26.03 Urmas Pappel

Katre Sai: Kokkuvõte Urmas Pappeli longust

Teisipäeval, 26. märtsil 2013 pidas TÜ Riigiteaduste instituudi doktorant Urmas Pappel Rahvusvaheliste Suhete Ringile loengu teemal „Kunagi ei tohi unustada rahvuslikku häbistamist!“ (Hiina-Jaapani suhted)“.

Pappel keskendus oma loengus Hiina ajaloolise narratiivi tekitamisele, milles on oluline roll Senkaku (jaapani k) / Diaoyu (hiina k) saarte piiritülil. Antud konfliktis kerkib esile kolm osapoolt – Hiina, Jaapan, Taiwan, kes kõik on esitanud soovi saarte üle (Taiwan & Hiina vs Jaapan). Saarte küsimus on oluline nii ajalooliselt kui ka geopoliitiliselt, kuna see on rikas kalastuspiirkond ja seal asuvad nafta- ja gaasimaardlad. Lisaks ressurssidele saaksid riigid oma geograafilisi piire laiendada. Hiina huvi selgitamiseks on viidatud ka katsele omandada Blue Water Access, kuid vastupidiselt mõningalt levinud seisukohtadele, ei aitaks see olemasolevate piiride tõttu ligipääsu ookeanile siiski saavutada.

Jaapan põhjendab oma õigust saartele viidates nende 1895. aastani kehtinud terra nulliuse staatusele, mille järgselt Jaapan saared enda koosseisu võttis. Hetkel omab Jaapan saarte üle de facto kontrolli ja hiinlased ei või saarele vabalt siseneda ega kalastuspaatidega läheneda. Saarel kehtib ka Jaapani õigussüsteem, millega mõistetakse kohut sisserännanute üle. Hiina jaoks tekitab lisaprobleeme USA kaitseleping Jaapaniga, mis peaks laienema ka kõnealustele saartele. Jaapan kaitseb enda õigust argumendiga, et kui Hiina saavutab saarte üle õiguse, siis see oleks alles Hiina esimene samm oma imperialistlike eesmärkide täitmisel ning kindlasti ei piirdutaks Senkaku saartega (ilmselt oleksid Jaapan ja Korea järgmised). Hiinlased nimelt leiavad tänapäevani, et Jaapan asub Hiina kultuuriruumis ning peaks kuuluma Hiina koosseisu (samamoodi Mongoolia jt lähemad ja kaugemad piirkonnad).

Hiina ajaloolased otsivad omakorda põhjuseid, kuidas tõestada saarte kuulumist Hiinale. Viidatakse varasemale ajaloole, mil Hiina kalamehed ja kaubitsejad kasutasid saari peatuspunktina ning on mõeldud ka argumendile, mis paigutaks saared Hiina kontinentaalplatoole (maismaa ranniku veealune jätk, kus peaks kehtima Hiina mõjuvõim kuni süvamere piirini). See argument on siiski vastuoluline, kuna sellisel juhul peaksid nad loobuma mõnest teisest saarest, mis kuulub hetkel küll Hiina koosseisu, kuid ei asu nende kontinetaalplatoo peal.

Pappel viitas, et Mao ajastul ei omanud piiritüli suurt tähtsust ja Hiina poliitiline identiteet oli üles ehitatud teistel sammastel (tugev ideoloogia ja klassivõitlus). Kommunistlik „Kõigi maade proletariaadid ühinege!“ ei vastandanud rahvusi ja riike, kus antud klass elab ja seega vaadeldi Jaapanit erinevatel tasanditel ning ei nähtud terviklikult vaenlasena. Võib väita, et veel 80ndatel viha Jaapani vastu puudus – sealt levis Hiinasse suur osa popkultuurist ning alles 90ndatel tekkinud rahvuslik viha oli põhimõtteliselt konstrueeritud.

Kui pärast Maod hakati tähtsustama rohkem majanduskasvu ning vähem ideoloogiat, mis päädis Tiananmeni rahutustega Taevase Rahu väljakul, siis hakati mõistma asjaolu, et pärast tugevat majanduse arendamist on hiinlaste hingeelu tagaplaanile jäänud ning lõhed ühiskonnas olid kasvanud äärmuslikuks (soositi rikkaid ja linnastunuid). 90ndatel alustati hingeravi rahvustunde tekitamisega – loodi rahvuslusel põhinev narratiiv, milles jaapanlasi esitati kui suuri vaenlasi. Isegi noored hiinlased olid kursis Jaapani kurjade plaanidega. Antud narratiiviga kaasnes 1992. aasta territoriaalmerd ja sellega piirnevat vett puudutava seaduse vastu võtmine, millega kuulutati Senkaku/Diaoyu saared Hiinale kuuluvaks. Loetletud põhjustel Jaapani positsioon mõnevõrra nõrgenes ning probleeme tekitas ka 1996. aastal USA poolt Jaapanisse lähetatud saadik, kes viitas saarte de jure mittekuulumisest Jaapanile ning sellega kaasnevast USA kaitselepingu piiratusest antud aladel (USA lükkas selle väite ümber).

Hiina püüdis riiki sisemiselt tugevdada ka läbi võimsa motiivi Century of humiliation, mida propageeritakse igal pool Hiinas väga tugevalt. Lääne ja Jaapani imperialismile vastuseisva Hiina ideel on üles ehitatud terve meedia. Hiinas räägitakse I oopiumisõjast, mis lahvatas otseselt Briti Impeeriumi mõjuvõimu suurendamise eesmärgil. Nimelt himustasid britid Hiina kallihinnalisi luksuskaupu, mida vahetati salakaubana sisseveetud oopiumi vastu ning kui hiinlased osutasid vastupanu, siis otsustati rünnaku kasuks. Kuigi Hiina propaganda on pärast seda suunatud paljude Lääneriikide vastu, siis kõige vihasemalt vastandutakse endiselt Jaapanile.

I Hiina-Jaapani sõda oli esimene suuremahuline konflikt kahe riigi vahel. Kuna Jaapan oli kiiresti moderniseerunud ühiskond, mida Lääneriigid pidasid liitlaseks, siis nõudis ka Jaapan Hiinalt sisuliselt samu asju. Üks antud sõja tulemeid on Hiina rahvusriigi identiteedi väljatöötamine. Kui varem nähti ennast tugeva kultuurina, mida Lääs ei suuda murendada, siis samasse kultuuriruumi kuuluva Jaapani vastuseis sundis hiinlasi tõlgendama oma identiteeti teise nurga alt (kultuuride konflikt ei olnud enam piisavalt mõjuv põhjus). Hiinlased väidavad, et Senkaku saared hõivanud Jaapan ei saa toetuda 1895. aastal sõlmitud Shimonoseki rahule, kuna rahuleping oli sundolukorras sõlmitud ja seega rahvusvaheliselt kehtetu. Jaapanlased väidavad omakorda, et saartest pole rahulepingus juttu ning need hõivati samal aastal täiesti juhuslikult (leping võib olla kehtetu, aga saari endiselt tagasi ei saa).

Järgmine tüli lahvatas 1919. aastal, kui Saksamaa koloonia Hiina piirkonnas anti Jaapanile, mitte Hiinale. Seejärel hõivas Jaapan ka Mandþuuria ning alustas 1937. aastal sissetungi Hiina emamaa piirkonda (alustati Shanghaist). Kui 1937. aastal toimunud Nanjingi veresaun oli Jaapanlaste arvates üsna tagasihoidlik ja kooskõlas ausate sõjaseadustega, milles esines veriseid vastuseise nagu sõjas ikka, siis Hiina väidab, et tegemist oli massiivse veresaunaga, milles hukkus 300 000 hiinlast (Jaapan pakub hukkunute arvuga 20 000 ja mõni eitab üldse selle toimumist).

Narratiivi kulminatsioon on Hiina kommunistliku partei võimuletulek. Partei reklaamis ennast kui jaapanlaste väljapeksjat, ainsat võimu Läänele vastuseismiseks ning Hiina identiteedi tugevdajat. 90ndatel püüdsid Peking ja Tokyo Senkaku piiritüli rahustada, kuid see ärritas Jaapani marurahvuslasi, kes taastasid küsimuse terava vastuseisu. Kui Jaapan alustas merealuste maardlate uurimist ning maad liisiti pealinnale, siis Hiina polnud sellest kuni aasta teadlik ning hiljem ei saanud enam midagi teha. Jaapani mõjuvõimu suurendab ka see, et saartel kehtib Jaapani jurisdiktsioon, millele Hiina ei saa vastu.

Jaapan püüab sõdu ja inimkaotusi tänaseni maha vaikida ning seda iseloomustab Jaapanis asuv sõjaajaloo muuseum, mis nimetab II Hiina-Jaapani sõda China incident´ks, mis jutustaks justkui lühiajalisest konfliktist, mida ajaloos ikka ette tuli ja millele erilist tähelepanu ei tohiks pöörata. Seega vaikitakse palju siiani maha. Sarnaselt toimib ka Hiina propaganda Jaapani vastu. 2012. aprillis tahtis Tokyo linn seni üksnes liisitud saared ära osta ning see õnnestus neid väidetavalt juba detsembris, hoolimata Hiina vastuseisust. Hiina riiklik meedia väidab siiamaani, et nad omavad nimetatud saarte üle kontrolli ning patrullivad nende ümbruses. Hiina on väidetavalt hõivanud ka mõne saare, korraldamaks nn „sõjamänge“, mida võiks seostada tulevikuks „harjutamisega“.

Sellegipoolest viitab Pappel, et Hiina-Jaapani majandussuhted on endiselt väga pragmaatilised ning antud suhete säilitamine on oluline mõlema jaoks. Seetõttu manitseb Peking tihti Jaapani-vastaste meeleavaldustel ülekäte läinud tegevusi lõpetama. Kokku on tulnud ka Hiina-Jaapani-Korea spetsialistid, kes üritavad kirjutada koos ajalugu, mida sobiks tõese ajaloo õpikuna kõigi riikide koolides kasutada.

Konspekteeris Katre Sai

On 28th November, the guest lecturer in RSR was Marina Kaljurand who gave lecture on “Cyber Security – challenges and potential responses”. She has served as the Ambassador of Estonia to USA, Mexico, Russia, Kazahstan and Israel. She has also been the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Estonia. Currently, she is a Chair of the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace.

First time when Marina Kaljurand learned about cyber security was in 2007 when Estonia was under politically motivated cyberattacks. Back then she was an Estonian ambassador to Russia and she had to explain what is happening in Estonia – DDoS-attacks. It was important to talk about this because cyber does not have borders and in this field, cooperation is necessary. She said that states are not allowed to take any illegal actions and according to international law they must stop every illegal action that is transiting their country. It was known back then that cyberattacks came from Russian territory – Estonia had all the legal instruments in place, but the will was missing (there was a cooperation between allies but not with Russia).

In year of Snowden’s disclosure, Kaljurand was posted to the US. She said that the US changed a lot during these times and question of trust was the most important. Estonia was the first country to have a bilateral agreement in cyber security with the US and it was used as a hook to bring Obama to Tallinn (he came later, though). For Estonian diplomats, it is very important to represent our country because usually nobody cares about us and many even do not know (still think that we are part of the USSR). That was the reason we had to find our niche – which is cyber (e-lifestyle, cyber security) – and now it opens the doors and starts the conversations.

Currently there are 84 global bodies dealing with cyber security. Marina Kaljurand is the Chair of the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace. At first, they were hesitating to include Russian and Chinese experts but as it is a global commission, they need people from different countries. They also have Jeff Moss and Joseph Nye, also human rights activists, and civil society experts. Commission is a multistakeholder. Governments need to cooperate in order to be successful because there are a lot of actors in cyber area. There is an ideological division in between of how the ICT is seen – one side (especially the West) sees it beneficial (lets do it!) and another (i.e. Russia and China) side sees the use of the ICT as interfering (colour revolutions, influencing internal politics). It is difficult to cooperate between two divisions.

Cyber is not only for IT geeks, there are so many fields – diplomacy, international affairs, law, etc. For Kaljurand, cyber security is about stability, it is an open, secure, stable, and accessible Internet. 65% of people are not online yet, they are to join us and we need to have stable and secure Internet. She said that we have to raise the awareness to countries who have no idea what is happening in cyber field. Thus, although she had no idea what all the 84 bodies are doing, she was happy that there are so many of them who are raising the awareness.

In 2013, it was decided by the UN GGE that international law applies to cyber space. The question is about how (jurisdiction and sovereignty). When is the sovereignty of a state violated (for example, in case of malware or when somebody really dies because of a cyber-attack?) UN is the only global organization, but it is from the 1940s. UN will never agree on everything, thus we need a division of like-minded states who have the same understanding and norms on how to behave in cyber space. For example, norm is that it is not okay to attack financial institutions during the peace time. Every country should be interested in having common norms, but it is not possible to agree because of the ideological divisions. If UN cannot work on that, then a group of likeminded countries can. Other bodies are the EU and NATO and both have its roles, for example, cyber is the 5th domain of operations (in addition to air, space, land, maritime). There is a NATO Centre of Excellence in Tallinn. The aim of cyber stability is to avoid misunderstandings (confidence building is getting people together, OECD is doing an excellent work there).

Kaljurand also spoke about Estonia’s e-voting. She used Hack the Pentagon – hackers were asked to hack a system to find vulnerabilities – example and she wants to do the same in Estonia with e-voting. She believes that we have a good system but there is so much criticism from abroad and we need a PR-event - Hack Estonian e-voting. We need international hackers for that. Government is not ready yet but she is still convincing it. We need to face challenges but not to step back. It may happen that people perceive it as negative PR (hackers are hacking Estonia) but we need to explain a lot what are we doing and why. We were lucky to have an ID-crisis in 2017 because we started to feel ourselves too comfortable.

What is the future of UN GGE? Has it failed because in the last meeting the participating countries did not reach a consensus?

Internet of Things, terrorism, international law, norms, confidence building measures, capacity building – GGE is looking these five fields. GGE was supposed to write a report (goal was not to go back from what was agreed two years earlier). Kaljurand does not think that coming years show a will of agreeing on something, she said that coming years will be for educating.

She also said that we need to start asking something for return. For example, if some country wants assistance in e-taxation, then it must make a political statement (international law applies to cyber space or a statement about human rights). If a country is not willing to make a statement, then it should ask for an assistance from some other country.

How to deal with Russia and China?

She has no answer to that. Balkanization of Internet (different countries have different Internets). She does not see that we could find common ground with China or Russia because of the big ideological differences. It may happen that states reach the point where they agree that cyberattacks are not okay. 2007 nobody died, it was just humiliating. All the cyberattacks have been kind of mild but if cyber 9/11 happens then the world would come together, and states would have more will and intentions to agree on some rules. It is a grey zone if you do not have rules. People get to together usually when something bad happens, it has not happened with cyber yet.

Tech-people can do attribution, but it has a political dimension as well, as it depends on the politicians (do they have the courage to say it out or not). She referred to former Minister of Defence Jaak Aaviksoo who said that we did reasonable attribution and our conclusion is that when somebody does everything like a dog then most probably it is a dog. Attribution is a political question and increasingly states should say that they were attacked by this or that country.

You can buy cyber weapons from the black market but it’s too primitive. It will change with Artificial Intelligence (AI) and internet of things, it will be cheaper for terrorists. So far it has not been used. KRATT – Estonian law on AI (obligations, responsibilities). Finland, company who has AI in its board, EE-FIN are competing on who will have the law first.

Why are there so many diplomatic efforts (84)?

She does not know what all of them are doing. On the one side, it is good that so many institutions are discussing cyber security. 2004 or 2007 nobody was discussing cyber but today everybody is discussing it. Her commission tries to look at what others are doing. It is good to have so many even if they duplicate. It is important to discuss and educate people.

Cyber security is connected to open internet. Are the EU and US values the same if something goes south?

US is very vocal about open internet, freedom of the Internet. They are strong supporters of human rights online and open internet. There are differences how countries see intelligence etc but basically, we are on the same side. We may disagree on small things, but we share the same principles and understanding.

Could you elaborate more on EU’s role (EU diplomacy toolbox) concerning cyber security?

Cyber diplomacy toolbox – if something happens how do we react. International law allows retaliation. We have regulations. What are the measures in case of cyberattack against a member state? All the rules apply to cyber security (political statements, sanctions etc). The same as the EU has done in the case of Crimea. In the EU it is easier than in NATO. In NATO, there is no mechanism of what to do in case of an attack.

However, there is a problem with the EU and overregulation - EU is very happy when it can regulate something. EU is not a single market, with cyber it is more complicated, there are more regulations. Some regulations are needed because you need to have some frames. You have to know what is allowed and what is not. It is difficult to find a balance.

How Is the cooperation with industries?

Estonia is cooperating pretty well with the industries. All industries (Microsoft, Facebook) complained that governments were not cooperating enough. Industries have ideas. States will not give away authority on retaliation, attribution etc. It is about attitudes (I know how to do my job!). Governments are starting to understand that they can’t do anything without industries. In the end, they have IT-nerds, governments cannot afford them. Hackers are going to school and teach cyber hygiene to students. Teachers were negative until they started to cooperate with the policemen. She said that hackers despite their image are not bad guys.

How much is Estonia an ideal case? How to implement it to other countries?

Estonia is doing well. Other countries need to find what is suitable to them. They don’t need to copy; every country (state) can find something what is interesting to them. Estonia needs to introduce what we are doing and urge others to find what is interesting to them. You can always do the same thing but with going around the corner.

Konspekteeris Kert Ajamaa