As the dust of diplomatic struggling in Honduras starts to settle, it appears ever more obvious that Taiwan remains perpetually exposed to diplomatic derecognition, especially as Beijing seems ever more determined to ramp up pressures on Taipei\u2019s remaining allies. Nevertheless, the Honduran case, besides shedding light on the inherent fragility of diplomatic recognition for Taiwan, also arguably exposes a more complex web of factors leading to derecognition, apart from direct Chinese pressure. With two other allies \u2013 Guatemala<\/a> and Paraguay<\/a> \u2013 heading to the polls in the coming months, Honduras\u2019 fate might offer valuable lessons for their respective diplomatic trajectories.<\/p>\n Pressure Mounting<\/strong><\/p>\n It could have hardly come as a surprise when Xiaomara Castro used Twitter to end Honduras\u2019 74-year long relationship with Taiwan. The country\u2019s first female president had already ruffled feathers in 2021 when she made it an election pledge to establish ties with Beijing, with rumours abound that economic incentives<\/a> might have been partially responsible for her decision to consider cutting ties. Back then, Taiwanese president Tsai Ing-wen herself took to Twitter<\/a> to highlight Honduras\u2019 special status, noting that she would like \u201cbenefit the people [\u2026] and strengthen the longstanding Taiwan-Honduras partnership.\u201d Her message, it seemed, bore fruit for at least the remainder of 2022 which saw the Castro administration primarily occupied with domestic issues and did not take concrete steps on the China question. Indeed, Taiwanese Vice President Lai Ching-te even attended<\/a> Castro\u2019s inauguration ceremony, instilling hope that she might still reconsider switching ties.<\/p>\n And, indeed, it was not until January 2023 that the incumbent Honduran government started edging closer to Beijing more openly. Then, Foreign Minister Eduardo Reina met with<\/a> China\u2019s Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, Xie Feng, on the side-lines of Brazilian President Lula\u2019s inauguration. The two men supposedly discussed Chinese support<\/a> for another<\/a> Chinese-built hydroelectric dam project, while inadvertently causing shudders<\/a> in both Taipei and Washington. By mid-March 2023, however, the government in Tegucigalpa then moved beyond talk about development assistance and formalized<\/a> diplomatic relations with the PRC.<\/p>\n Neither diplomatic attempts by the Biden administration<\/a> nor open appeals<\/a> from the Taiwanese government were able to avert the diplomatic breakaway. Tellingly though, Washington seemed to constrain itself even in light of the existing TAIPEI Act<\/a>, which was once touted<\/a> a strong underwriting framework for the U.S. to enhance its support for Taiwan. Biden merely once despatched his Special Advisor for the Summit of the Americas, Chris Dodd, to talk to Honduran officials, ultimately raising questions about Washington\u2019s willingness to enforce the TAIPEI Act\u2019s measures. Taiwan\u2019s Foreign Minister Joseph Wu, on the other hand, explicitly warned Tegucigalpa<\/a> of becoming overly dependent on Chinese financial support and eventually being debt-trapped by Beijing. Meanwhile, for the now diplomatically recognized administration in Beijing Taipei\u2019s and Washington\u2019s efforts to try and influence Castro \u2013 perhaps unsurprisingly \u2013 constituted \u201carm-twisting and bullying<\/a>.\u201d<\/p>\n And while the Taiwanese Foreign Ministry also immediately pointed to Honduras having been bribed<\/a> into switching allegiance, the process of Honduras\u2019 derecognition of the self-governing island indicates a more complex web of factors underpinning derecognition. This is, however, not to deny that pressures from Beijing<\/a> were non-existent. In fact, the previous Honduran government under Juan Orlando Hernandez lamented<\/a> that Beijing had sought to gain his government\u2019s diplomatic recognition in exchange for Covid-19 vaccines. These pressure tactics were consequently harshly criticized by both the Taiwanese and foreign affairs officials in Washington \u2013 they all warned<\/a>that such assertiveness is putting people\u2019s lives at risk. It therefore is unsurprising that Chinese news media were quick to underscore that the switch was \u201can independent and courageous historical decision<\/a>,\u201d despite evidence to the contrary.<\/span><\/p>\n Image: This is how the 74-year long relationship ended<\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n Yet, direct top-down pressure from Beijing only partially explains Honduras\u2019 process of derecognition of Taiwan. In fact, the newly signed economic agreement<\/a> between Beijing and Tegucigalpa actually speaks to more profound, and perhaps deeply-rooted, structural considerations on the Honduran side for severing ties. The already burdened economy took yet another considerable hit during the Covid-19 pandemic, with GDP figures declining rapidly by about nine percent<\/a>. About 400,000<\/a> people lost their jobs within the first year of Covid, leading to a rapid increase<\/a> of people living in poverty in addition to almost a third of the population that already faced extreme poverty prior to the pandemic. The combined effects of an economic contraction and a public health crisis must have put pressure on the incoming Castro government even prior to officially taking office, eventually resulting in severing ties with the less economically powerful Taipei.<\/p>\n Thus, the switch away from Taiwan to the PRC likely coincided with government plans<\/a> to deliver upon its campaign promises to quickly boost economic growth, eradicate extreme poverty, and reduce social inequality. An alleged demand for 2.5 billion USD in aid restructuring by Foreign Minister Reina certainly lends credence to the incumbent administration being caught between a rock and a hard place financially, even though both Castro and Reina vehemently denied<\/a> such request. In hindsight, it appears more likely that Beijing\u2019s more recent developmental overtures towards Honduras merely came at the right time. According to Honduran officials, several attempts had been made to obtain additional financial support for larger infrastructure projects \u2013 including a hospital and a hydroelectric dam \u2013 but were primarily met with lofty promises<\/a> and warnings of falling for Beijing\u2019s \u201cdollar-diplomacy<\/a>\u201d with the Taiwanese officials however failing to offer any concrete assurances themselves. By contrast, immediately after signing on to Beijing\u2019s \u2018One China\u2019 interpretation, the news mouthpiece Xinhua went all out in proclaiming that the new relationship comes with \u201cexcellent growth potential<\/a>\u201d. The editorial went on to say that Honduras \u201cembraced a golden opportunity to boost its social and economic development,\u201d showcasing the penetrating rhetoric often employed<\/a> by Chinese newspapers to counter critique towards Beijing\u2019s geopolitical game.<\/p>\n Setting Precedent?<\/strong><\/p>\n For president Tsai Ing-wen the almost simultaneously planned state visit to both Belize and Guatemala thus quickly turned into a matter of shoring up vital support<\/a>. Guatemala \u2013 together with the last Taiwan stronghold in South America, Paraguay \u2013 are both headed for important national elections that could see a shift in government, and consequently a shift in Taiwan policy. Both have seen an uptick in Chinese pressure \u2013 including vaccine-for-recognition<\/a> tactics also employed in Honduras \u2013 but their respective governments upheld ties, nonetheless. However, as once again exemplified by Honduras, national elections have always been a particularly worrisome period<\/a> for Taipei\u2019s diplomatic reach.<\/p>\n While in Guatemala, Tsai sought to underscore her administration\u2019s commitment to its Central American ally. By demonstratively visiting a Taiwan-funded hospital in one of the nation\u2019s poorest neighbourhoods, Chimaltenango, Tsai possibly intended to counter the harsh critique received from Honduran officials who complained about Taiwanese constraint in spending financial resources. The Guatemala-Taiwan relationship has proven resilient<\/a>throughout the years, with all Taiwanese presidents paying regular visits. These included a state-visit by Tsai who was afforded the opportunity to address<\/a> the Guatemalan congress during which she praised the former\u2019s efforts in supporting the self-governing island\u2019s cause. And yet, even Foreign Minister Mario Bucar\u00f3\u2019s latest \u201cStand by Taiwan<\/a>\u201d-visit in August 2022 could not veil that tensions exist that at times side-line the expansive cooperative bilateral network<\/a> or personal connections at the political level.<\/p>\n Image: Guatemalan Foreign Minister Mario Bucar\u00f3 meeting with Taiwanese Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Alexander Yui (Source: The MFA \/ EPA-EFE)<\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n First and foremost, while bilateral trade has remained largely consistent and has become increasingly institutionalized<\/a>, trade with China has increased<\/a> substantially, resulting in numerous Guatemalan business leaders to call<\/a> on the government to no longer forego the economic opportunities of establishing ties with Beijing. These pressures in particular could become an election issue when Guatemalans head to the polls in June, a sentiment also echoed by China\u2019s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Just prior to Tsai touching down in Guatemala City, MFA spokesperson Mao Ning called on the Giammettei administration to \u201cmake the right decision<\/a>.\u201d<\/p>\n In Paraguay, meanwhile, liaising with Taipei has been largely beneficial<\/a>, not only politically but also economically. The incumbent Ben\u00edtez has remained steadfast in its recognition of Taiwan, in spite of recurring attempts<\/a> by the opposition to force the government to change course. In March, President Mario Abdo Ben\u00edtez once again heralded strong ties when he paid a personal visit to Taiwan, yet he himself will not stand<\/a> for re-election. His Colorado party and prime candidate Santiago Pena continue to promote ties with the self-governing island, whereas the key oppositional figure Pedro Efra\u00edn Alegre Sasiain (Authentic Radical Liberal Party) already announced that his party\u2019s win would go hand in hand with a diplomatic switch. Sasiain in particular has been an outspoken proponent<\/a> for the nation\u2019s fruitful beef exporting industry which has long lamented<\/a> that access to mainland China\u2019s meat market would constitute a major win for local businesses and farmers<\/a>.<\/p>\n Economic considerations such as enhancing the vital beef industry could prove decisive in an election that will likely see many voters expressing a strong desire for better economic opportunities in the post-Covid era. As such, it may not require direct Chinese pressure or influence campaigns<\/a> to sway Paraguayan voters, instead domestic concerns might trump the geopolitical dimension. Even though no official polling figures exist, this year\u2019s national election could prove tight between Alegre and Pena, making Taiwan\u2019s usually steadfast ally look far more fragile and willing to consider derecognition.<\/p>\n Overall, it is likely that Honduras will not be the last Taiwanese ally considering a switch in favour of mainland China. With the elections in both Guatemala and Paraguay still undecided, it remains to be seen whether the respective opposition parties and pro-Beijing politicians will be able to advocate for diplomatic derecognition once in office. Concurrently, it seems that Guatemala might retain ties with Taipei, not only because incumbent president Giammettei recently boosted Taipei\u2019s confidence when personally meeting Tsai Ing-wen, noting that the self-governing island was \u201cthe one and only true China<\/a>\u201d and treating his Taiwanese counterpart to a lavish state dinner. Meanwhile, Paraguay\u2019s position appears a little less certain with just a few weeks to go until the election.<\/p>\n Yet, the Honduran case has vividly showcased that Taiwan\u2019s often effective niche diplomacy and small-scale developmental support are coming under pressure. Indeed, it appears to no longer be a reliable means to retain allies, particularly those disproportionately affected by economic hardship. For the Castro administration, seeking to overcome strong economic headwinds and appealing to a poverty-stricken population seemingly outweighed the positive aspects of maintaining ties with Taipei \u2013 such as a fairly strong trade partnership<\/a>, particularly for coffee<\/a> and shrimps<\/a>, and bottom-up development projects. For now, the diplomatic struggle between Beijing and Taipei might be on pause, yet uncertain elections periods in Guatemala and Paraguay could upend the relative calm and further delimit Taiwan\u2019s diplomatic space.<\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n Author: Larissa St\u00fcnkel<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0 In mid-March 2023, the self-governing island of Taiwan lost another one of its already few diplomatic allies. Announcing the severing of diplomatic ties between Taiwan and Honduras on Twitter on March 15, Honduran president Xiaomara Castro noted …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":66,"featured_media":1208,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"inline_featured_image":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[5],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-51","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-dfsrublogposts"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/defactostates\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/51","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/defactostates\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/defactostates\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/defactostates\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/66"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/defactostates\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=51"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/defactostates\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/51\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1777,"href":"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/defactostates\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/51\/revisions\/1777"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/defactostates\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/1208"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/defactostates\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=51"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/defactostates\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=51"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/defactostates\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=51"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}![\"taiwandiplomatic1\"](\"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/398\/taiwandiplomatic1-249x300.jpg\")
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