The development of Transnistrian foreign policy<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n Transnistria established<\/span><\/a> its own small diplomatic corps in 1991. In the following two decades, its foreign policy apparatus handled negotiations with the Moldovan central government and international mediators. As well as relations with Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh. Ultimately, the complex task of managing Transnistria\u2019s relations with Russia and Ukraine outweighed all. <\/span><\/p>\n Although Moscow never officially recognised Transnistria\u2019s independence, support from Russia has been a vital aspect of the de facto state\u2019s existence. From Transnistria\u2019s perspective, Russia is a <\/span>\u201cstrategic partner\u201d<\/span><\/a> and the de facto state is part of the \u201cRussian World\u201d. Even more strikingly, in a <\/span>2006 referendum<\/span><\/a> more than 98% of Transnistrian voters opted for independence and \u201csubsequent free integration\/association with Russia\u201d. Furthermore, <\/span>Transnistria applauded<\/span><\/a>\u00a0the secession and subsequent accession of Crimea to the Russian Federation in 2014. <\/span><\/p>\n In 1990s and 2000s, Tiraspol aimed at <\/span>an informal alliance<\/span><\/a> with Kyiv against the Moldovan central government. Kyiv in turn, maintained a <\/span>\u201cbenevolent neutrality\u201d<\/span><\/a> and supported Tiraspol occasionally. After the \u201cOrange Revolution\u201d, Kyiv and Chi\u0219in\u0103u agreed to establish a European Union civilian mission on the Moldovan-Ukrainian border (EUBAM) which led to <\/span>vocal protests from Tiraspol<\/span><\/a>. Despite the ups and downs, economic interaction continued until 2014, since about one third of foreign investments in Transnistria <\/span>originated from Ukraine<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n Image: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of TMR in Tiraspol (Source: Eiki Berg)<\/span><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n The Transnistrian MFA declared integration in the Eurasian Customs Union as a \u201cnational idea\u201d in 2012. In the same year, a member of the Russian Duma <\/span>established \u201cEurasian Integration\u201d<\/span><\/a>, an NGO that aimed to establish closer relations between Transnistria and the states of the Customs Union. The organization was short-lived, as the NGO stopped its activities in 2018 due to a corruption scandal. Meanwhile, Transnistrian integration into Eurasian economic structures became virtually impossible after 2014, due to the sharp pro-Western turn in Ukraine. <\/span><\/p>\n In 2015, the <\/span>Transnistrian government agreed<\/span><\/a> to partake in the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) between the European Union and Moldova. Since then, contacts with EU representatives became more common. About half a year after his inauguration in late 2016, the current Transnistrian president Vadim Krasnoselsky travelled to the United Kingdom (pre-Brexit) and <\/span>met with British officials<\/span><\/a>. Since January 2019, the president\u2019s office in Transnistria started to <\/span>publish its press releases<\/span><\/a> also in English. As a result of these contacts and symbolic gestures, Transnistrian exports to the EU surged. <\/span><\/p>\n The beginning of the war<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n On 24 February 2022, Russian troops crossed the Russo-Ukrainian \u201cline of contact\u201d beyond Donbass and started the war. At the time, many political observers expected Transnistria to play an active role in the conflict. Furthermore, according to the <\/span>secret map<\/span><\/a> which Lukashenko revealed, reaching Transnistria was one of the goals of the Russian army. As of today, Russian troops did not even come close to that goal and the Transnistrians played a different role.<\/span><\/p>\n On the very first day of Russian aggression in Ukraine, the Transnistrian president Vadim Krasnoselsky stated that \u201cthey are in full control of the situation\u201d, and that \u201cthe stability and security of the citizens are guaranteed\u201d. Instead of proclaiming a state of emergency, Krasnoselsky established an operational headquarters to respond to the rapidly developing situation. Additionally, de facto authorities started to prepare for the arrival of Ukrainian war refugees. Interestingly, Krasnoselsky described the war in Ukraine as \u201c<\/span>events taking place in Ukraine.\u201d<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n February 25, the second day of the war, <\/span>the Transnistrian president visited<\/span><\/a> one of the newly opened \u201caccommodation centres\u201d for \u201cpersons arriving in Transnistria in connection with the aggravation of the situation in Ukraine.\u201d On several occasions, <\/span>Krasnoselsky held speeches<\/span><\/a> to reflect the situation in Ukraine while highlighting that Transnistria \u201cdoes not pose a military threat\u201d, that it \u201cdoes not hatch plans of aggressive nature\u201d and that \u201dit is focused on ensuring peace\u201d. These statements dissociated the Transnistrian government with the Russian aggression and focused on handling the worsening economic and humanitarian situation in the de facto state.<\/span><\/p>\n Diplomacy in the shadow of the war in Ukraine<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n On the third day of the war, the Polish ambassador in Moldova visited Tiraspol and held talks with Vitaly Ignatiev, the Transnistrian foreign minister. In the <\/span>press release<\/span><\/a>, neither the war nor Ukraine were mentioned at all. Several weeks later, the newly appointed US ambassador to Moldova, also visited Tiraspol. This time the talks focused on the 5+2-negotiations as well as the need for recruiting English language teachers for the \u201cCentre for English Language and American Culture\u201d at the Shevchenko University. Again, this meeting passed without <\/span>mentioning<\/span><\/a> the war in Ukraine.<\/span><\/p>\n During the following months, a representative of the Moldovan central government, the Polish ambassador, the OSCE Head of Mission and two Russian diplomats visited Tiraspol and held meetings with president Krasnoselsky. By November 2022, several foreign diplomats \u2013 mostly from NATO member states \u2013 had visited Transnistria. With 21 diplomatic visitors from the EU, NATO and Ukraine and eight representatives from Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Russia, the West engaged Transnistrian high-ranking officials more actively in the first 15 months of the war.<\/span><\/p>\n Image: President Vadim Krasnoselsky meeting with UK ambassador in Moldova, Steven Fisher on June 27, 2022 (TMR Presidential Office Press Service)<\/span><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n During their chat with Krasnoselsky, the British ambassador brought up the Russian aggression and the consequences of the war for other countries. The <\/span>Transnistrian president\u2019s office<\/span><\/a> paraphrased the British ambassador\u2019s statement by referring to the \u201cthe Russian-Ukrainian conflict\u201d \u2013 making this the first and so far the only time such a conflict is mentioned in press releases of the presidential office. In his meeting with the British ambassador, Krasnoselsky stated that \u201eTransnistria should not be a hostage to the geopolitical situation that has developed due to the deterioration of relations between other states.\u201d This statement was motivated by the irritation from <\/span>the recent attempt of the PACE<\/span><\/a> to frame Transnistria as an occupied Moldovan territory, which came as the leadership of the de facto state focused on distancing themselves from the war.<\/span><\/p>\n At the same time, contacts with other post-Soviet de facto states remained rare. In April 2022, the then South Ossetian foreign minister <\/span>had a telephone conversation<\/span><\/a> with Vitaly Ignatiev. In May 2022, the Transnistrian Minister of Health signed a memorandum with their Abkhazian counterpart. In August and September of the same year, Tiraspol and <\/span>South Ossetia<\/span><\/a> exchanged <\/span>diplomatic notes<\/span><\/a>. In December 2022, the Abkhazian MFA <\/span>sent a diplomatic note to Transnistria<\/span><\/a> but there were no high-level visits taking place. This demonstrates of how little importance these relations were compared to the ones with the West and Russia.<\/span><\/p>\n Dragging Transnistria into the war?<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n In early March 2022, the Transnistrian Ministry of State Security <\/span>released a statement<\/span><\/a> claiming that it had thwarted a terrorist attack within the de facto state. Allegedly, the Ukrainian security service tried to assassinate multiple officials within the statelet. Several weeks later, Vadim Krasnoselsky <\/span>invited the FBI<\/span><\/a> to participate in the investigations, the call to operate within the pro-Russian de facto state would have been unthinkable a decade ago.<\/span><\/p>\n From April until June 2022, several mysterious incidents occurred in Transnistria. Drones armed with explosives, grenade launchers, anti-tank mines and plastic explosives were used to attack the Ministry of State Security in Tiraspol, the inactive Tiraspol Airport, a radio station and TV transmitter, the infamous Cobasna ammunition depot, another former aerodrome, and a military reserve unit. No injuries or casualties were reported as a result of these incidents. The perpetrators remain unknown. <\/span>Russian news agencies<\/span><\/a> blamed Ukraine for the attacks, with little proof to back their claims.<\/span><\/p>\n![\"tmrdiplomacy1\"](\"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/398\/tmrdiplomacy1-300x206.jpg\")
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