{"id":6,"date":"2024-04-04T05:13:03","date_gmt":"2024-04-04T02:13:03","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/eurus1\/3-russian-military-strategy-and-european-security-after-annexation-crimea\/"},"modified":"2024-04-04T05:13:09","modified_gmt":"2024-04-04T02:13:09","slug":"3-russian-military-strategy-and-european-security-after-annexation-crimea","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/eurus1\/3-russian-military-strategy-and-european-security-after-annexation-crimea\/","title":{"rendered":"3. Russian military strategy and European security after the annexation of Crimea"},"content":{"rendered":"<p id=\"yui_3_17_2_1_1562655597208_347\">\r\n\t<span id=\"yui_3_17_2_1_1562655597208_346\" style=\"OpenSans,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;small\"><strong id=\"yui_3_17_2_1_1562655597208_345\">The lecture aims to achieve the following objectives:<\/strong><\/span>\r\n<\/p>\r\n\r\n<ul id=\"yui_3_17_2_1_1562655597208_401\">\r\n\t<li id=\"yui_3_17_2_1_1562655597208_406\">\r\n\t\t<span id=\"yui_3_17_2_1_1562655597208_407\" style=\"OpenSans,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;small\">analyse Russia\u2019s military strategy during the annexation of Crimea.<\/span>\r\n\t<\/li>\r\n\t<li id=\"yui_3_17_2_1_1562655597208_404\">\r\n\t\t<span id=\"yui_3_17_2_1_1562655597208_405\" style=\"OpenSans,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;small\">examine how the annexation of Crimea impacted the security environment in Eastern and Central Europe.<\/span>\r\n\t<\/li>\r\n\t<li id=\"yui_3_17_2_1_1562655597208_400\">\r\n\t\t<span id=\"yui_3_17_2_1_1562655597208_399\" style=\"OpenSans,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;small\">look at NATO\u2019s response to the annexation of Crimea.<\/span>\r\n\t<\/li>\r\n<\/ul>\r\n\r\n<p id=\"yui_3_17_2_1_1562655597208_402\">\r\n\t<span id=\"yui_3_17_2_1_1562655597208_403\" style=\"OpenSans,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;small\">To successfully complete the third self-test, students have to watch the video lecture and read the compulsory material for the section. <\/span>\r\n<\/p>\r\n\r\n<p>\r\n\t<\/p><div class=\"ratio ratio-16x9 mb-3\"><div class=\"video-placeholder-wrapper video-placeholder-wrapper--16x9\">\n\t\t\t    <div class=\"video-placeholder d-flex justify-content-center align-items-center\">\n\t\t\t        <div class=\"overlay text-white p-2 w-100 text-center d-block justify-content-center align-items-center\">\n\t\t\t            <div>Kolmandate osapoolte sisu n\u00e4gemiseks palun n\u00f5ustu k\u00fcpsistega.<\/div>\n\t\t\t            <button class=\"btn btn-secondary btn-sm mt-1 consent-change\">Muuda n\u00f5usolekut<\/button>\n\t\t\t        <\/div>\n\t\t\t    <\/div>\n\t\t\t<\/div>\n<\/div>\r\n\r\n\r\n<p dir=\"ltr\" id=\"docs-internal-guid-df5d7a6f-7fff-f217-69ff-c06cf959c4c6\" style=\"line-height:1.4000000000000001;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt;text-align:justify\">\r\n\tIn this section, <span style=\"NewRoman';color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline\">we are going to look at the impact and consequences of the annexation of Crimea from a security perspective. The examination of this case from a security dimension is important for several reasons: the annexation of Crimea not only changed the security environment in the region and shifted EU-Russia relations in a more negative direction, but also revealed Russia\u2019s military might. However, most of the scholars debate whether Russian military strategy was novel or was simply a combination of military tactics applied in a new way.\u00a0<\/span>\r\n<\/p>\r\n\r\n<p dir=\"ltr\" style=\"line-height:1.4000000000000001;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt;text-align:justify\">\r\n\t\u00a0\r\n<\/p>\r\n\r\n<p dir=\"ltr\" id=\"docs-internal-guid-edc29cab-7fff-336b-c0a7-019ccdb00e97\" style=\"line-height:1.4000000000000001;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt;text-align:justify\">\r\n\t<span style=\"NewRoman';color:#000000;background-color:#ffffff;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline\">Back in 2008, Thomas de Waal, an expert on the South Caucasus,<\/span><span style=\"NewRoman';color:#000000;background-color:#ffffff;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline\"> argued\u00a0that Putin\u2019s greatest legacy could be defined as \u201c<strong>soft annexation<\/strong>,\u201d which, at the time, was undertaken in Georgia\u2019s breakaway provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.\u00a0<\/span> <span style=\"NewRoman';color:#000000;background-color:#ffffff;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline\">The strategy of \u2018soft annexation\u2019 is based on the ideas that Russia is pulling political, economic, and military levers to exploit ethnic conflicts in countries that are in its sphere of interest with the aim to increase the tensions, gain influence in these states, while preventing them from moving closer to the West.<\/span>\r\n<\/p>\r\n\r\n<p dir=\"ltr\" style=\"line-height:1.4000000000000001;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt;text-align:justify\">\r\n\t\u00a0\r\n<\/p>\r\n\r\n<p dir=\"ltr\" id=\"docs-internal-guid-32400113-7fff-7abd-076b-5855168bba40\" style=\"line-height:1.4000000000000001;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt;text-align:justify\">\r\n\t<span style=\"NewRoman';color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline\">In this respect, most of the scholars tend to agree that <strong>Russian military novelties in Crimea<\/strong> were a mix of old Soviet ideas, combined with observations of Western warfare, and adopted and redesigned for use by the modernized armed forces. In other words, the real novelty in Russian military strategy in the Crimean case was the integration of military tools with more unconventional tools. For instance, Russia combined covert military action with using civilian self-defense force to create conditions and environment necessary to legitimize further military action (<\/span>Ven Bruusgaard, 2014).\r\n<\/p>\r\n\r\n<p dir=\"ltr\" style=\"line-height:1.4000000000000001;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt;text-align:justify\">\r\n\t\u00a0\r\n<\/p>\r\n\r\n<p dir=\"ltr\" id=\"docs-internal-guid-2b9a8490-7fff-45e1-f44e-2177ddad5e44\" style=\"line-height:1.4000000000000001;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt;text-align:justify\">\r\n\t<span style=\"NewRoman';color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline\">As mentioned earlier in the lecture, the annexation of Crimea not only demonstrated Russian military capacities, but also forced European political elite to rethink the <strong>security situation in Central and Eastern European<\/strong> countries as well as to debate about the established principles of territorial integrity and self-determination.\u00a0 More specifically, the annexation of Crimea led many European policy makers to question NATO\u2019s commitment and capacity to defend its member states as well as challenge the nature of the alliance\u2019s relationship with Russia.\u00a0<\/span> <span style=\"NewRoman';color:#000000;background-color:transparent;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline\">Despite the debates, NATO reinforced its commitment to defending central and eastern European allies by applying air defence and surveillance measures, maritime deployments, and military exercises.<\/span>\r\n<\/p>\r\n\r\n<p dir=\"ltr\" style=\"line-height:1.4000000000000001;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt;text-align:justify\">\r\n\t\u00a0\r\n<\/p>\r\n\r\n<p dir=\"ltr\" style=\"line-height:1.4000000000000001;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt;text-align:justify\">\r\n\t<span id=\"docs-internal-guid-6cf556f2-7fff-7c32-99df-a5db645b4c5a\" style=\"NewRoman';color:#000000;background-color:#ffffff;font-weight:400;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;text-decoration:none;vertical-align:baseline\">The video lecture, examines the NATO\u2019s response to the annexation of Crimea in more detail and looks further at Russian military strategy.<\/span>\r\n<\/p>\r\n\r\n<p dir=\"ltr\" style=\"line-height:1.4000000000000001;margin-top:0pt;margin-bottom:0pt;text-align:justify\">\r\n\t\u00a0\r\n<\/p>\r\n\r\n<p dir=\"ltr\">\r\n\t<strong>References:<\/strong>\r\n<\/p>\r\n\r\n<ul dir=\"ltr\">\r\n\t<li id=\"docs-internal-guid-89858f7f-7fff-1ca2-f54d-ab9848a53664\" style=\"line-height: 1.2;margin-top: 0pt;margin-bottom: 0pt;text-align: justify\">\r\n\t\t<span>Interview with Thomas de Waal. Expert on Russia and Caucasus. \u201cSoft annexation of Abkhazia is the greatest legacy of Putin to his successor\u201d. <\/span><span>Caucasian Review of International Affairs<\/span><span>, Vol.2 (3), Summer 2008<\/span><span>.\u00a0<\/span>\r\n\t<\/li>\r\n\t<li style=\"line-height: 1.2;margin-top: 0pt;margin-bottom: 0pt;text-align: justify\">\r\n\t\tKristin Ven Bruusgaard.\u00a0<i>Crimea and Russia\u2019s strategic overhaul<\/i>. Challenges in Russia and Afghanistan. 2014.\r\n\t<\/li>\r\n<\/ul>\r\n\r\n<p>\r\n\t<strong>Reading material:<\/strong>\r\n<\/p>\r\n\r\n<ol style=\"margin-right:0px;margin-bottom:10px;margin-left:30px;color:#444444;14px;line-height:21px;background-color:#fefefe\">\r\n\t<li>\r\n\t\tPaul Belkin, Derek E. Mix, Steven Woehrel.\u00a0<i>NATO: response to the crisis in Ukraine and security in Central and Eastern Europe.<\/i>\u00a0Congressional research service. July 2014.\r\n\t<\/li>\r\n\t<li>\r\n\t\tMarius Laurinavicius, et.al.\u00a0<i>EU and Russia relations after Crimea: red lines for \u201cBusiness as usual\u201d.<\/i>\u00a0Eastern Europe studies centre.\r\n\t<\/li>\r\n\t<li>\r\n\t\tKristin Ven Bruusgaard.\u00a0<i>Crimea and Russia\u2019s strategic overhaul<\/i>. Challenges in Russia and Afghanistan. 2014.\r\n\t<\/li>\r\n\t<li>\r\n\t\tKatri Pynn\u00f6niemi.\u00a0<i>Russian thinking in the Ukrainian crisis. From drawing a line of defence of seeing a threat to national security<\/i>. Finnish institute of international affairs. September 2014.\r\n\t<\/li>\r\n<\/ol>\r\n<br><div class=\"wp-block-group attached-files-group is-layout-constrained wp-block-group-is-layout-constrained\"><div class=\"wp-block-file\"><a href=\"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/364\/1._o_nato_response_to_the_crisis_in_ukraine_and_security_in_central_and_eastern_europe.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">1._o_nato_response_to_the_crisis_in_ukraine_and_security_in_central_and_eastern_europe.pdf<\/a><\/div><div class=\"wp-block-file\"><a href=\"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/364\/2._o_eu_and_russia_relations_after_crimea_red_lines_for_business_as_usual.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">2._o_eu_and_russia_relations_after_crimea_red_lines_for_business_as_usual.pdf<\/a><\/div><div class=\"wp-block-file\"><a href=\"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/364\/3._o_crimea_and_russias_strategic_overhaul.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">3._o_crimea_and_russias_strategic_overhaul.pdf<\/a><\/div><div class=\"wp-block-file\"><a href=\"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/364\/4._o_russian_thinking_in_the_ukrainian_crisis._from_drawing_a_line_of_defence_of_seeing_a_threat_to_national_security.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">4._o_russian_thinking_in_the_ukrainian_crisis._from_drawing_a_line_of_defence_of_seeing_a_threat_to_national_security.pdf<\/a><\/div><\/div>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>The lecture aims to achieve the following objectives: analyse Russia\u2019s military strategy during the annexation of Crimea. examine how the annexation of Crimea impacted the security environment in Eastern and Central Europe. look at NATO\u2019s response to the annexation of &#8230;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":188,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"inline_featured_image":false,"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-6","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/eurus1\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/6","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/eurus1\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/eurus1\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/eurus1\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/188"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/eurus1\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=6"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/eurus1\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/6\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":60,"href":"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/eurus1\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/6\/revisions\/60"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/eurus1\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=6"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}