13.10 Maria Mälksoo

Alexander Lott: Kokkuvõte Maria Mälksoo loengust

Maria Mälksoo loeng 13. oktoobril Rahvusvaheliste Suhete Ringis teemal: „Euroopa mitu mälu”.

Ühismälu küsimusest Euroopas saab rääkida alates II maailmasõjast. Mälu kõnealuses kontekstis on väga intiimne asi, kehtib mõttekäik „oma särk on kõige ligemal.” Ühismälu kohta on tabavalt tähendanud E. Durkheim: „Ei ole olemas läbinisti isiklikku mälu, vaid pigem kollektiivne, mis sünnib ühes surnutega.” Meie kuvand endast mõjutab suhteid teistega.

Mälusõda Ida-Euroopas

Peamine mälusõja rindejoon jookseb endisel raudsel eesriidel: Venemaa ja endised NSVL-i satelliidid on lepitamatutel seisukohtadel. Suurimaks valukohaks on kõnealuses vaidluses Suur Isamaasõda. NSVL-i tegevusele sõjas otsitakse jätkuvalt üle-Euroopalist konsensust. Venemaale mõjub viimane ärritavalt, mille ilmekaks tõestuseks on Medvedevi poolt kokku kutsutud ajalookomisjon. Komisjoni lähteteesiks on, et ajaloo võltsimine riiklikes huvides pole kuritegu. Baltimaad ja Poola peavad mälusõda aga nullsummamänguna, mis tähendab võitlust identiteediliste lähtealuste eest. See omakorda tähendab tihtipeale ebapragmaatiliste sammude astumist välispoliitikas.

II maailmasõjast on kujunenud aina enam julgeolekupoliitiline küsimus. Seda iseloomustavad mh Mart Laari avaldused, et kommunism tuleb tervikuna hukka mõista; samuti Pronksiöö sündmused, mil võideldi nö „kõva” mälu materjali ümber, kuigi tavaliselt keskendutakse nö „pehmele” mälule.

Ukraina püüab näiteks aina enam uurida ülestõusuarmee tegevust. Siiski, Ukrainas valitseb kaks erinevat seisukohta, mida ühest küljest iseloomustab Janukovitšði ettepanek püstitada Valgevene-Ukraina piirile Vabastaja monumenti, teisest aga Juštšenko ettepanek Holodomor genotsiidiks kuulutada.

Võitlus ei käi mitte riikide vahel, vaid suunaga „päris-Euroopa” poole, nii nagu „vana Euroopat” tajutakse selle keskmena. Üheks Ida-Euroopa punktivõiduks sel skaalal sai Euroopa Parlamentaarse Assamblee poolt üheselt ning võrdselt hukkamõistetud natsi- ja kommunismikuriteod. Ida-Euroopa tegevus on suunatud „päris-Euroopale,” otsitakse oma tegevusele kinnitust ja ajaloonarratiivi sissekirjutamist.

Euroopa Liit

EL tasandil usutakse, et on võimalik luua rahvusülene identiteet, milles mälu toimib kui sotsiaalse solidaarsuse edendaja. Niisiis, kui saavutada ühtsem arusaam II maailmasõja mõistmiseks, on ka Euroopa ühtsem. Ühismälu defineeritaksegi kui ühtse Euroopa eeltingimust.

Ühtlustatud arusaama ometi tekkinud pole – „kommunismi mälu” uurimist pole endiselt välja kujunenud ning see on üpris tühi valdkond. Alles hiljaaegu alustas siiski rühm teadlasi Cambridge’i Ülikoolis sellelaadsete uuringutega. Teema olulisust kinnitab näiteks Guardiani korrespondendi näide, kes väitis, et uskumus soveti ja natsi kuritegude ebavõrdsest olemusest tähendaks justkui genotsiidi eitamist.

Lääs on võimetu põgenema mälusõja eest. Lääs peaks ka enda positsiooni defineerima II maailmasõjas. Mälusõda toimub Euroopa väärtuste nimel, mistõttu ei saa Lääs sellest kõrvale hoiduda. Samuti võib orwellikust tõdemusest „Kes kirjutab minevikku, kirjutab tulevikku” lähtuvalt väita, et Euroopa Liidulgi on omad kaalutlused mälusõjast täieliku distantseerumise vältimiseks. Nimelt on Euroopa Liit 2004. a. laienemise järel olemuslikult mõneti teisenenud, millest tulenevalt on oluline ka Lääne-Euroopal säilitada autoriteeti minevikukäsitlustesse puutuvas. Ida-Euroopa riikide sihiks näib sellegipoolest olevat osundada, et nende ajalugu tuleb sarnaselt arvestada Lääne-Euroopa omaga.

Ometi võib Lääne-Euroopa tõrksuse taga mälupoliitika küsimustes näha printsiibi „oma särk kõige ligemal” mõju. Nimelt on Lääne-Euroopa mälusõjad justkui minevikku jätnud ning keskendunud tulevikule. Ida-Euroopa võtab seda aga silmakirjalikkusena ning orientalistlikus mõttes (stereotüüpse) halvustamisena – ida halvustamisena seetõttu, et tegemist on idaga. Ida-Euroopa väidab, et raudse eesriide tagant vabanenuna saadi mälupoliitika protsessiga lihtsalt sellevõra Lääne-Euroopast hiljem alustada, mistõttu tuleb järelikult selline „minevikku klammerdumine” andeks anda.

Maria Mälksoo leiab, et mäluvaidluste väljatõrjumine pole võimalik – kaanetamine on välistatud, kui protsess on juba esile kerkinud (vrdl. perestroika). Valgevene, Poola, Baltikum olid II maailmasõja poliitiline ning moraalne kese, kuivõrd just selles piirkonnas - laiemalt Ida-Euroopas – põrkusid kaks totalitaarset süsteemi ning türanni. Seega on loogiline, et just nimelt siin asub hetkel ka mälusõja peamine tanner.

Holokausti läbitöötamisel on jõutud piltlikult väljendudes kõrgustesse ning tasemeni, milleni kommunismi puhul on ainuüksi konsensuse leidmise raskuse tõttu võimatu jõuda. Timothy Snyderi kohaselt on Holokaust ignoreeritud reaalsus. Nimelt ignoreerib Auschwitzi kuvand II maailmasõja käigus NSVL-i jäänud juutide saatust. Niinimetatud ida- juudid on tänapäevani marginaliseeritud, mida tingib paljuski Auschwitzi kuvand. Samuti on Gulag justkui standardsümbol, mis ei ole adekvaatne – pigem võiks kõneleda Holodomorist, muudest näljahädadest ning Suurest Terrorist (`37. ja `38. a põhiohver mitte eliit, vaid kulakud – T. Snyder).

Kollektiivne mälu ei peegelda tegelikku ajaloo kulgu. Peaksime tegelema ajaloo kriitilise uurimisega – kollektiivne mälupoliitika ei taotle dialoogi, vaid uurimise sulgemist.

Venemaa – näitleja töö iseendaga (Stanislavski)

Venemaa puhul näeme vastuolu ausa ajaloouurimise ja enda rahvusvahelise positsiooni kindlustamise vahel. Stalinismi mälu on ohvrite, mitte aga kuritegude keskne. Valitseb juriidiline vaakum, mis peegeldab poliitilist ignorantsust. Venemaal puudub tänini terrorit hukkamõistev akt.

Venemaa ei usu end olevat korda saatnud tegusid, mida II maailmasõjas tehti: see oleks justkui enesetapujärgne eneseanalüüs. Venemaa ei saa omale omistada süütu ohvri rolli, mis Baltimaade ja Poola jaoks on võimalik. Putini ajal on Venemaal süvenenud ümberpiiratuse tunne. Nii jagas Putin kohtumisel ajalooõpetajatega suuniseid, et kui Venemaa ajaloos esineb ka probleemseid peatükke, siis kindlasti mitte rohkem kui teistel riikidel.

Venemaal on palju kommunismiohvrite mälestusmärke, mis on aga valdavalt eraannetuste najal kerkinud – seega süütegude kordasaatjaid justkui pole, tegu pigem force majeure`ga. Mälukonflikti Venemaal iseloomustab paradoks: kui riiklik terror oli kuritegelik, siis kes oli kurjategija. Riik ei saa olla vastutav – Venemaa on lõppeks NSVL-i õigusjärglane. Stalin riikliku terrori täidesaatjana on jällegi puutumatu „võitja” staatuses.

Rääkides venelaste ohvritest II maailmasõjas, kehtib Venemaa puhul ohvrite kaaperdamine riiklikes huvides. Vene ametlike arvude kohaselt langes II maailmasõjas 25-27 miljonit sõjaväelast ning tsiviilisikut, peamiselt tsiviilohvrid. Ometi tapsid de facto kõigest u. ühe 25-st tsiviilohvrist Venemaal sakslased, sellal kui Poolas oli vastav näitaja 1/10 ning Valgenes 1/5 (T. Snyder). Need ohvrid ometi kaasatakse Venemaa käsitlusse hukkunute statistikasse puutuvas. Miks on see probleem? Eneseanalüüsi puudumine on muutnud Venemaad sõjakaks – oma „tõde” kehtestatakse välismaal jõu abil.

Kokkuvõte

Euroopas tervikuna pärsib unustamise kultuur demokraatiat. Küsimus ei seisne mitte selles, kas mäletada või unustada, vaid selles, kuidas mäletada? Missugusest punktist peaks unustamine algama? Kas mäletamine on eetiliselt võttes kohustus?

Samuti tõusetub mälumilitarismi küsimus: kas rohkem mälu on puhastava toimega (vennad Kaczynskid)? Kas EL-l on vaja ühtset mälunarratiivi? Ehk on siinkohal võtmeks hoopis tolerantse ajalooteadvuse edendamine, radikaalselt demokraatlik mälupoliitika. Maria Mälksoo leiab loenguõhtu teemale osundades, et Euroopa mitu mälu on paratamatus. Mälu on siiski ennekõike isiklik. Kokkuvõtvalt leiab ettekande pidaja, et vajame rohkem kriitilist ajalugu, mitte ajalugu kinnikaanetavat poliitikat.

Konspekteeris Alexander Lott

On 28th November, the guest lecturer in RSR was Marina Kaljurand who gave lecture on “Cyber Security – challenges and potential responses”. She has served as the Ambassador of Estonia to USA, Mexico, Russia, Kazahstan and Israel. She has also been the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Estonia. Currently, she is a Chair of the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace.

First time when Marina Kaljurand learned about cyber security was in 2007 when Estonia was under politically motivated cyberattacks. Back then she was an Estonian ambassador to Russia and she had to explain what is happening in Estonia – DDoS-attacks. It was important to talk about this because cyber does not have borders and in this field, cooperation is necessary. She said that states are not allowed to take any illegal actions and according to international law they must stop every illegal action that is transiting their country. It was known back then that cyberattacks came from Russian territory – Estonia had all the legal instruments in place, but the will was missing (there was a cooperation between allies but not with Russia).

In year of Snowden’s disclosure, Kaljurand was posted to the US. She said that the US changed a lot during these times and question of trust was the most important. Estonia was the first country to have a bilateral agreement in cyber security with the US and it was used as a hook to bring Obama to Tallinn (he came later, though). For Estonian diplomats, it is very important to represent our country because usually nobody cares about us and many even do not know (still think that we are part of the USSR). That was the reason we had to find our niche – which is cyber (e-lifestyle, cyber security) – and now it opens the doors and starts the conversations.

Currently there are 84 global bodies dealing with cyber security. Marina Kaljurand is the Chair of the Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace. At first, they were hesitating to include Russian and Chinese experts but as it is a global commission, they need people from different countries. They also have Jeff Moss and Joseph Nye, also human rights activists, and civil society experts. Commission is a multistakeholder. Governments need to cooperate in order to be successful because there are a lot of actors in cyber area. There is an ideological division in between of how the ICT is seen – one side (especially the West) sees it beneficial (lets do it!) and another (i.e. Russia and China) side sees the use of the ICT as interfering (colour revolutions, influencing internal politics). It is difficult to cooperate between two divisions.

Cyber is not only for IT geeks, there are so many fields – diplomacy, international affairs, law, etc. For Kaljurand, cyber security is about stability, it is an open, secure, stable, and accessible Internet. 65% of people are not online yet, they are to join us and we need to have stable and secure Internet. She said that we have to raise the awareness to countries who have no idea what is happening in cyber field. Thus, although she had no idea what all the 84 bodies are doing, she was happy that there are so many of them who are raising the awareness.

In 2013, it was decided by the UN GGE that international law applies to cyber space. The question is about how (jurisdiction and sovereignty). When is the sovereignty of a state violated (for example, in case of malware or when somebody really dies because of a cyber-attack?) UN is the only global organization, but it is from the 1940s. UN will never agree on everything, thus we need a division of like-minded states who have the same understanding and norms on how to behave in cyber space. For example, norm is that it is not okay to attack financial institutions during the peace time. Every country should be interested in having common norms, but it is not possible to agree because of the ideological divisions. If UN cannot work on that, then a group of likeminded countries can. Other bodies are the EU and NATO and both have its roles, for example, cyber is the 5th domain of operations (in addition to air, space, land, maritime). There is a NATO Centre of Excellence in Tallinn. The aim of cyber stability is to avoid misunderstandings (confidence building is getting people together, OECD is doing an excellent work there).

Kaljurand also spoke about Estonia’s e-voting. She used Hack the Pentagon – hackers were asked to hack a system to find vulnerabilities – example and she wants to do the same in Estonia with e-voting. She believes that we have a good system but there is so much criticism from abroad and we need a PR-event - Hack Estonian e-voting. We need international hackers for that. Government is not ready yet but she is still convincing it. We need to face challenges but not to step back. It may happen that people perceive it as negative PR (hackers are hacking Estonia) but we need to explain a lot what are we doing and why. We were lucky to have an ID-crisis in 2017 because we started to feel ourselves too comfortable.

What is the future of UN GGE? Has it failed because in the last meeting the participating countries did not reach a consensus?

Internet of Things, terrorism, international law, norms, confidence building measures, capacity building – GGE is looking these five fields. GGE was supposed to write a report (goal was not to go back from what was agreed two years earlier). Kaljurand does not think that coming years show a will of agreeing on something, she said that coming years will be for educating.

She also said that we need to start asking something for return. For example, if some country wants assistance in e-taxation, then it must make a political statement (international law applies to cyber space or a statement about human rights). If a country is not willing to make a statement, then it should ask for an assistance from some other country.

How to deal with Russia and China?

She has no answer to that. Balkanization of Internet (different countries have different Internets). She does not see that we could find common ground with China or Russia because of the big ideological differences. It may happen that states reach the point where they agree that cyberattacks are not okay. 2007 nobody died, it was just humiliating. All the cyberattacks have been kind of mild but if cyber 9/11 happens then the world would come together, and states would have more will and intentions to agree on some rules. It is a grey zone if you do not have rules. People get to together usually when something bad happens, it has not happened with cyber yet.

Tech-people can do attribution, but it has a political dimension as well, as it depends on the politicians (do they have the courage to say it out or not). She referred to former Minister of Defence Jaak Aaviksoo who said that we did reasonable attribution and our conclusion is that when somebody does everything like a dog then most probably it is a dog. Attribution is a political question and increasingly states should say that they were attacked by this or that country.

You can buy cyber weapons from the black market but it’s too primitive. It will change with Artificial Intelligence (AI) and internet of things, it will be cheaper for terrorists. So far it has not been used. KRATT – Estonian law on AI (obligations, responsibilities). Finland, company who has AI in its board, EE-FIN are competing on who will have the law first.

Why are there so many diplomatic efforts (84)?

She does not know what all of them are doing. On the one side, it is good that so many institutions are discussing cyber security. 2004 or 2007 nobody was discussing cyber but today everybody is discussing it. Her commission tries to look at what others are doing. It is good to have so many even if they duplicate. It is important to discuss and educate people.

Cyber security is connected to open internet. Are the EU and US values the same if something goes south?

US is very vocal about open internet, freedom of the Internet. They are strong supporters of human rights online and open internet. There are differences how countries see intelligence etc but basically, we are on the same side. We may disagree on small things, but we share the same principles and understanding.

Could you elaborate more on EU’s role (EU diplomacy toolbox) concerning cyber security?

Cyber diplomacy toolbox – if something happens how do we react. International law allows retaliation. We have regulations. What are the measures in case of cyberattack against a member state? All the rules apply to cyber security (political statements, sanctions etc). The same as the EU has done in the case of Crimea. In the EU it is easier than in NATO. In NATO, there is no mechanism of what to do in case of an attack.

However, there is a problem with the EU and overregulation - EU is very happy when it can regulate something. EU is not a single market, with cyber it is more complicated, there are more regulations. Some regulations are needed because you need to have some frames. You have to know what is allowed and what is not. It is difficult to find a balance.

How Is the cooperation with industries?

Estonia is cooperating pretty well with the industries. All industries (Microsoft, Facebook) complained that governments were not cooperating enough. Industries have ideas. States will not give away authority on retaliation, attribution etc. It is about attitudes (I know how to do my job!). Governments are starting to understand that they can’t do anything without industries. In the end, they have IT-nerds, governments cannot afford them. Hackers are going to school and teach cyber hygiene to students. Teachers were negative until they started to cooperate with the policemen. She said that hackers despite their image are not bad guys.

How much is Estonia an ideal case? How to implement it to other countries?

Estonia is doing well. Other countries need to find what is suitable to them. They don’t need to copy; every country (state) can find something what is interesting to them. Estonia needs to introduce what we are doing and urge others to find what is interesting to them. You can always do the same thing but with going around the corner.

Konspekteeris Kert Ajamaa