by an omniscient consciousness."

If someone were to accept the above consequence [that uncomposed space is an ultimate truth, the Sūtra School Challenger would respond to him,] "It follows that the subject [uncomposed space] is not an ultimate truth because of being a conventional truth."

If he says that the reason [that uncomposed space is a conventional truth] is not established, [then the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [uncomposed space] is [a conventional truth] because of being a permanent phenomenon."

C. Explanation of the Presentation of Identifying Isolates

Regarding the third [from among the seven topics in the small path of reasoning] (C.) explanation of the presentation of identifying isolates, from the three, (1.) refutation [of mistaken views], (2.) presentation [of our own system], and (3.) dispelling [objections], as for the first [refutation of mistaken views]:

1. Refutation of Mistaken Views

Debate C-1 (p.442)

If someone [a hypothetical Defender] says, "Whatever is coextensive with the isolate of functioning thing is necessarily a definition," [the Sūtra School Challenger responds to him,] "It [absurdly] follows that the subject, the definiendum of that which is able to perform a function, is [a

definition] because of [being coextensive with the isolate of functioning thing]. You asserted the pervasion."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [the definiendum of that which is able to perform a function] is [coextensive with the isolate of functioning thing] because (1) it is different from the isolate of functioning thing, (2) whatever is it is necessarily the isolate of functioning thing, and (3) whatever is the isolate of functioning thing is necessarily it."

If he says that the first part of the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [the definiendum of that which is able to perform a function] is [different from the isolate of functioning thing] because of (1) being an existent and (2) not being one with the isolate of functioning thing."

If he says that the second part of the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that whatever is the definiendum of that which is able to perform a function is necessarily the isolate of functioning thing because whatever is that [the definiendum of that which is able to perform a function] is necessarily one with functioning thing."

If he says that the third part of the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that whatever is the isolate of functioning thing is necessarily the definiendum of that which is able to perform a function because functioning thing is the definiendum of that which is able to perform a function."

If he accepts the basic consequence, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [the definiendum of that which is able to perform a function] is not a definition because of being a definiendum."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [the definiendum of that which is able to perform a function] is a definiendum because of being the definiendum of the triply qualified imputed existent of that which is able to perform a function."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows with respect to the subject, that which is able to perform a function, that its definiendum is the definiendum of its triply qualified imputed existent because it is a definition."

Debate C-2 (p.446)

If someone [a hypothetical Defender] says, "Whatever is coextensive with the isolate of functioning thing is necessarily a definiendum," [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject, the triply qualified imputed existent of that which is able to perform a function, is [a definiendum] because of [being coextensive with the isolate of functioning thing]."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [the triply qualified imputed existent of that which is able to perform a function] is coextensive with the isolate of functioning thing because (1) it is different from the isolate of functioning thing, (2) whatever is it is necessarily the isolate of functioning thing, and (3) whatever is the isolate of functioning thing is necessarily it."

If he says that the first part of the reason is not established, apply the reasoning from the above proof.

If he says that the second part of the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows with respect to the subject, that which is able to perform a function, that whatever is its triply qualified imputed existent is necessarily the isolate of functioning thing because functioning thing is its triply qualified imputed existent."

If he says that the third part of the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows with respect to the subject, functioning thing, that whatever is its isolate is necessarily the triply qualified imputed existent of that which is able to perform a function because whatever is its isolate is necessarily the definiendum of that which is able to perform a function."

If he accepts the basic consequence [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject the triply qualified imputed existent of that which is able to perform a function, is not a definiendum because of being a definition."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [the triply qualified imputed existent of that which is able to perform a function] is [a

definition] because of being the definition of the definiendum of that which is able to perform a function."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows with respect to the subject, that which is able to perform a function, that its triply qualified imputed existent is the definition of its definiendum because it is a definition."

Debate C-3 (p.448)

If someone [a hypothetical Defender] says, "Whatever is coextensive with the isolate of that which is able to perform a function is necessarily a definition," [the Sūtra School Challenger responds to him,] "It [absurdly] follows that the subject, the definition of functioning thing, is [a definition] because of [being coextensive with the isolate of that which is able to perform a function]."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [the definition of a functioning thing] is [coextensive with the isolate of that which is able to perform a function] because (1) it is different from the isolate of that which is able to perform a function, (2) whatever is it is necessarily the isolate of that which is able to perform a function, and (3) whatever is the isolate of that which is able to perform a function is necessarily it."

The first part of the reason is easy. If he says that the second part of the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows with respect to the subject, functioning thing, that whatever is its definition is necessarily the isolate of that which is able to perform a function because it is the definiendum of that which is able to perform a function."

If he says that the third part of the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows with respect to the subject, that which is able to perform a function, that whatever is its isolate is necessarily the definition of functioning thing because it is the definition of functioning thing."

If he accepts the basic consequence, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject, the definition of a functioning thing, is not a definition because of being a definiendum."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [the definition of a functioning thing] is [a definiendum] because of being the definiendum of the triply qualified substantial existent of functioning thing."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows with respect to the subject, functioning thing, that its definition is the definiendum of its triply qualified substantial existent because it is a triply qualified imputed existent."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [functioning thing] is [a triply qualified imputed existent] because of being a definiendum."

"[It follows that] there is pervasion [i.e., whatever is a definiendum is necessarily a triply qualified imputed existent] because that which is a triply qualified imputed existent is a definition of a definiendum and that which is a triply qualified substantial existent is the definition of a definition."

Debate C-4 (p.452)

If someone [a hypothetical Defender] says, "Whatever is coextensive with the isolate of that which is able to perform a function is necessarily a definiendum," [the Sūtra School Challenger responds to him,] "It [absurdly] follows that the subject, the triply qualified substantial existent of functioning thing, is [a definiendum] because of [being coextensive with the isolate of that which is able to perform a function]."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [the triply qualified substantial existent of functioning thing] is [coextensive with the isolate of that which is able to perform a function] because (1) it is different from the isolate of that which is able to perform a function, (2) whatever is it is necessarily the isolate of that which is able to perform a function, and (3) whatever is the isolate of that which is able to perform a function is necessarily it."

The first part of the reason is easy. If he says that the second part of the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows with respect to the subject, functioning thing, that whatever is its triply qualified substantial existent is necessarily the isolate of that which is able to

perform a function because it is the triply qualified imputed existent of that which is able to perform a function.

If he says that the third part of the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows with respect to the subject, that which is able to perform a function, that whatever is its isolate is necessarily the triply qualified substantial existent of functioning thing because it is the triply qualified substantial existent of functioning thing."

If he accepts the basic consequence [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [the triply qualified substantial existent of functioning thing] is not a definiendum because of being a definition."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [the triply qualified substantial existent of functioning thing] is [a definition] because of being the definition of the definition of functioning thing."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows with respect to the subject, functioning thing, that its triply qualified substantial existent is the definition of the definition of it because it is a triply qualified imputed existent."

Debate C-5 (p.455)

If someone [a hypothetical Defender] says, "Whatever is coextensive with the isolate of functioning thing is necessarily a permanent phenomenon," [the Sūtra School Challenger responds to him,] "It [absurdly] follows that the subject, functioning-thing-which-is-one-with-functioning-thing, is [a permanent phenomenon] because of [being coextensive with the isolate of functioning thing]. You asserted the pervasion."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [functioning-thing-which-is-one-with-functioning-thing] is [coextensive with the isolate of functioning thing] because (1) it is different from the isolate of functioning thing, (2) whatever is it is necessarily the isolate of functioning thing, and (3) whatever is the isolate of functioning thing is necessarily it."

The first and second parts of the reason are easy. If he says that the third part of the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that whatever is the isolate of functioning thing is necessarily the functioning thing which is one with functioning thing because (1) whatever is the isolate of functioning thing is necessarily one with functioning thing and (2) whatever is one with functioning thing is necessarily a functioning thing."

If he accepts the basic consequence [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [functioning-thing-which-is-one-with-functioning-thing] is not a permanent phenomenon because of being an impermanent phenomenon."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [functioning-thing-which-is-one-with-functioning-thing] is [an impermanent phenomenon] because of being a composed phenomenon."

Debate C-6 (p.458)

If someone [a hypothetical Defender] says, "Whatever is an illustration-isolate of functioning thing is necessarily the isolate of functioning thing." [the Sūtra School Challenger responds to him,] "It [absurdly] follows that the subject, a sound, is the isolate of functioning thing because of being an illustration-isolate of functioning thing. You asserted the pervasion."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject, a sound, is an illustration-isolate of functioning thing because of being an illustration of functioning thing."

If he accepts the basic consequence [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject, a sound, is not the isolate of functioning thing because of being different from functioning thing."

Debate C-7 (p.459)

If someone [a hypothetical Defender] says, "Whatever is the meaning-isolate of functioning thing is necessarily the isolate of functioning thing," [the Sūtra School Challenger responds to him,] "It [absurdly] follows that the subject, that which is able to perform a function, is the isolate of

functioning thing because of being the meaning-isolate of functioning thing. You asserted the pervasion."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject, that which is able to perform a function, is the meaning-isolate of functioning thing because of being the definition of functioning thing."

If he accepts the basic consequence, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject, that which is able to perform a function, is not the isolate of functioning thing because of not being one with functioning thing."

Debate C-8 (p.460)

If someone [a hypothetical Defender] says, "Whatever is the general-isolate of function thing is necessarily an illustration-isolate of functioning thing," [the Sūtra School Challenger responds to him,] "It [absurdly] follows that the subject, functioning thing, is [an illustration-isolate of functioning thing] because of [being the general-isolate of functioning thing]."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [functioning thing] is [the general-isolate of functioning thing] because of being the self-isolate of functioning thing."

"[It follows that] there is pervasion [i.e., whatever is the self-isolate of functioning thing is necessarily the general-isolate of functioning thing] because those two are mutually inclusive."

If he accepts the basic consequence, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [functioning thing] is not an illustration-isolate of functioning thing because of not being an illustration of functioning thing."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows with respect to the subject, functioning thing, that it is not an illustration of itself because once [someone] has ascertained it with valid cognition, a non-ascertainment of functioning thing with valid cognition is not possible."

Debate C-9 (p.462)

If someone [a hypothetical Defender] says, "Pot-which-is-one-with-pot is pot's isolate," [the Sūtra School Challenger responds to him,] "It follows that the subject, pot-which-is-one-with-pot, is not pot's isolate because of not being one with pot."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject, pot-which-is-one-with-pot, is not one with pot because of being different from pot."

If he says that there is no pervasion, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows with respect to the subject, pot, that whatever is different from it is necessarily not one with it because it is without a self of persons."

If at the above point where he had said that there is no pervasion he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that pot-which-is-one-with-pot is different from pot because pot-which-is-one-with-pot is a pot which is different from pot."

Debate C-10 (p.465)

Also, if someone says, "One-with-pot is pot's isolate," [the Sūtra School Challenger responds to him,] "It follows that the subject, one-with-pot, is not pot's isolate because of not being one with pot."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject, one-with-pot, is not one with pot because of being different from pot."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject, one-with-pot, is different from pot because of being a permanent phenomenon."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "the subject, pot, it follows that one with it is a permanent phenomenon because it is an established base."

Debate C-11 (p.466)

If someone [a hypothetical Defender] says, "Pot's isolate is pot's isolate," [the Sūtra School Challenger responds to him,] "It follows that the subject, pot's isolate, is not pot's isolate because of not being a pot."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject, pot's isolate, is not a pot because of being a permanent phenomenon."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "The subject, pot, it follows that its isolate is a permanent phenomenon because it is an established base."

Debate C-12 (p.467)

If someone [a hypothetical Defender] says, "Whatever is reversed from not being a pot is necessarily pot's isolate," [the Sūtra School Challenger responds to him,] "It [absurdly] follows that the subjects, the two – a gold pot and a copper pot, are pot's isolate because of being reversed from not being pots."

If follows that [the two – a gold pot and a copper pot – are reversed from not being pots] because of being pots."

If he accepts the basic consequence [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subjects, the two – a gold pot and a copper pot, are not pot's isolate because of not being reversed from [being] different from pot."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that [the two – a gold pot and a copper pot – are not reversed from being different from pot] because [the two – a gold pot and a copper pot] are different from pot; because of being mutually exclusive with [pot]."

Debate C-13 (p.469)

If someone [a hypothetical Defender] says, "Whatever is reversed from [being] different from pot is necessarily pot's isolate, "[the Sūtra School Challenger responds to him,] "It [absurdly] follows that the subject, the horn of a rabbit, is pot's isolate because of being reversed from [being] different from pot. You asserted the pervasion."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject the horn of a rabbit, is reversed form [being] different from pot because of not being different from pot."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject, the horn of a rabbit, is not different from pot because of being non-different from pot."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject, the horn of a rabbit, is non-different from pot because of being ascertained as non-existent."

If he accepts the basic consequence, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject, the horn of a rabbit, is not pot's isolate because of not being reversed from not being one with pot."

"It follows that [the horn of a rabbit is not reversed from not being one with pot] because [the horn of a rabbit] is something which is not one with pot; because [it] is not one with pot."

"It follows that [the horn of a rabbit is not one with pot] because that is non-existent."

2. Presentation of Our Own System

There is something to be posited as pot's isolate because pot is pot's isolate. The two, pot's isolate and one-with-pot, are coextensive. If something is an established base, then it is necessarily its own isolate because if something is an established base, then it is necessarily one with itself.

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that if something is an established base, the it is necessarily one with itself because if something is an established base, it is necessarily not different from itself."

3. Dispelling Objections

Debate C-14 (p.473)

Someone [a hypothetical Challenger] might say, "It follows that functioning thing and that which is able to perform a function are one because those two are mutually inclusive." [the Sūtra School Defender answers,] "There is no pervasion."

"[It follows that] there is no pervasion because functioning thing and that which is able to perform a function are different; because there are [cases of someone's] ascertaining that which is able

to perform a function with valid cognition without ascertaining functioning thing with valid cognition; because ascertaining that which is able to perform a function with valid cognition must precede ascertaining functioning thing with valid cognition."

Debate C-15 (p.475)

Also, someone [a hypothetical Challenger] might say, "Functioning thing, impermanent phenomenon, product, and composed phenomenon, rather than being mere enumerations of names, are one. Similarly, object of knowledge, existent, established base, and object of comprehension are also one, as is the case with the Unequalled Son of Shuddhodana, the Omniscient Sun-Friend, and the Omniscient Sugarcane One."

[The Sūtra School Defender answers,] "this is not correct because the Son of Shuddhodana, the Sun-Friend, and the Sugarcane One are different phenomena."

If one were to say that the reason is not established, [then the Proponent of Sūtra would become Challenger and respond,] "It follows [that the Son of Shuddhodana, the Sun-Friend, and the Sugarcane One are different phenomena] because it is possible for there to be [a case of] ascertaining with valid cognition the basis to which the term 'the Son of Shuddhodana' applies without ascertaining with valid cognition the bases to which the terms 'the Sun-Friend' and 'the Sugarcane One' apply."

{Better to say, "...what base the term 'Sun of Sh' applies to without ascertaining what bases the terms Sun-Fr &c. refer to? The referent basis to which the terms 'Son of Shuddhodana,' the Sun-Friend, and the 'Sugarcane One' apply is one. You've ascertained that base, but not that the latter terms refer to it?}

"Therefore, although the referent basis to which the terms 'Son of Shuddhodana,' the Sun-Friend, and the 'Sugarcane One' apply is one, they are not one because whatever is one must be one from the point of view of both name and meaning."

D. Explanation of the Presentation of Opposite-From-Being Something -and Opposite-From-Not-Being-Something

Regarding the fourth [from among the seven topics in the small path of reasoning] (D.) explanation of the presentation of opposite-from-being something -and opposite-from-not-being-something, from the three, (1.) refutation [of mistaken views], (2.) presentation [of our own system], and (3.) dispelling [objections], as for the first [refutation of mistaken views]:

1. Refutation of Mistaken Views

Debate D-1 (p.490)

If someone [a hypothetical Defender] says, "Whatever is opposite from being a functioning thing is necessarily opposite from being a permanent phenomenon," [the Sūtra School Challenger responds to him,] "It [absurdly] follows that the subject, object of knowledge, is [opposite from being a permanent phenomenon] because of [being opposite from being a functioning thing.] You asserted the pervasion."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [object of knowledge] is [opposite from being a functioning thing] because of not being a functioning thing."

"[It follows that] there is pervasion [i.e., whatever is not a functioning thing is necessarily opposite from being a functioning thing] because opposite-from-being-a-functioning-thing and not being a functioning thing are mutually inclusive."

If he accepts the basic consequence, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [object of knowledge] is not opposite from being a permanent phenomenon because of being opposite from not being a permanent phenomenon."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [object of knowledge] is [opposite from not being a permanent phenomenon] because of being a permanent phenomenon."

"[It follows that] there is pervasion [i.e., whatever is a permanent phenomenon is necessarily opposite from not being a permanent phenomenon] because the two, opposite-from-not-being-a-permanent-phenomenon and permanent phenomenon, are mutually inclusive."

Debate D-2 (p.492)

If someone [a hypothetical Defender] says, "Whatever is opposite from being opposite from being a functioning thing is necessarily opposite from being a functioning thing," [the Sūtra School Challenger responds to him,] "It [absurdly] follows that the subject, a pot, is [opposite from being a functioning thing] because of [being opposite from being opposite from being a functioning thing]. You asserted the pervasion."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [a pot] is [opposite from being opposite from being a functioning thing] because of not being opposite from being a functioning thing ."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [a pot] is [not opposite from being a functioning thing] because of being opposite from not being a functioning."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [a pot] is [opposite from not being a functioning thing] because of being a functioning thing."

"[It follows that] there is pervasion [i.e., whatever is a functioning thing is necessarily opposite from not being a functioning thing] because those two [functioning thing and opposite-from-not-being-a-functioning-thing] are mutually inclusive."

If he accepts the basic consequence, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [a pot] is not opposite from being a functioning thing because it abides as something which is a functioning thing."

Debate D-3 (p.495)

If someone [a hypothetical Defender] says, "Whatever is opposite from not being opposite from being opposite from not being opposite from being a permanent phenomenon is necessarily opposite from being opposite from not being a permanent phenomenon." [the Sūtra School Challenger responds to him,] "It [absurdly] follows that the subject, pillar's isolate, is [opposite from being opposite from not being a permanent phenomenon] because of [being opposite from not being opposite from being opposite from not being opposite from being a permanent phenomenon] You asserted the pervasion."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [pillar's isolate] is [opposite from not being opposite from being opposite from not being opposite from being a permanent phenomenon] because of being opposite from being opposite from not being opposite from being a permanent phenomenon."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [pillar's isolate] is opposite from being opposite from not being opposite from being a permanent phenomenon] because of not being opposite from not being opposite from being a permanent phenomenon."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [pillar's isolate] is [not opposite from not being opposite from being a permanent phenomenon] because of being opposite from being opposite from being a permanent phenomenon."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [pillar's isolate] is [opposite from being opposite from being a permanent phenomenon] because of not being opposite from being a permanent phenomenon."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [pillar's isolate] is [not opposite from being a permanent phenomenon] because of being opposite from not being a permanent phenomenon."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [pillar's isolate] is [opposite from not being a permanent phenomenon] because of being a permanent phenomenon."

If he accepts the basic consequence, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject, pillar's isolate, is not opposite from being opposite from not being a permanent phenomenon because of being opposite from not being opposite from not being a permanent phenomenon."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [pillar's isolate] is [opposite from not being opposite from not being a permanent phenomenon] because of being opposite from not being a permanent phenomenon."

Debate D-4 (p.506)

If someone [a hypothetical Defender] says, "Whatever is something which a permanent phenomenon is is necessarily a permanent phenomenon," [the Sūtra School Challenger responds to him,] "It [absurdly] follows that the subject, only-a-permanent-phenomenon, is a permanent phenomenon because of being something which a permanent phenomenon is ."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [only-a-permanent-phenomenon] is [something which a permanent phenomenon is] because of being both something which something is and a permanent phenomenon."

If he says that the reason [that only-a-permanent-phenomenon is both something which something is and a permanent phenomenon] is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that [something] is both something which is only a permanent phenomenon and a permanent phenomenon because of being a permanent phenomenon."

If he says that the reason [that something is a permanent phenomenon] is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that [something] is a permanent phenomenon because of (1) being an existent and (2) not being a functioning thing."

The first part of the reason is easy. If he says that the second part of the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that it is a functioning thing because of being a functioning thing."

If he accepts [that it is a functioning thing, the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that there is a cause of it because it is a functioning thing."

If he accepts [that there is a cause of it, the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that it is produced from its cause because there is a cause of it."

If he accepts [that it is produced from its cause, the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that it is the effect of its cause because it is produced from its cause."

If he accepts [that it is the effect of its cause, the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that it is related with its cause as that arisen from it because you accepted [that it is produced from its cause]."

If he accepts [that it is related with its cause as that arisen from it, the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that if there is no cause of it, it must not exist because it is related with its cause as that arisen from it."

If he accepts [that if there is no cause of it, it must not exist, the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It [absurdly] follows with respect to the subject, object of knowledge, that it does not exist because there is no cause of it."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows with respect to the subject [object of knowledge] that [there is no cause of it] because it is a permanent phenomenon."

If he accepts the basic consequence [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It [absurdly] follows that the subject, only-a-permanent-phenomenon, is an existent because of being a permanent phenomenon."

If he accepts [that only-a-permanent-phenomenon is an existent, the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that there is not only-a-permanent-phenomenon because functioning things exist."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that functioning things exist because of being selfless."

Debate D-5 (p.518)

If someone [a hypothetical Defender] says, "Whatever is something which a permanent phenomenon is not is necessarily a permanent phenomenon," [the Sūtra School Challenger responds to him,] "It [absurdly] follows that the subject, a pillar is a [permanent phenomenon] because of [being something which a permanent phenomenon is not]."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject, a pillar is something which a permanent phenomenon is not] because of being both something which something is not and a permanent phenomenon."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that [something] is both something which is not a pillar and and is a permanent phenomenon because of being a common locus of something which is not a pillar and is a permanent phenomenon."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that [something is a common locus of something which is not a pillar and is a permanent phenomenon] because of being a permanent phenomenon."

If he accepts the basic consequence, [the Sūtra School Challenger reports,] "It follows that the subject, a pillar, is not a permanent phenomenon because of being an impermanent phenomenon." The reason is easy.

Debate D-6 (p.521)

If someone [a hypothetical Defender] says, "Whatever is selfless is necessarily not both suitable as an object of an awareness which is [it] and suitable as an object of an awareness which is not [it]," [the Sūtra School Challenger responds to him,] "It [absurdly] follows that the subject, a definiendum, is [not both suitable as an object of an awareness which is it and suitable as an object of an awareness which is not it] because of [being selfless]."

The reason is easy. If he accepts [the basic consequence, the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject, a definiendum, is both suitable as an object of an awareness which is [it] and suitable as an object of an awareness which is not [it] because of (1) being the first and (2) also being the second."

If he says that the first part of the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that [a definiendum] is suitable as an object of awareness which is a definiendum because of (1) being suitable as an object of an awareness and (2) an awareness is a definiendum."

If he says that the second part of the above reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that [a definiendum] is suitable as an object of an awareness which is not a definiendum because of being suitable as an object of an awareness which is a definition."

If follows that it is so because of (1) being suitable as an object of a knower and (2) a knower is the definition of an awareness.

2. Presentation of Our Own System

The two, opposite-from-not- being-something and being something, are mutually inclusive. The two, opposite-from-being-something and not being something, are mutually inclusive. Even though one may stack up [the modifiers] "opposite-from-not-being", it is mutually inclusive with a single "opposite-from-not-being". An even number of [the modifiers] opposite-from being" is mutually inclusive with "opposite-from-not-being". If something has an odd number of [the modifiers] "opposite-from-being", it is mutually inclusive with a single "opposite-from-being".

3. Dispelling Objections

Debate D-7 (p.526)

Someone [a hypothetical Challenger] might say, "It follows that opposite-from-not-being-a-functioning-thing is a permanent phenomenon because (1) opposite-from-not-being-a-functioning-thing does exist and (2) opposite-from-not-being-something is a permanent phenomenon." [To this the Sūtra School Defender responds,] "There is no pervasion."

"[It follows that] the reason is established because the two, opposite-from-being-something and opposite-from-not-being-something, individually are permanent phenomena."

Debate D-8 (p.527)

Also, someone [a hypothetical Challenger] might say, "It follows that the two, being non-non-something and being something, are not mutually inclusive because if something both is non-non-

something and [also] is something, then anything would be possible." [To this the Sūtra School Defender responds, "The reason is not established."]

"[It follows that] the reason [that if something both is non-non-something and is something, then anything would be possible] is not established because an object of knowledge is both a non-non-[object of knowledge] and [an object of knowledge].

"It follows that [an object of knowledge is both a non-non-object of knowledge and an object of knowledge] because of (1) being a non-non-object of knowledge and (2) being an object of knowledge."

"Both reasons are individually established because of being an existent."

E. Explanation of the Presentation of the Introduction to Causes and Effects

Regarding the fifth [from among the seven topics in the small path of reasoning] (E.) explanation of the presentation of the introduction to causes and effect, from the three, (1.) refutation [of mistaken views], (2.) presentation [of our own system], and (3.) dispelling [objections], as for the first [refutation of mistaken views]:

1. Refutation of Mistaken Views

Debate E-1 (p.550)

If someone [a hypothetical Defender] says, "Whatever is an established base is necessarily either a cause or an effect," [the Sūtra School Challenger responds to him,] "It [absurdly] follows that the subject, object of knowledge, is [either a cause or an effect] because of [being an established base]."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [object of knowledge] is [an established base] because of being established by a valid cognizer."

If he accepts the basic consequence, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [object of knowledge] is neither a cause nor an effect because of not being a functioning thing."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [object of knowledge] is [not a functioning thing] because of being a permanent phenomenon."

Debate E-2 (p.552)

If someone [a hypothetical Defender] says, "Whatever is a cause is necessarily not an effect," [the Sūtra School Challenger responds to him,] "It [absurdly] follows that the subject, a functioning thing, is [not an effect] because of [being a cause]. You asserted the pervasion."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [a functioning thing] is [a cause] because there is an effect of it."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows with respect to the subject [a functioning thing] that [there is an effect of it] because a functioning thing's subsequent arising is an effect of it."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows with respect to the subject [a functioning thing] that its subsequent arising is an effect of it because it is a composed phenomenon."

If he accepts the basic consequence, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [a functioning thing] is an effect because there is a cause of it."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows with respect to the subject [a functioning thing] that [there is a cause of it] because its prior arising is a cause of it."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows with respect to the subject [a functioning thing] that [its prior arising is a cause of it] because it is a functioning thing."

Debate E-3 (p. 553)

If someone [a hypothetical Defender] says, "Whatever is a direct cause is necessarily not an indirect cause," [the Sūtra School Challenger responds to him,] "It [absurdly] follows that the subject, a functioning thing, is [not an indirect cause because of [being a direct cause]]."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [a functioning thing] is [a direct cause] because of being a direct cause of a functioning thing's subsequent arising."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows with respect to the subject [a functioning thing] that it is a direct cause of its subsequent arising because it is a functioning thing."

If he accepts the basic consequence, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [a functioning thing] is an indirect cause because of being an indirect cause of a functioning thing's subsequent arising's subsequent arising."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows with respect to the subject [a functioning thing] that it is an indirect cause of its subsequent arising's subsequent arising because it is a composed phenomenon."

Debate E-4 (p.555)

If someone [a hypothetical Defender] says, "Whatever is a direct effect is necessarily not an indirect effect," [the Sūtra School Challenger responds to him,] "It [absurdly] follows that the subject, a functioning thing, is [not an indirect effect] because of [being a direct effect]."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [a functioning thing], is [a direct effect] because of being a direct effect of a functioning thing's prior arising."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows with respect to the subject [a functioning thing] that it is a direct effect of its prior arising because it is a product."

If he accepts the basic consequence, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [a functioning thing] is an indirect effect because of being an indirect effect of a functioning thing's prior arising's prior arising."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows with respect to the subject [a functioning thing] that it is an indirect effect of its prior arising's prior arising because it is a composed phenomenon."

Debate E-5 (p.556)

If someone [a hypothetical Defender] says, "Whatever is a cause of functioning thing is necessarily a direct cause of functioning thing," [the Sūtra School Challenger responds to him,] "It [absurdly] follows that the subject, functioning thing's prior arising's prior arising, is [a direct cause of functioning thing] because of being [a cause of functioning thing]. You asserted the pervasion."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [functioning thing's prior arising's prior arising] is [a cause of functioning thing] because of being a prior arising of functioning thing."

If he accepts the basic consequence, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [functioning thing's prior arising's prior arising] is not a direct cause of functioning thing because of being an indirect cause of functioning thing."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [functioning thing's prior arising's prior arising] is [an indirect cause of functioning thing] because functioning thing is its indirect effect."

Debate E-6 (p.560)

If someone [a hypothetical Defender who intends to say, "Whatever is a direct effect of functioning thing is necessarily an effect which is produced directly from a functioning thing," instead] says, "Whatever is a direct effect of a functioning thing is necessarily an effect of what is produced directly from a functioning thing," [the Sūtra School Challenger responds to him,] "It [absurdly] follows that the subject, a subsequent arising of a functioning thing, is [an effect of what is produced directly from a functioning thing] because of [being a direct effect of a functioning thing]. You asserted the pervasion."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows with respect to the subject, a functioning thing, that its subsequent arising is its direct effect because it is an impermanent phenomenon."

If he accepts the basic consequence, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject, a subsequent arising of a functioning thing, is not an effect of what is produced directly from a functioning thing because of arising simultaneously with what is produced directly from a functioning thing."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [a subsequent arising of a functioning thing] does arise simultaneously with what is produced directly from a functioning thing because of being produced simultaneously with the direct effect of a functioning thing."

"It follows that [a subsequent arising of a functioning thing is produced simultaneously with the direct effect of a functioning thing] because, once the subsequent arising of a functioning thing is established, there is no time when a direct effect of a functioning thing is not also produced, and once a direct effect of a functioning thing is established, there is no time when the subsequent arising of a functioning thing is not also produced."

Debate E-7 (p.562)

If someone [a hypothetical Defender] says, "Whatever is a pot's cause is necessarily a pot's substantial cause," [the Sūtra School Challenger responds to him,] "It [absurdly] follows that the subject, a being who serves as a cause of pot, is a pot's substantial cause because of being a pot's cause. You asserted the pervasion."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [a being who serves as a cause of pot] is [a pot's cause] because of being a pot's cooperative condition."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [a being who serves as a cause of pot] is [a pot's cooperative condition] because of being a main producer of a pot, his cooperative effect, which is not a continuation of his own substantial entity."

If he accepts the basic consequence, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject, a being who serves as a cause of pot, is not a pot's substantial cause because of not being a main producer of a pot as a continuation of his own substantial entity."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [a being who serves as a cause of pot] is [not a main producer of a pot as a continuation of his own substantial entity] because there is no pot which is a subsequent continuation of his substantial entity."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows with respect to the subject [a being who serves as a cause of pot that there is no pot which is a subsequent continuation of his substantial entity] because he is a person."

Debate E-8 (p.565)

If someone [a hypothetical Defender] says, "Whatever is a pot's cause is necessarily a pot's cooperative condition," [the Sūtra School Challenger responds to him,] "It [absurdly] follows that the subject, the clay that serves as a cause of pot, is [a pot's cooperative condition] because of [being a pot's cause]. You asserted the pervasion."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [the clay that serves as a cause of pot] is [a pot's cause] because a pot is its effect."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows with respect to the subject, a pot, that it is an effect of the clay that serves as its own cause because there is clay that serves as its own cause."

If he accepts the basic consequence, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [the clay that serves as a cause of pot] is not a pot's cooperative condition because of being a pot's substantial cause."

Debate E-9 (p.567)

If someone [a hypothetical Defender] says, "Whatever is a cause is necessarily a substantial cause," [the Sūtra School Challenger responds to him,] "It [absurdly] follows that the subject, the flame of a butter lamp in its final moment, is [a substantial cause] because of [being a cause]. You asserted the pervasion."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [the flame of a butter lamp in its final moment] is [a cause] because of being a functioning thing."

If he accepts the basic consequence, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject, the flame of a butter lamp in its final moment, is not a substantial cause because of not being a main producer of its own substantial effect as a subsequent continuation of its own substantial entity."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [the flame of a butter lamp in its final moment] is [not a main producer of its own substantial effect as a subsequent continuation of its own substantial entity] because a subsequent continuation of its own substantial entity does not exist."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows with respect to the subject [the flame of a butter lamp in its final moment] that [a subsequent continuation of its own substantial entity does not exist] because it is a functioning thing with respect to which the continuation of its own substantial entity is about to be severed."

Debate E-10 (p.586)

If someone [a hypothetical Defender] says, "Whatever phenomena are the same in terms of establishment and abiding are necessarily the same substantial entity in terms of establishment and abiding," [the Sūtra School Challenger responds to him,] "It [absurdly] follows that the subjects, the two – the color of sandalwood and the odor of sandalwood, are [the same substantial entity in terms of establishment and abiding] because of [being the same in terms of establishment and abiding]. You asserted the pervasion."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subjects [the two – the color of sandalwood and the odor of sandalwood] are [the same in terms of establishment and abiding] because those two are established simultaneously, abide simultaneously, and disintegrate simultaneously."

"[It follows that] there is pervasion [i.e., if those two are established simultaneously, abide simultaneously, and disintegrate simultaneously, then they are necessarily the same in terms of establishment and abiding] because that is the meaning of being the same in terms of establishment and abiding."

If he accepts the basic consequence, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subjects, the two – the color of sandalwood and the odor of sandalwood, are not the same substantial entity in terms of establishment and abiding because of not being the same substantial entity."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject, the two – the color of sandalwood and the odor of sandalwood, are not the same substantial entity because of being phenomena which are produced as diverse entities."

Debate E-11 (p.590)

If someone [a hypothetical Defender] says, "Whatever phenomena are the same type of substantial entity are necessarily the same substantial entity," [the Sūtra School Challenger responds to him,] "It [absurdly] follows that the subjects, the two – a large and a small barley grain produced from one barley head which is their substantial cause, are the same substantial entity because of being the same type of substantial entity. You asserted the pervasion."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subjects [the two – a large and a small barley grain produced from one barley head which is their substantial cause] are [the same type of substantial entity] because of being different composed phenomena which are produced from their own same substantial cause."

"[It follows that] there is pervasion [i.e., whatever are different composed phenomena which are produced from their own same substantial cause are necessarily the same type of substantial entity] because the meaning of being phenomena which are the same or are not the same type of substantial entity must refer to their substantial cause as being the same or not the same; because there is a way of

explaining the meaning of phenomena which are the same or are not the same type of substantial entity."

If he accepts the basic consequence, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subjects those two [a large and a small barley grain produced from one barley head which is their substantial cause], are not the same substantial entity because of not being phenomena which are produced as the same substantial entity; because of being different entities."

Debate E-12 (p.594)

If someone [a hypothetical Defender] says, "Whatever phenomena are the same type are necessarily the same essence," [the Sūtra School Challenger responds to him,] "It [absurdly] follows that the subjects, the two – a white horse and a black horse, are the same essence because of being the same type. You asserted the pervasion."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subjects [the two – a white horse and a black horse] are [the same type] because of being the same isolate type."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subjects [the two – a white horse and a black horse] are [the same isolate type] because of being phenomena naturally able to produce an awareness thinking, 'This and that are alike,' upon merely being seen by whosoever directs the mind toward them."

"[It follows that] there is pervasion [i.e., whatever phenomena are naturally able to produce an awareness thinking, 'This and that are alike,' upon merely being seen by whosoever directs the mind toward them are necessarily the same isolate type] because there is a meaning of being the same isolate type."

If he accepts the basic consequence, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subjects [the two – a white horse and a black horse] are not the same essence because of being different entities; because of being mutually unrelated to each other and factually other."

Debate E-13 (p.597)

If someone [a hypothetical Defender] says, "Whatever is an effect of functioning thing's substantial cause is necessarily a substantial effect of functioning thing," [the Sūtra School Challenger responds to him,] "It [absurdly] follows that the subject, functioning thing, is a substantial effect of functioning thing because of being a an effect of functioning thing's substantial cause. You asserted the pervasion."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [functioning thing] is an effect of its own substantial cause because its substantial cause is a cause of it."

If he accepts the basic consequence, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [functioning thing] is not a substantial effect of functioning thing because of not being an effect of functioning thing."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows with respect to the subject [functioning thing] that it is not its own effect because of being selfless."

2. Presentation of Our Own System

With respect to the second, in our own system:

There is a definition of a cause because a producer is the definition of a cause. The three – cause, effect, and functioning thing – are mutually inclusive. There is a definition of a cause of functioning thing because a producer of a functioning thing is the definition of a cause of functioning thing; because if something is a functioning thing, then its producer is necessarily the definition of its cause.

If the causes of functioning thing are divided, there are two because there are the two, the direct causes of functioning thing and the indirect causes of functioning thing. There is a definition of a direct cause of functioning thing because a direct producer of functioning thing is the definition of a direct cause of functioning thing. There is an illustration because a prior arising of functioning thing is a direct cause of functioning thing. There is a definition of an indirect cause of functioning thing because an indirect producer of functioning thing is the definition of an indirect cause of functioning thing. There is an illustration because a prior arising of functioning thing's prior arising is an indirect

cause of functioning thing. Extend the reasoning in that way to the direct and indirect causes of all functioning things.

If the causes of functioning thing are divided in another way, there are two because there are the two, the substantial causes of functioning thing and the cooperative conditions of functioning thing. There is a definition of a substantial cause of functioning thing because a main producer of functioning thing as a continuation of its own substantial entity is the definition of a substantial cause of functioning thing. There is an illustration because a product which is a cause of functioning thing is a substantial cause of functioning thing. There is a definition of a cooperative condition of functioning thing because a main producer of functioning thing as a substantial entity which is not a continuation of its own substantial entity is the definition of a cooperative condition of functioning thing. There is an illustration because a person which is a cause of functioning thing is a cooperative condition of functioning thing.

There is a definition of an effect because the produced is the definition of an effect. There is a definition of an effect of functioning thing because that produced by functioning thing is the definition of an effect of functioning thing. There is an illustration because a subsequent arising of functioning thing is an effect of functioning thing.

If the effects of functioning thing are divided there are two because there are the two, the direct effects of functioning thing and the indirect effects of functioning thing. There is a definition of a direct effect of functioning thing because that produced directly by functioning thing is the definition of a direct effect of functioning thing. There is an illustration because a subsequent arising of functioning thing is a direct effect of functioning thing. There is a definition of an indirect effect of functioning thing because that produced indirectly by functioning thing is the definition of an indirect effect of functioning thing. There is an illustration because a subsequent arising of functioning thing's subsequent arising is an indirect effect of functioning thing. Extend the reasoning in that way to the direct and indirect effects of other functioning things.

3. Dispelling Objections

Debate E-14 (p.600)

Someone [a hypothetical Challenger] might say, "It follows that there is no substantial cause of a functioning thing because the prior arising of a functioning thing is not [its substantial cause]."

If [another] says that the reason is not established [the hypothetical Challenger will respond,] "It follows that the subject, the prior arising of a functioning thing, is not a substantial cause of a functioning thing because it is not definite to become a functioning thing."

If [another] says that the reason is not established, [the hypothetical Challenger will respond,] If follows that the subject, the prior arising of a functioning thing, is not definite to become a functioning thing because of having become a functioning thing."

[To this the Sūtra School Defender responds,] There is no pervasion, [i.e., although it is true that the prior arising of a functioning thing has become a functioning thing, this does not entail that it is not definite to become a functioning thing]."

If someone [a hypothetical Defender] were to say that the reason [of the last consequence] is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject, the prior arising of a functioning thing has become a functioning thing because of being a functioning thing."

Debate E-15 (p.603)

Someone [a hypothetical Challenger] might say, "It follows with respect to the subjects, the two – a pillar and a pot, that their substantial cause exists because they are a functioning thing. You asserted the pervasion."

If [another] accepts the consequence, [the hypothetical Challenger responds,] "It follows with respect to the subjects, the two – a pillar and a pot, that there is something which is definite to become them because their substantial cause exists. You asserted the reason."

If [another] accepts the consequence, [the hypothetical Challenger responds,] "It follows with respect to the subjects, the two – a pillar and a pot, that there is something which is them because there is something which is definite to become them."

[To this the Sūtra School Defender responds,] "Earlier there was no pervasion [i.e., if their substantial cause exists, then something which is definite to become them does not necessarily exist]."

With respect to the position that whatever is a functioning thing is necessarily an effect of a cause of itself, someone [a hypothetical Challenger] might say, "It [absurdly] follows with respect to the subject, a cause of itself, that [it is an effect of the cause of itself] because of [being a functioning thing]."

[To this the Sūtra School Defender responds,] "The reason [that a cause of itself is a functioning thing] is not established because there is no cause of itself; because itself is a permanent phenomenon."

Debate E-16 (p.606)

Someone [a hypothetical Challenger] might say, "it follows that the subject, a pot, is cause and effect because of being both a cause and an effect." [To this the Sūtra School Defender responds,] "There is no pervasion."

If someone were to accept the consequence, [then the Sūtra School Proponent would become Challenger and respond,] "It follows that the subject, a pot, is not cause and effect because of not being different; because of being one."

Debate E-17 (p.607)

Someone [a hypothetical challenger] might say, "It [absurdly] follows that there is a cause of non-permanent phenomenon (i.e., phenomenon that is not permanent) because whatever is a cause is necessarily a cause of [a] non-permanent phenomenon."

[To this the Sūtra School Defender responds,] "that is not correct because whatever is a cause is necessarily not a cause of non-permanent phenomenon."

"It follows that [whatever is a cause is necessarily not a cause of non-permanent phenomenon] because whatever is an established base is necessarily not a cause on non-permanent phenomenon."

"It follows that [whatever is an established base is necessarily not a cause of non-permanent phenomenon] because with regard to all established bases non-permanent phenomenon is not an effect."

"It follows that [with regard to all established bases non-permanent phenomenon is not an effect] because with regard to all established bases non-permanent phenomenon is not a functioning thing." (phenomenon which is not permanent a better translation?)

Debate E-18 (p.610)

Also, someone [a hypothetical Challenger] might say, "It follows that there is a common locus which is a cause of functioning thing and an effect of functioning thing because there is an effect of a functioning thing which is a cause of functioning thing." [To this the Sūtra School Defender responds,] "There is no pervasion."

[If another says that the reason is not established, the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that there is an effect of a functioning thing which is a cause of functioning thing because a functioning thing which is a cause of functioning thing is a cause."

If follows that [a functioning thing which is a cause of functioning thing is a cause] because that [functioning thing which is a cause of functioning thing] is a functioning thing."

"Furthermore, it follows that there is an effect of a functioning thing which is a cause of functioning thing because functioning thing is an effect of a functioning thing which is a cause of functioning thing; because that [functioning thing] is a subsequent arising of a functioning thing which is a cause of functioning thing."

If someone says that the reason [that functioning thing is a subsequent arising of a functioning thing which is a cause of functioning thing] is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows with respect to the subject, functioning thing, that it is a subsequent arising of a functioning thing which is a cause of it because it is a composed phenomenon."

With respect to what was said, someone [a hypothetical Challenger] might say, "It follows with respect to the subject, functioning thing, that there is no effect of it [i.e., a functioning thing] which is a cause of it [i.e., functioning thing] because there is nothing which is its cause and its effect."

[To this the Sūtra School Defender responds,] "there is no pervasion [i.e., even though it is true that there is nothing which is its cause and its effect, this does not necessarily imply that there is no effect of it which is a cause of it."

[One cannot accept that there is no effect of it which is a cause of it, for] "It follows with respect to the subject, functioning thing, that there is an effect of it which is a cause of it because (1) there is something [i.e., a functioning thing] which is a cause of it [i.e., functioning thing] and (2) that [functioning thing which is a cause of functioning thing] is not a permanent phenomenon."

F. Explanation of the Presentation of Generalities and Instances

Regarding the sixth [from among the seven topics in the small path of reasoning] (F.) explanation of the presentation of generalities and instances, from the three, (1.) refutation [of mistaken views], (2.) presentation [of our own system], and (3.) dispelling [objections], as for the first [refutation of mistaken views]:

1. Refutation of Mistaken Views

Debate F-1 (p.633)

If someone [a hypothetical Defender] says, "whatever is a generality is necessarily not an instance," [the Sūtra School Challenger responds to him,] "It [absurdly] follows that the subject, functioning thing, is not an instance because of being a generality. You asserted the pervasion."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject, functioning thing, is a generality because there are instances of it."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows with respect to the subject, functioning thing, that there are instances of it because a pot is [an instance of functioning thing]."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows with respect to the subject, a pot, that it is an instance of functioning thing because (1) it is a functioning thing, (2) it is related with functioning thing as the same essence, and (3) many common locuses of not being it and also being a functioning thing are established."

If he says that the second part of the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject, a pot, is related with functioning thing as the same essence because of (1) being the same essence as functioning thing, (2) also being different from functioning thing, and (3) if functioning things did not exist, then it [too] would not exist."

If he says that the first part [of the last reason] is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject, a pot, is the same essence as functioning thing because of being the same nature as functioning thing."

If he says that the second part of the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject, a pot, is different from functioning thing because of being a form."

If he says that the third part of the reason is not established, [[the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows with respect to the subject, a pot, that if functioning things did not exist, then it [too] would not exist because if functioning things did not exist, then anything would be possible."

If he says that the third part of the reason above is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows with respect to the subject, a pot, that many common locuses of not being it and also being a functioning thing are established because a sandalwood pillar is such and also a juniper pillar is such."

If he accepts the basic consequence, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject, functioning thing, is an instance because of being an instance of object of knowledge."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject, functioning thing, is an instance of object of knowledge because (1) it is an object of knowledge, (2) it is related with object of knowledge as the same essence, and (3) many common locuses of not being it and also being an object of knowledge are established."

Debate F-2 (p.643)

If someone [a hypothetical Defender] says, "Whatever is a generality of functioning thing is necessarily a generality of that which is able to perform a function," [the Sūtra School Challenger responds to him,] "It [absurdly] follows that the subject, definiendum, is a generality of that which is

able to perform a function because of being a generality of functioning thing You asserted the pervasion."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows with respect to the subject, definiendum, that it is a generality of functioning thing because functioning thing is an instance of it."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject, functioning thing, is an instance of definiendum because (1) it is a definiendum, (2) it is related with definiendum as the same essence, and (3) many common locuses of not being it and also being a definiendum are established."

If he accepts the basic consequence [that definiendum is a generality of that which is able to perform a function, the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows with respect to the subject, that which is able to perform a function, that it is not an instance of definiendum because of being a definition; because of being the definition of a functioning thing."

Debate F-3 (p.646)

If someone [a hypothetical Defender] says, "Whatever is a generality of functioning thing is necessarily a generality of impermanent phenomenon," [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It [absurdly] follows that the subject, different-from-impermanent-phenomenon, is a generality of impermanent phenomenon because of being a generality of functioning thing. You asserted the pervasion."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows with respect to the subject, different-from-impermanent-phenomenon, that it a generality of functioning thing because functioning thing is an instance of it."

If he accepts the basic consequence, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject, different-from-impermanent-phenomenon, is not a generality of impermanent phenomenon because impermanent phenomenon is not an instance of it."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject, impermanent phenomenon, is not an instance of different-from-impermanent-phenomenon because of not being different from impermanent phenomenon."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows with respect to the subject, impermanent phenomenon, that it is not different from itself because it is without a self of persons."

Debate F-4 (p.649)

If someone [a hypothetical Defender] says, "There is no common locus of being a generality of a generality and also being an instance of instance," [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that there is [a common locus of being a generality of generality and also being an instance of instance] because permanent phenomenon is such."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows with respect to the subject, permanent phenomenon, that it is a common locus of being a generality of generality and also being an instance of instance because (1) it is a generality of generality and (2) it is an instance of instance."

If he says that the first part of the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows with respect to the subject, permanent phenomenon, that it is a generality of generality because generality is an instance of it."

If he says that the second part of the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject, permanent phenomena, is an instance of instance because (1) it is an instance, (2) it is related with instance as the same essence, and (3) many common locuses of not being it and also being an instance are established."

Debate F-5 (p.659)

If someone [a hypothetical Defender] says, "Whatever is a generality of permanent phenomenon is necessarily not an instance of permanent phenomenon," [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It [absurdly] follows that the subject generality [is not an instance of permanent phenomenon] because of [being a generality of permanent phenomenon]."

"It follows that [generality is a generality of permanent phenomenon] because permanent phenomenon is an instance of it."

"It follows that [permanent phenomenon is an instance of generality] because (1) permanent phenomenon is a generality, (2) permanent phenomenon is related with generality as the same essence, and (3) many common locuses of not being a permanent phenomenon and also being a generality are established."

If he accepts the basic consequence, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] it follows that the subject, generality, is an instance of permanent phenomenon because (1) it is a permanent phenomenon, (2) it is related with permanent phenomenon as the same essence, and (3) many common locuses of not being it and also being a permanent phenomenon are established."

Debate F-6 (p.667)

If someone [a hypothetical Defender] says, "Whatever is a generality of functioning thing is not necessarily not an instance of functioning thing." [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "That is not correct because there is nothing which is both a generality of functioning thing and an instance of functioning thing."

"It follows that there is nothing which is both a generality of functioning thing and an instance of functioning thing because there is no permanent phenomenon which is such [a common locus] and there is no impermanent phenomenon which is such [a common locus]."

"It follows that the first part of the reason [i.e., that there is no permanent phenomenon which is a common locus of being a generality of functioning thing and an instance of functioning thing] is established because whatever is a permanent phenomena is necessarily not an instance of functioning thing; because whatever is a permanent phenomena is necessarily not a functioning thing."

"The second part of the reason above [i.e., that there is no impermanent phenomenon which is a common locus of being a generality of functioning thing and an instance of functioning thing] is established because if there were a functioning thing which is a generality of functioning thing, then anything would be possible."

Debate F-7 (p.670)

If [in reference to our statement that whatever is a functioning thing is necessarily not a generality of functioning thing], someone [a hypothetical Challenger] says, "It follows that the subject, sound-impermanent-phenomena, is [not a generality of functioning thing] because of [being a functioning thing," [the Sūtra School Defender responds to him,] "The reason is not established."

[If another accepts that sound-impermanent-phenomenon is not a generality of functioning thing, then the proponent of the Sūtra school, as Challenger, responds,] "One cannot accept it because sound-impermanent-phenomenon is a generality of functioning thing; because functioning thing is an instance of sound-impermanent-phenomenon."

It follows that [functioning thing is an instance of sound-impermanent-phenomenon] because (1) functioning thing / sound is an impermanent phenomenon, (2) functioning thing / sound is related with impermanent phenomenon as the same essence, and (3) many common locuses of not being a functioning thing and also sound is an impermanent phenomenon are established."

The latter reason [that many common locuses of not being a functioning thing and also sound is an impermanent phenomenon are established] follows because object of knowledge is such and permanent phenomena is such.

It follows that it is so because with respect to whatever is selfless sound is necessarily an impermanent phenomenon.

Debate F-8 (p.675)

If someone [a hypothetical Defender] says, "Whatever is an instance of awareness is necessarily an instance of functioning thing," [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It [absurdly] follows that the subjects, the two—a prime cognizer and a subsequent cognizer—which are a cause of functioning thing, are [an instance of functioning thing] because of being [an instance of awareness]. You asserted the pervasion."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subjects [the two—a prime cognizer and a subsequent cognizer—which are a cause of functioning thing] are an instance of awareness because (1) they are an awareness [or awarenesses]

(2) they are related with awareness as the same essence, and (3) many common locuses of not being them and also being an awareness are established.

The first and second parts of the reason are easy. If he says that the third part of the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that many such common locuses are established because (1) an exalted knower of all aspects is such, (2) a prime cognizer is also such, and (3) these two [an exalted knower of all aspects and a prime cognizer] are established as mutually different.

If he accepts the basic consequence, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subjects [the two — a prime cognizer and a subsequent cognizer—which are a cause of functioning thing] are not an instance of functioning thing because of not being related with functioning thing as the same essence."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows the subjects [the two — a prime cognizer and a subsequent cognizer—which are a cause of functioning thing] are not [related with functioning thing as the same essence] because of being a cause of functioning thing. The reason is easy."

2. Presentation of Our Own System

There is a definition of generality because a phenomenon which encompasses its manifestations is the definition of generality. If generalities are divided terminologically, there are three because there are the three: type-generalities, meaning-generalities, and collection-generalities.

There is a definition of a type-generality because a phenomenon which encompasses the many which have its type is the definition of a type-generality. There is an illustration because object of knowledge is a type-generality.

There is a definition of the meaning-generality of pot because that imputed factor which, although it is not a pot, appears as a pot to a pot apprehending conception is the definition of the meaning-generality of pot. There is an illustration because an appearance (to a thought consciousness in its second moment of apprehending a pot) of opposite-from-not-being-pot-of-the-second-moment is an illustration of the meaning-generality of pot.

There is a definition of a collection-generality because a gross form which is a composite of its many parts is the definition of a collection-generality. There are illustrations because a pot and a pillar are collection-generalities.

There is a common locus of being a collection-generality and a type-generality because a pot is such a common locus. There is a common locus of not being a collection-generality and being a type-generality because object of knowledge is such a common locus. There is a common locus of not being a type-generality and being a collection-generality because the two—a pillar and a pot—are such a common locus. There is a common locus of not being a type-generality and not being a collection-generality because the two—a permanent phenomenon and a functioning thing—are such a common locus.

There is a definition of an instance because a phenomenon which has its own type engaging it as a pervader is the definition of its being an instance.

3. Dispelling Objections

Debate F-9 (p.681)

Someone [a hypothetical Challenger] might say, "It follows that the two—a pillar and a pot—are a generality because of being a collection-generality." [To this the Sūtra School Defender answers,] "There is no pervasion."

[If another person says that the reason, that the two—a pillar and a pot— are a collection-generality is not established, then the Proponent of the Sūtra School, as Challenger, responds to him, "It follows that] the reason is established because of being a mass composed of the eight particle substances."

If he accepts the consequence [that the two—a pillar and a pot —are a generality, the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subjects [the two—a pillar and a pot—] are not a generality because there are no instances of them."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows with respect to the subjects, [the two—a pillar and a pot—that there are no instances of them] because they are objects of knowledge of which being [them] is not possible."

Debate F-10 (p.682)

Also someone [a hypothetical Challenger] might say, "It follows that object of knowledge is not a generality because it is not a generality of that which is object of knowledge." The Sūtra School Defender responds,] "There is no pervasion."

If [another says that the reason not established, then the Proponent of the Sūtra School, as Challenger, responds,] "It follows that it is not a generality of that which is object of knowledge because there is no generality of that which is object of knowledge."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that there is no generality of that which is object of knowledge because (1) there is no generality of object of knowledge and (2) the two, object of knowledge and that which is object of knowledge, are mutually inclusive."

If someone were to accept the above consequence, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject, object of knowledge, is a generality because of being a phenomenon which encompasses its manifestations."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject, [object of knowledge], is [a phenomenon which encompasses its manifestations] because of being a phenomenon which encompasses the many which have its type."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject, [object of knowledge], is a phenomenon which encompasses the many which have its type because of encompassing the many which have its type."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject, [object of knowledge, encompasses the many which have its type] because all permanent phenomena and functioning things are included within its type."

Debate F-11 (p.685)

Also someone [a hypothetical Challenger] might say, "It [absurdly] follows that [something] is a generality of non-object of knowledge because that-which-is-not is an instance of object of knowledge." [To this the the Sūtra School Defender answers,] "There is no pervasion."

If someone [a hypothetical Defender] accepts the consequence [that something is a generality of non-object of knowledge, the Proponent of the Sūtra School, as Challenger, responds,] "It follows that [whatever exists] is not a generality of non-object of knowledge because if something were a generality of non-object of knowledge, then anything would be possible."

Debate F-12 (p.687)

Also someone [a hypothetical Challenger] might say, "It [absurdly] follows that there is an instance of non-instance because there is a generality of non-generality." [To this the the Sūtra School Defender answers,] "There is no pervasion."

[If another says that the reason—that there is a generality of non-generality—is not established, then the Proponent of the Sūtra School, as Challenger, responds, "It follows that] the reason is established because object of knowledge is a generality of non-generality."

If he says that the reason is not established, [Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject, object of knowledge, is a generality of non-generality because non-generality is an instance of it."

Debate F-13 (p.689)

Also someone [a hypothetical Challenger] might say, "It follows that the subject, object of knowledge, is not a generality of non-generality because of being a generality of that which is a generality." [To this the Sūtra School Defender answers,] "There is no pervasion."

"The reason is established because that which is a generality is a an instance of it."

Debate F-14 (p.689)

Also someone [a hypothetical Challenger] might say, "It follows that permanent phenomenon is not a instance of sound-impermanent-phenomenon because functioning thing is an instance of sound-impermanent-phenomenon." [To this the Sūtra School Defender answers,] "There is no pervasion."

[This is so, for] "It follows that permanent phenomenon is an instance of sound-impermanent-phenomenon because sound-impermanent-phenomenon is a phenomenon which encompasses its manifestations, permanent phenomena."

"It follows that [sound-impermanent-phenomenon is a phenomenon which encompasses its manifestations, permanent phenomena] because among the manifestations of [sound-impermanent-phenomenon] there are permanent phenomena; because among the manifestations of that there are both permanent phenomena and functioning things."

Debate F-15 (p.690)

Someone [a hypothetical Challenger] might say, "It follows that the subject, existent, is an instance because of being a phenomenon which has its own type engaging it as a pervader."

"It follows that it is so because there is an existent which engages it as a pervader."

[To this the Sūtra School Defender answers,] "There is no pervasion [i.e., even though it is true that there is an existent which engages it as a pervader, this does not entail that it is a phenomenon which has a type engaging it as a pervader] because there is a purpose for the statement, 'has its own type,' as a part of the definition."

G. Explanation of the Presentation of Substantial and Isolate Phenomena

Debate G-1 (p.729)

If someone [a hypothetical Defender] says, "Whatever is a substantial phenomenon is necessarily an isolate phenomenon," [the Sūtra School Challenger responds to him,] "It [absurdly] follows that the subject, a pot, is [an isolate phenomenon] because of [being a substantial phenomenon]. You asserted the pervasion."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [a pot] is [a substantial phenomenon] because (1) it is an established base, (2) it is itself (3) non-it is not it and (4) its isolate is not mutually exclusive with substantial phenomenon."

[It follows that] the first part of the reason [that a pot is an established base] is established because of being an existent."

If he says that the second part of the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows a pot is a pot because a pot exists."

If he says that the third part of the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that non-pot is not a pot because non-pot is a permanent phenomenon."

If he says that the fourth part of the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that a pot's isolate is not mutually exclusive with substantial phenomenon because there is a common locus of being a pot's isolate and a substantial phenomenon."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that [there is a common locus of being a pot's isolate and a substantial phenomenon] because a pot is such."

If he accepts the basic consequence, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [a pot] is not an isolate phenomenon because of (1) not being any of the first three isolate phenomena and (2) not being any of the four similitudes."

If he says that the first part of the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject [a pot] is [not any of the first three isolate phenomena] because of (1) not being an isolate phenomenon which is itself, (2) not being an isolate phenomenon which is not itself, and (3) also not being an isolate phenomenon of the third type."

If he says that the first part of the reason [that a pot is not an isolate phenomenon which is itself] is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It [absurdly] follows with respect to the subject [a pot] that non-it is it because it is an isolate phenomenon which is itself. You asserted the reason."

[It follows that] there is a pervasion because that which is a common locus such that (1) it is an established base, (2) it is itself, (3) non-it is it and also (4) its isolate is not mutually exclusive with

isolate-phenomenon-which-is-itself is the definition of its being an isolate phenomenon which is itself."

If he accepts the consequence [that non-pot is a pot, the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that non-pot is not a pot because non-pot is not a functioning thing."

If he says that the second part of the reason [that a pot is not an isolate phenomenon which is not itself] is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It [absurdly] follows with respect to the subject, a pot, that it is not itself because it is an isolate phenomenon which is not itself. You asserted the reason."

[It follows that] there is a pervasion because that which is a common locus such that (1) it is an established base, (2) it is not itself, (3) non-it is not it and also (4) its isolate is not mutually exclusive with isolate-phenomenon-which-is-not-itself is the definition of its being an isolate phenomenon which is not itself."

If he accepts the consequence [that a pot is not itself, the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that a pot is a pot because a pot exists."

If he says that the third part of the reason [that a pot is not an isolate phenomenon of the third type] is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It [absurdly] follows with respect to the subject, a pot, that non-it is it because it is an isolate phenomenon of the third type. You asserted the reason."

[It follows that] there is a pervasion because that which is a common locus such that (1) it is an established base, (2) it is not itself, (3) non-it is it and also (4) its isolate is not mutually exclusive with isolate-phenomenon-of the third type is the definition of its being an isolate phenomenon of the third type."

If he accepts the consequence [that non-pot is a pot, the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that non-pot is not a pot because non-pot is not a pot."

If he says that the second part of the main reason above [i.e., that a pot is not any of the four similitudes] is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows that the subject, a pot, is not any of the four similitudes because of (1) not being a similitude of isolate-phenomenon-which-is-itself, (2) not being a similitude of isolate-phenomenon-which-is-not-itself, (3) not being a similitude of isolate-phenomenon-of the third type, and (4) also not being a similitude of substantial phenomenon."

If he says that the first part of the reason [that a pot is not a similitude of isolate-phenomenon-which-is-itself] is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It [absurdly] follows with respect to the subject, a pot, that non-it is it because it is a similitude of isolate-phenomenon-which-is-itself. You asserted the reason."

[It follows that] there is a pervasion because that which is a common locus such that (1) it is an established base, (2) it is itself, (3) non-it is it and also (4) its isolate is not mutually exclusive with similitude-of-isolate-phenomenon-which-is-itself is the definition of its being a similitude of isolate-phenomenon-which-is-itself."

If he accepts the consequence [that non-pot is a pot], that has been refuted above.

If he says that the second part of the reason [that a pot is not a similitude of isolate-phenomenon-which-is-not-itself] is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It [absurdly] follows with respect to the subject, a pot, that it is not itself because it is a similitude of isolate-phenomenon-which-is-not-itself. You asserted the reason."

[It follows that] there is a pervasion because that which is a common locus such that (1) it is an established base, (2) it is not itself, (3) non-it is not it and also (4) its isolate is not mutually exclusive with similitude-of-isolate-phenomenon-which-is-not-itself is the definition of its being a similitude of isolate-phenomenon-which-is-not-itself."

If he accepts the consequence [that a pot is not itself], that has been refuted above.

If he says that the third part of the reason [that a pot is not a similitude of isolate-phenomenon-of-the-third-type] is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It [absurdly] follows with respect to the subject, a pot, that it is not itself because it is a similitude of isolate-phenomenon-of-the-third-type."

[It follows that] there is a pervasion because that which is a common locus such that (1) it is an established base, (2) it is not itself, (3) non-it is it and also (4) its isolate is not mutually exclusive with

similitude-of-isolate-phenomenon-of-the-third-type is the definition of its being a similitude of isolate-phenomenon-of-the-third-type."

If he accepts the consequence [that a pot is not itself], that has been refuted above.

If he says that the fourth part of the reason [that a pot is not a similitude of substantial phenomenon] is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It [absurdly] follows with respect to the subject, a pot, that its isolate is not mutually exclusive with similitude-of-substantial-phenomenon because it is a similitude of substantial phenomenon. You asserted the reason."

[It follows that] there is a pervasion because that which is a common locus such that (1) it is an established base, (2) it is itself, (3) non-it is not it, and also (4) its isolate is not mutually exclusive with similitude-of-substantial-phenomenon is the definition of its being a similitude of substantial phenomenon."

Furthermore, "It follows that the subject, a pot, is not a similitude of substantial phenomenon because of actually abiding as a substantial phenomenon."

If he says that the reason is not established, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows with respect to the subject [a pot] that [it actually abides as a substantial phenomenon] because [it] is a substantial phenomenon."

If he says there is no pervasion, [the Sūtra School Challenger responds,] "It follows with respect to the subject, a substantial phenomenon, that whatever is it necessarily actually abides as it because it is selfless."

Hence, there are isolate phenomena which are themselves because definiendum, permanent phenomenon, generality, instance and so forth are such phenomena.

There are isolate phenomena which are not themselves because definition, different, one with pot, the two—a pillar and a pot, and all phenomena of which being them is not possible are such phenomena.

There are isolate phenomena of the third type because instance-of-generality-of-functioning-thing, generality-of-functioning-thing, and so forth are such phenomena.

There is a similitude of substantial phenomenon because functioning-thing-which-is-an-isolate-phenomenon is such a phenomenon.

There is a similitude of isolate-phenomenon-which-is-itself because non-isolate-phenomenon-which-is-itself is such a phenomenon.

There is a similitude of isolate-phenomenon-which-is-not-itself because isolate-phenomenon-which-is-not-itself is such a phenomenon.

There is a similitude of isolate-phenomenon-of-the-third-type because isolate-phenomenon-of-the-third-type is such a phenomenon.

Toward the spread of virtue and goodness.