{"id":42,"date":"2023-02-28T14:19:23","date_gmt":"2024-04-04T02:34:07","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/defactostates\/overview-2022-de-facto-states-under-increased-pressure\/"},"modified":"2024-04-17T15:31:53","modified_gmt":"2024-04-17T12:31:53","slug":"overview-2022-de-facto-states-under-increased-pressure","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/defactostates\/overview-2022-de-facto-states-under-increased-pressure\/","title":{"rendered":"Overview of 2022: De Facto States Under Increased Pressure"},"content":{"rendered":"

\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0<\/p>\n

The De Facto States Research Unit looks back at the developments in the lesser recognised world in 2022. In <\/span>last year\u2019s blog<\/span><\/a>, we noted the world becoming more unstable and unsafe for de facto states over 2021. The year 2022 has confirmed this trend with the escalation of Russia\u2019s aggression in Ukraine to a full-scale war that has been an outright challenge to the post-World War II international order. Having previously benefitted from the \u201cfrozenness\u201d of the international system \u2013 buying themselves time to focus on state-building and creating space for themselves by manoeuvring between different actors \u2013, de facto states are now facing narrowing of options. While the continuing international power realignment might benefit some actors in short term and foment new secessionist movements, the increasing erosion of international order and reliance on power politics does not make the outlook for 2023 good for remaining de facto states. <\/span><\/p>\n

The Republic of Abkhazia<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Parliamentary elections<\/span><\/a> in March result in a <\/span>president-aligned<\/span><\/a> parliament, raising fears that the body will lose its function of providing checks and balance on the executive. Several long-standing issues recur over the year: COVID-19 pandemic straining the fragile health sector; <\/span>energy crisis<\/span><\/a> creating hours-long <\/span>blackouts<\/span><\/a> during autumn and winter periods; <\/span>corruption<\/span><\/a>, including possible diversion of state funds through the renovation of the power grid; <\/span>fuel shortage<\/a>\u00a0<\/span>during the summer, mainly blamed on the record-high numbers of Russian tourists travelling in by their own cars, or by passenger trains which are given priority on the railway over supply trains. Relations with Georgia remain cold, with the current government <\/span>rejecting<\/span><\/a> any <\/span>attempts of dialogue<\/span><\/a> as <\/span>benefitting Georgia<\/span><\/a>. Moreover, a Russian-style <\/span>law on foreign agents<\/span><\/a>, targeting international organizations and local NGOs working with them, is being discussed. Many fear that such a policy, if adopted, will increase Abkhazia\u2019s self-isolation. Russia-Abkhazia relations reach an unprecedented strain in 2022. In July, Abkhazians learn that president Aslan Bzhaniya agreed in January to transfer the territory of the <\/span>Pitsunda state dacha<\/span><\/a> to Russia \u2013 on loan to Russian state since 1995, supposedly Putin himself has now asked for this property. The agreement needs parliamentary ratification, and with a pro-president majority, the opposition fears it\u2019s a done deal. The public rallies in protest, especially once it emerges that the <\/span>territory agreed on<\/span><\/a> is much larger than the actual property, leading the Russian ambassador to Abkhazia to threaten that if the territory is not transferred, Russia might <\/span>reconsider<\/span><\/a> its military base and investments in Abkhazia. Bzhaniya echoes the statement, saying that Abkhazia simply cannot afford to disagree. Towards the end of the year, increased border checks of both Abkhaz <\/span>people<\/span><\/a> and <\/span>goods<\/span><\/a> by Russians at the Psou border crossing, Russia\u2019s refusal to supply additional electricity, as well as the decrease of support for the 2023 Abkhaz <\/span>state budget<\/span><\/a>, are all seen as ways of pressuring Abkhazia on the matter, although the agreement remains unratified by the end of the year. Government\u2019s plans to solve the energy crisis through <\/span>privatization<\/span><\/a> \u2013 essentially giving a green light for Russian companies \u2013 along with the Pitsunda estate controversy and the planned law on foreign agents, lead in November to the formulation of a <\/span>new protest movement<\/span><\/a>, the <\/span>Assembly of Socio-Political Forces<\/span><\/a>, mostly comprised of young politicians and social activists united by concern over Abkhazia\u2019s sovereignty. Not all is grim between Abkhazia and Russia, though: in September, a new agreement on <\/span>dual citizenship<\/span><\/a> is signed, giving more Abkhazians opportunities to travel (although EU <\/span>bans<\/span><\/a> Russian passports issued in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, distinguishable by serial numbers), and to receive Russian social benefits (considerably higher than Abkhazian ones). Abkhaz leadership plays with the idea of joining the Russian-Belarussian Union State once the war in Ukraine is over, and relations with Belarus seem to pick up over the year, evidenced by a high-profile visit from Belarussian president Aleksandr Lukashenka in September, followed by a <\/span>visit<\/span><\/a> from the delegation of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Union of Belarus and Russia in November. Despite deepening ties, <\/span>recognition by Belarus<\/span><\/a> is yet to come. <\/span><\/p>\n

The Autonomous Region of Bougainville<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Bougainville\u2019s quest for independence continues. In April, Bougainville and Papua New Guinea <\/span>sign<\/span><\/a> the Era Kone Covenant, considered an important roadmap on future developments: it outlines how the results of the 2019 Bougainville independence referendum will be tabled and ratified in the National Parliament of PNG, which Bougainville\u2019s president Ishmael Toroama says will happen <\/span>in 2023<\/span><\/a>. The Covenant also foresees that Bougainville\u2019s independence should be settled not before 2025, and no later than 2027. In February, Toroama convenes the <\/span>Constitutional Planning Commission<\/span><\/a>, in May, he <\/span>launches<\/span><\/a> the Bougainville Constitutional Planning Commission Awareness and Consultations in North, Central, and South Bougainville, aimed at developing the new constitution through widespread consultations. But towards the end of the year, <\/span>fears<\/span><\/a> of PNG deadlocking the independence process start to grow, and in November, Bougainville threatens to cancel the upcoming meeting of the Joint Supervisory Body with the PNG government. Indeed, <\/span>some statements<\/span><\/a> from PNG prime minister James Marape reveal that he considers the Era Kone Covenant deadlines to be for reaching a settlement, which may or may not be full independence. He continues to campaign for Bougainville to settle for greater economic independence. Central Government\u2019s concerns regarding Bougainville\u2019s <\/span>economic viability<\/span><\/a> are not entirely unfounded, as about 85% of the region\u2019s budget comes from PNG. Bougainville itself hopes that the agreement on <\/span>reopening the Panguna mine<\/span><\/a> which the local landowners reach in February, is an important step towards future economic growth that could <\/span>sustain statehood<\/span><\/a>, but <\/span>concerns<\/span><\/a>, notably over environmental impact and possible investors, remain. In December, an independent environmental and human rights legacy impact <\/span>assessment<\/span><\/a> of the Panguna mine begins \u2013 the work is funded by the previous operator Rio Tinto who had to abandon the mine at the civil war in 1989, following commitments announced in 2021.<\/span><\/p>\n

Donbas (Donetsk People\u2019s Republic and Luhansk People\u2019s Republic)<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

On February 15, Russian State Duma <\/span>appeals<\/span><\/a> to the president for recognition of both DPR and LPR, aggravating tensions in and around Ukraine. On February 18, leaders of both statelets <\/span>announce<\/span><\/a> evacuation of civilians to Russia due to the increased threat of attack from Ukraine. Evacuations start a day later, when DPR and LPR leaders also announce general mobilization, men aged 18-55 are forbidden to leave. On February 21, Russia <\/span>officially recognises<\/span><\/a>\u00a0DPR and LPR, a decision <\/span>\u2018celebrated\u2019<\/span><\/a> by Abkhazia, <\/span>South Ossetia<\/span><\/a>, and Nagorno-Karabakh (<\/span>these entities were also recognised by North Korea<\/a> on 13 July 2022, and Syria<\/a> on 29 June 2022)<\/span>. Russian troops enter Donbas. Abkhazia, which unlike South Ossetia has so far refrained from recognition, <\/span>recognises<\/span><\/a> both on February 25. On February 24, Russia starts a full-scale attack against Ukraine, <\/span>evoking<\/span><\/a> among other justifications the need of \u201censuring the security of Russia and our citizens, protecting the residents of Donbas from genocide\u201d. Throughout the spring and summer, men mobilised from Donbas area \u2013 about 140,000 by mid-June \u2013 are fighting on the frontlines, casualty rates are high due to <\/span>lack of training and equipment<\/span><\/a>. Local protests against mobilization are quickly supressed. In widely condemned <\/span>staged referendums<\/span><\/a> in Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia on September 23-27, more than 95% of voters <\/span>apparently<\/span><\/a> want to join Russia. Despite not having full control of any of the regions or even clear borders, Putin announces the <\/span>annexation<\/span><\/a> of these oblasts on September 30, thus putting an end to DPR and LPR as de facto states. <\/span><\/p>\n

The Republic of Kosovo<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

The year is dominated by tensions between Kosovo Albanians and the ethnic Serbs. In attempts to bring majority Serb areas of Kosovo under government\u2019s full control, a series of <\/span>administrative orders<\/span><\/a> are introduced over the summer, including for transitioning about 10,000 cars from using Serbian number plates to Kosovo ones, starting from August 1, and introducing an extra entry document for Serbian ID holders, as Serbia requires similar entry-exit documents from Kosovars. The plans are postponed after Serbs close two border crossings between Serbia and Kosovo in protest. Serbia and Kosovo reach a <\/span>free movement agreement<\/span><\/a> following talks in Brussels, both agreeing to forego the entry-exit document requirement. The \u2018number plate issue\u2019 is reintroduced a few months later, to be implemented from November 1. Once again, <\/span>tensions<\/span><\/a> mount. Many ethnic Serbs in Kosovar <\/span>government<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>police<\/span><\/a> and judicial branch walk out of their jobs, creating a security vacuum. Angered further over plans to hold <\/span>snap local elections<\/span><\/a> in the municipalities whose mayors participated in the walk-out on December 18, Serbs <\/span>in protest<\/span><\/a> block roads at border crossings with Serbia, organise explosions and shootings. The events prompt <\/span>Serbia<\/span><\/a> to put its <\/span>troops<\/a>\u00a0<\/span>on the <\/span>highest alert level<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>accusing<\/span><\/a> Kosovo of \u201cterrorism against Serbs,\u201d and <\/span>requesting<\/span><\/a> permission from KFOR for up to 1,000 Serbian military personnel to enter Kosovo. Kosovar authorities scrap the licence plate plan once again in an EU-mediated <\/span>agreement with Serbia<\/span><\/a>, and postpone the elections until 23 April 2023, while NATO\u2019s KFOR peacekeeping force has increased presence and patrols in Serbian dominated areas. Following these concessions, Serbia promises roadblocks set up by ethnic Serbs in Kosovo to be dismantled, and Kosovo <\/span>reopens<\/span><\/a> the main border crossing on December 29. Both the EU as well as the US <\/span>urge<\/span><\/a> Kosovo to set up an <\/span>association of majority Serb municipalities<\/span><\/a>, per a 2013 Brussels agreement as a way to de-escalate tensions long-term. Kosovo rejects the plan, as it would create a Serbia-aligned mini-state within Kosovo. On December 15, Kosovo <\/span>submits<\/span><\/a> an <\/span>application<\/span><\/a> to join the European Union. The Kosovo Specialist Chambers in the Hague, established in 2017, reaches its <\/span>first verdicts<\/span><\/a> in 2022: former KLA unit commander Salih Mustafa is sentenced to 26 years in prison for war-time torture. Two members of the KLA War Veterans\u2019 Organisation are also convicted at the start of the year for obstructing justice and leaking information. Kosovo also starts preparing the first <\/span>national strategy for transitional justice<\/span><\/a>, to address the unresolved legacy of the conflict.<\/span><\/p>\n

\"overview1\"<\/span><\/p>\n

Image: Knyaz Lazar overlooking the square in North Mitrovica decorated by the Serbian and Russian flags. Many cars are with Serbian number plates or without any (Source: Eiki Berg).<\/span><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/p>\n

Nagorno-Karabakh (the Republic of Artsakh)<\/strong> <\/span><\/p>\n

In the aftermath of the 2020 war, the situation in and around what has remained of Nagorno-Karabakh is increasingly dire, with a lot of volatility. The de facto state is effectively <\/span>side-lined<\/span><\/a> in the Armenian-Azerbaijan dialogue \u2013 increasingly dominated by Baku, and with the West slowly <\/span>replacing<\/span><\/a> Moscow in mediation \u2013 over the territory\u2019s final status. By October, Armenian president <\/span>admits<\/span><\/a> that a peace treaty with Azerbaijan might not include NKR, making it a separate agenda. NKR authorities insist that any agreement that considers NKR as part of Azerbaijan is <\/span>unacceptable<\/span><\/a>, while Azerbaijan\u2019s president calls for Armenians of Karabakh to <\/span>accept<\/span><\/a> that the conflict has ended, and that they are citizens of Azerbaijan that should either integrate or relocate. Intermittent <\/span>clashes<\/span><\/a> between Azeri and ethnic Armenian soldiers <\/span>break out<\/span><\/a> throughout<\/span><\/a> the year, with Azerbaijan <\/span>subjugating<\/span><\/a> more<\/span><\/a> areas<\/span><\/a> under its direct control. The <\/span>inability<\/span><\/a> of Russian peacekeepers to maintain order and peace is periodically criticised by <\/span>Artsakh<\/span><\/a>, by <\/span>Armenia<\/span><\/a>, as well as by <\/span>Azerbaijan<\/span><\/a>. In March, the <\/span>gas pipeline<\/span><\/a> supplying NKR with Armenian gas is damaged, Azerbaijan refuses access for repairs for 10 days, leaving most of about 120,000 Armenians remaining in NKR without heat and power in the middle of the winter. In May, NKR authorities initiate a process of <\/span>constitutional reform<\/span><\/a> \u2013 transition from a presidential to a semi-presidential system is hoped to provide more flexibility in emergency situations, improving security of NKR. The timing of this step is <\/span>criticised<\/span><\/a> by local opposition. The switch to presidential system was made <\/span>in 2017<\/span><\/a>, when consolidation of power was seen as benefitting the security situation. In September, Ruben Vardanyan, a Russian billionaire of Armenian descent, <\/span>renounces<\/span><\/a> his Russian citizenship, to move to NKR. Amidst <\/span>speculation<\/span><\/a> that the move is somehow orchestrated by Moscow, he claims he has not done so for the sake of a position in NRK. In November, he is appointed <\/span>prime minister<\/span><\/a>. In December, Azerbaijani eco-activists <\/span>block<\/span><\/a> the Lachin corridor <\/span>on grounds<\/span><\/a> of Armenians continuing to operate polluting metal mines in areas still under NKR control, halting the movement of people as well as goods on what Armenians call the <\/span>\u201cRoad of Life\u201d<\/span><\/a>, the only road that connects Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh as the construction of an alternative route bypassing Lachin area is <\/span>not completed<\/span><\/a>. The <\/span>infrastructure<\/span><\/a> supplying NKR with electricity, gas, telephone, and internet connections also runs through the Lachin corridor. With Artsakh\u2019s <\/span>gas supply<\/span><\/a> being once again cut off, it creates a humanitarian catastrophe as food and medicines <\/span>run out<\/span><\/a>. People in NKR gather in <\/span>mass protests<\/span><\/a>. The road remains blocked by the end of 2022 and beyond, with the situation on the ground growing progressively worse, despite calls from the international community for Azerbaijan and Russian peacekeepers to ensure access.<\/span><\/p>\n

\"overview2\"<\/p>\n

Image: Azerbaijani eco-activists blocking the \u201cRoad of Life\u201d (Source: <\/span>IARI<\/span><\/a>, 07\/02\/23)<\/span><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/p>\n

The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Northern Cyprus finds itself in <\/span>economic crisis<\/span><\/a> in early 2022. The freefall of lira has exposed the pitfalls of being overly dependent on the patron state both in terms of state budget, as well as trade, and Turkey\u2019s increased interference in TRNC politics raises <\/span>protest<\/span><\/a> among federalists. Further protests are staged in March against the signing of an <\/span>economic protocol<\/span><\/a> between TRNC and Turkey which, opposition argues, is accompanied by laws curbing freedom of expression and civil society, while promoting Islam. In May, it emerges that the economic protocol, foreseeing a loan of around 240 million Euros for TRNC, has been <\/span>signed<\/span><\/a> on April 14 with the inclusion of the aforementioned limitations. In September, <\/span>protests<\/span><\/a> erupt<\/span><\/a> over the start of construction on a Turkey-funded 155 million Euro <\/span>government complex<\/span><\/a> including a mosque, a palace, and a new parliament building that critics believe is another sign of annexation. The municipality itself tries to file a <\/span>case in court<\/span><\/a> against the construction, based on lack of necessary building permits, but their case is rejected. In December, Turkish Cypriot businessman Asil Nadir sells his <\/span>Kibris media group<\/span><\/a>, which includes the daily Kibris, the English-language Cyprus Today, a radio and a television station, to a Turkish firm allied to Turkey\u2019s ruling party. Despite fearing closer ties with Turkey, president Ersin Tatar\u2019s right-wing National Unity Party (UBP) that is in favour of increased cooperation emerges victorious, while taking 24 of the 50 seats, and forming a governing coalition with the Democratic party and Rebirth Party after snap <\/span>parliamentary elections<\/span><\/a> on January 23. In response to USA\u2019s decision to lift an arms embargo in place since 1987 from the Republic of Cyprus from 2023, both Turkish <\/span>president<\/span><\/a> and <\/span>foreign minister<\/span><\/a> promise to reinforce their troops in Northern Cyprus, in protection of the local population. In December, this is followed by news that Turkey will build a <\/span>naval base<\/span><\/a> on the island. In early October, Turkish Cypriot foreign minister issues an <\/span>ultimatum<\/span><\/a> to the UN: recognise TRNC within a month, or leave the island. TRNC maintains that their <\/span>consent<\/span><\/a> should be sought for the renewal of the peacekeeping mission\u2019s mandate, promising to evict them from their bases in the North, most notably from Karolou Stefani base north of Famagusta, otherwise. Russia announces plans for <\/span>direct flights<\/span><\/a> between Russia and Northern Cyprus, the only country outside of Turkey to do so. Initially, flights are supposed to start from November 15 \u2013 the anniversary of TRNC\u2019s declaration of independence \u2013 but are later postponed to early 2023. According to Russian news outlets, about 10,000 Russians <\/span>live<\/span><\/a> in TRNC. <\/span>Local elections<\/span><\/a> take place on December 25 \u2013 this time, <\/span>opposition<\/span><\/a> manages to gain most mayoral positions, including in Famagusta, where Turkey\u2019s meddling is seen as a reason why some candidates <\/span>withdraw<\/span><\/a> from the race. Despite long-term murmurs, no recognitions are achieved this year, although TRNC is admitted to the Organization of Turkic States as an <\/span>observer<\/span><\/a>. President of TRNC, Ersin Tatar, reaffirms through the year his commitment to a <\/span>two-state solution<\/span><\/a>, claiming that full recognition of TRNC cannot be prevented.<\/span><\/p>\n

\"overview3\"<\/p>\n

Image: <\/span>Vice President of Gambia Badara Joof in an official visit to TRNC on November 30 (Source: www.kktcb.org<\/a>)<\/span><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/p>\n

The State of Palestine<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

2022 becomes the <\/span>bloodiest year<\/span><\/a> on record in the West Bank and Jerusalem area since the end of the second intifada in 2005 <\/span>according<\/span><\/a> to UN, with at least 170 Palestinians being killed in the West Bank and East Jerusalem area. The fighting initially picks up in March as Palestinian terrorist attacks against Israel increase in intensity. At the end of the month, the Israeli Defence Forces launch the months-long <\/span>operation<\/span><\/a> Breakwater, <\/span>aimed against<\/span><\/a> militants from al-Aqsa, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, but prompting the emergence of <\/span>new armed groups<\/span><\/a> in response<\/span><\/a>, as well as the re-emergence of some old ones, especially around cities of Jenin and Nablus. The new groups do not align with specific Palestinian parties or movements. Al Jazeera journalist Shireen Abu Akleh is killed by the Israeli Defence Force in one of their offensives in May \u2013 according to evidence submitted by Al Jazeera to the International Criminal Court, the journalist was <\/span>directly targeted<\/span><\/a> by the IDF. IDF organises <\/span>operation<\/span><\/a> Breaking Dawn, a three-day bombing campaign in Gaza in August, <\/span>killing<\/span><\/a> at least 49, including 17 children. The raid ends with an Egyptian-mediated <\/span>truce<\/a>\u00a0<\/span>between Israel and militant group Palestinian Islamic Jihad, as Hamas has decided not to join the fighting. They also target human rights groups, <\/span>raiding<\/span><\/a> and closing offices in the West Bank. IDF increasingly resorts to tactics used in the 2000-2005 intifada, such as punishing sieges on neighbourhoods and cities, and targeted assassinations in the West Bank. In addition to IDF activities, <\/span>attacks<\/span><\/a> by Israeli settlers against Palestinians in the West Bank also increase in 2022, becoming more coordinated. At least three Palestinian are killed in these <\/span>settler attacks<\/span><\/a>. Complicating the picture is the lack of a clear, unifying Palestinian governance structure \u2013 the Palestinian Authority nominally in charge in the West Bank is <\/span>losing support<\/span><\/a>, being seen by many as colluding with Israel. Human Rights Watch <\/span>claims<\/span><\/a> that Palestinian authorities both in the West bank and the Gaza strip use systematic torture on detained critics, further undermining their standing within their own communities. In August, Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas draws international <\/span>condemnation<\/span><\/a> when, during a press conference with the German chancellor Olaf Scholz in Berlin accuses Israel of committing \u201c50 Holocausts\u201d. In Gaza, residents are able to enjoy <\/span>swimming<\/span><\/a> in the Mediterranean for the first time in years: as three internationally funded sewage treatment plants have been able to operate more steadily, sea pollution has dropped to levels safe enough for swimming on large parts of the coastline. Formed at the end of December, Israel\u2019s new government, headed by Benyamin Netanyahu and being called the most far-right coalition ever, makes West Bank settlement expansion its priority, and seeks to <\/span>change<\/span><\/a> the status quo on Jerusalem\u2019s holy Temple Mount, which so far has not allowed Jewish worship. In November, US president Biden names a new <\/span>special representative for Palestinian affairs<\/span><\/a>, considered a significant upgrade of relations. US officials continue to reaffirm their commitment to a two-state solution. On December 31, the UN General Assembly passes a <\/span>resolution<\/a>\u00a0<\/span>calling on the International Court of Justice to give an opinion on the legal consequences of Israel\u2019s illegal occupation of Palestinian territories.<\/span><\/p>\n

Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (Western Sahara)<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Conflict between the Polisario Front and Morocco toils on, <\/span>intensifying<\/span><\/a> at the end of 2022. In March, <\/span>Spain<\/span><\/a> announces a major policy shift towards Western Sahara: <\/span>abandoning<\/span><\/a> neutrality, it is now endorsing Morocco\u2019s plan for an autonomous Western Sahara region, in what is seen as an attempt to pacify Morocco following worsening of relations the year prior. Polisario Front reaffirms the right of the about 350,000 to 500,000 strong local population to hold a <\/span>referendum<\/span><\/a> on their future. Algeria, supportive of Polisario Front and home to about 176,000 Sahrawi, as well as a big gas supplier of Spain, <\/span>reacts<\/span><\/a> by recalling its ambassador to Spain, and by <\/span>suspending<\/span><\/a> a 20-year cooperation treaty. But Polisario Front is struggling, as Morocco is ramping up its military and its efforts. In August, the <\/span>World Food Programme<\/span><\/a> announces that due to rising costs, monthly food rations in the Sahrawi refugee camps in Algeria need to be cut by over 75%, less than half of the recommended daily intake of calories per person. In the Western Sahara area proper, Morocco continues with <\/span>resettlement<\/span><\/a>, its people outnumbering local Saharans three to one. <\/span>Football World Cup<\/span><\/a> reveals some complexities of identities on the ground: among Western Saharans celebrating Morocco\u2019s win in December are some Sahrawi people, noting that despite discontent with the Moroccan state as such, joy over the success of the national team has united Arabs and Africans alike, that since cease-fire in 1991 have merged and coexisted in a common environment. But others remain steadfastly anti-Moroccan, the feeling extending to actively rooting against the football team. At the end of October, UN Security Council votes to extend the <\/span>mandate<\/span><\/a> of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) until 31 October 2023. Peacekeepers are tasked with monitoring and reporting, and, where possible, with mine clearance. UN also <\/span>called<\/span><\/a> for a revival of UN-led negotiations on a mutually acceptable political solution for the region. <\/span>Kenya<\/a> reiterated recognition on September 16. <\/span>Colombia<\/a> and <\/span>South Sudan<\/a> resumed diplomatic relations on August 10 and September 20, respectively.<\/span><\/p>\n

The Republic of Somaliland<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

From the start of the year, presidential elections, scheduled for November 13, raise concerns. Opposition <\/span>fears<\/span><\/a> that incumbent Muse Bihi Abdi seeks to forego the elections and extend his tenure. <\/span>Clashes<\/span><\/a> between security forces and people demanding the timely conduct of elections erupt in August, killing at least five people; dozens are arrested. International community condemns the excessive use of force, and calls for dialogue to set up a roadmap for elections. In September, the electoral body claims that due to technical and financial reasons, <\/span>presidential elections<\/a>\u00a0<\/span>can\u2019t take place for about another nine months. On October 1, Guurti \u2013 the non-elected gathering of tribe elders that functions as the upper house of the parliament \u2013 extends Bihi\u2019s term for another two years, and its own <\/span>mandate<\/span><\/a> by another five years. Opposition refuses to recognise Bihi\u2019s presidency after November 13. Another important vote is set for December for deciding the three parties allowed to participate in <\/span>formal politics<\/span><\/a> (this system is in place to curb clan-based fragmentation and political deadlocks), the postponement of the presidential elections creates confusion and quarrel over the <\/span>timeline<\/span><\/a> and sequencing of elections. <\/span>Drought<\/span><\/a> continues to plague Somaliland, impacting over 800,000 people, and causing many to <\/span>leave homes<\/span><\/a> in search of food and water. Government provides <\/span>humanitarian assistance<\/span><\/a>, many <\/span>states<\/span><\/a> provide<\/span><\/a> international<\/span><\/a> aid<\/span><\/a> as well. In April, a <\/span>fire<\/span><\/a> at the main market in capital city Hargeisa destroys hundreds of businesses, mostly run by <\/span>women<\/span><\/a>. About two dozen people are injured. The government estimates the <\/span>economic impact<\/span><\/a> of the fire to be about 60 percent of Somaliland\u2019s GDP. Before domestic crises take over, Somaliland makes an active push for international engagement and recognition. In January, <\/span>some members<\/span><\/a> of UK\u2019s House of Commons call for Somaliland\u2019s <\/span>recognition<\/span><\/a>. Following large public <\/span>rallies<\/span><\/a> in support of independence and recognition, Somaliland\u2019s government announces the <\/span>suspension<\/span><\/a> of talks with Somalia, citing lack of seriousness on latter\u2019s part. In December, Bihi announces that the basis for the <\/span>renewal<\/span><\/a> of talks is a two-state solution, with an international mediation mechanism. Also in January, Ethiopia announces after a visit by Somaliland\u2019s president an upgrade of their counsellor general in Somaliland to <\/span>full ambassador<\/span><\/a> \u2013 the first state ever to do so. In February, Somaliland\u2019s foreign minister leads a delegation on a visit to <\/span>Taiwan<\/span><\/a> \u2013 the friendship is fruitful, as Taiwan pledges funds to combat drought, as well as provide <\/span>relief<\/span><\/a> after the Waheen Market fire. In March, president Bihi <\/span>visits<\/span><\/a> USA, meeting with <\/span>government representatives<\/span><\/a>, and with <\/span>diaspora<\/span><\/a> representatives. But just as Somaliland is starting to gain international support, protests calling for <\/span>reunification<\/span><\/a> with Somalia break out in the Sool region from December 28. As security forces respond with <\/span>violence<\/span><\/a>, protests quickly grow in scope and intensity. <\/span><\/p>\n

Republic of South Ossetia \u2013 the State of Alania<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Elections are on the agenda for South Ossetia \u2013 the first round of <\/span>presidential elections<\/span><\/a> are held on April 10, the second on May 8. Before elections, the incumbent president Anatoly Bibilov positions himself as Moscow\u2019s darling. He supports the <\/span>deployment of South Ossetians<\/span><\/a> to fight in Ukraine as contractors of Russian military units in South Ossetia, promises a referendum on <\/span>joining Russia<\/span><\/a>, but also has the central elections commission <\/span>disqualify<\/span><\/a> some of his strongest contenders. <\/span>Five candidates<\/span><\/a> compete in the first round, Bibilov and Alan Gagloev, leader of Nykhas party, advance to the second round. In the end, Bibilov\u2019s <\/span>authoritarian tendencies<\/span><\/a>, the belief that he had <\/span>surrendered territory<\/span><\/a> to Georgia, and backlash from South Ossetian soldiers <\/span>deserting<\/span><\/a> from Ukraine contribute to his downfall: Gagloev wins the second round in what many consider <\/span>protest voting<\/span><\/a>, as the opposition lacks a viable election programme. While still supportive of <\/span>strong ties<\/span><\/a> with Russia, Gagloev cancels the referendum, a step <\/span>welcomed<\/span><\/a> by Russia due to \u201cunsuitable timing\u201d. Gagloev assures that <\/span>consultations with Russia<\/span><\/a> regarding <\/span>greater integration<\/span><\/a> are still ongoing, but like his predecessor, leaves unanswered whether joining Russia means becoming an administrative part of Russia, or joining the Union State with Russia and Belarus (and possibly Abkhazia) as an equal. There is a slight thaw in the relations with Georgia in September, following Gagloev\u2019s campaign promises to ease South Ossetia\u2019s self-imposed isolation: after about three years of closure, some crossing points between South Ossetia and Georgia are temporarily <\/span>reopened<\/span><\/a>, albeit only for pedestrian traffic. South Ossetia also continues with <\/span>borderization<\/span><\/a> on the South Ossetian-Georgian boundary line, adding observation posts, fencing, and border signage. In December, the International Criminal Court in The Hague announces the conclusion of the <\/span>investigation of war crimes and crimes against humanity<\/span><\/a> during the 2008 Russian-Georgian war, earlier in the year, arrest warrants had been issued to three former South Ossetian officials. The actions of ICC are <\/span>denounced<\/span><\/a> in South Ossetia as being biased, pro-Georgian. During the second half of the year, the honeymoon period between South Ossetians and their <\/span>new president<\/span><\/a> comes to an end: as Gagloev refuses to resign as party leader despite his presidency, and installs his own party member as the new speaker of the parliament (thereby concentrating power), he is moving away from the democratic reforms he promised in the campaign. <\/span><\/p>\n

The Republic of China (Taiwan)<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Taiwan continues its strategy of <\/span>strengthening relations<\/span><\/a> with <\/span>friendly nations<\/span><\/a>, assisting them when Beijing retaliates by blocking or restricting imports. At the beginning of January, Taiwan\u2019s state-run Tobacco and Liquor Corp buys 20,400 bottles of <\/span>Lithuanian rum<\/span><\/a> after China indicates the shipment will be blocked. Sharing cocktail and cooking recipes on social media, TTL <\/span>sells out<\/span><\/a> first batches of the rum in an hour from hitting stores. In October, Taiwan lifts the Covid-related <\/span>entry restrictions<\/span><\/a> for tourists, which have been in place for more than 2.5 years. The overall security situation around Taiwan grows progressively worse over 2022, China steps up its sabre-rattling with frequent <\/span>air incursions<\/span><\/a> into Taiwan\u2019s <\/span>defence zone<\/span><\/a> throughout<\/span><\/a> the year<\/span><\/a>, and with <\/span>military exercises<\/span><\/a> around<\/span><\/a> Taiwan. China\u2019s 20th party congress in October is carefully followed: as Xi Jinping consolidates his power, he and the rest of the party make sure to <\/span>reiterate<\/span><\/a>that Taiwan will be brought back into Chinese fold \u2013 <\/span>by force<\/span><\/a>, if necessary. US-Taiwan relations <\/span>pick up<\/span><\/a>: in February, USA <\/span>approves<\/span><\/a> a 100 million USD deal for upgrading Taiwan\u2019s Patriot air defence system. Early March, a <\/span>visit<\/span><\/a> to Taiwan by a delegation of former US top security and defence officials, sent by president Biden, draws China\u2019s ire. In May, Biden outright <\/span>states<\/span><\/a> that US would defend Taiwan militarily if attacked by China. In August, House speaker Nancy Pelosi\u2019s visit to Taiwan <\/span>heightens tensions<\/span><\/a> between USA, China and Taiwan, even people in Taiwan are <\/span>split<\/span><\/a>over whether the visit is an extraordinary show of support, or a provocation. A US congressional <\/span>delegation<\/span><\/a> makes a further stand by visiting Taiwan shortly after Pelosi, as well as the announcement of <\/span>bilateral trade talks<\/span><\/a>. Local elections take place in November. Seen as a test of the ruling party\u2019s support ahead of the next presidential election (in 2024), the governing Democratic Progressive Party\u2019s (DPP) <\/span>campaign<\/span><\/a> focuses on threat from China over local issues \u2013 a strategy which does not bear fruit, as the party <\/span>loses<\/span><\/a> several races to the opposition, leading to president Tsai Ing-wen\u2019s resignation as party leader. <\/span>In response<\/span><\/a> to sabre-rattling from China, Taiwan increases <\/span>defence spending<\/span><\/a>, plans to produce drones and more missiles, and to improve civilian defence capabilities. At the end of 2022, plans to extend <\/span>compulsory military service<\/span><\/a> from four to twelve months from 2024 are announced. But the military is facing an uphill struggle, as low reputation turns people towards <\/span>civilian defence and resistance initiatives<\/span><\/a>, instead. Despite this, many Taiwanese <\/span>believe<\/span><\/a> that a war is unlikely in the next decade, nor do they <\/span>pay attention<\/span><\/a> to China.<\/span><\/p>\n

\"overview4\"<\/p>\n

Image: Nancy Pelosi\u2019s official visit to Taiwan on August 3 (Source: Taiwan\u2019s Presidential Office)<\/span><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/p>\n

Pridnestrovian Moldovan Republic (Transnistria)<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n

Transnistria gains international attention in 2022 in relation to Russia\u2019s war in Ukraine, both concerns that the breakaway territory could be used to <\/span>launch<\/span><\/a> another attack on Ukraine, that advancement in Ukraine could be used to <\/span>form<\/span><\/a> a <\/span>land connection<\/span><\/a> between Russia and Transnistria in further <\/span>geopolitical plans<\/span><\/a>, or that Transnistria could be used to <\/span>escalate<\/span><\/a> the conflict to another country, are aired. On March 15, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe <\/span>votes<\/span><\/a> to recognise Transnistria as a region occupied by Russia. Transnistria is inevitably impacted by the war: its elites are isolated as both Ukrainian and Moldovan authorities are staunchly anti-Russian. In a careful balancing act, they <\/span>avoid<\/span><\/a> officially endorsing the invasion of Ukraine, as many in Transnistria, including prominent figures, are ethnic Ukrainians, and many open their homes for Ukrainian refugees. The state itself opens 6 <\/span>refugee centres<\/span><\/a> by the beginning of March. Ukraine <\/span>destroys<\/span><\/a> much of the infrastructure connecting them at the start of the war and closes the border, <\/span>increasing<\/span><\/a> prices and trade reliance on Moldova, which temporarily halts export from the Moldova Steel Works Factory on grounds of <\/span>environmental concerns<\/span><\/a>, although the licence is then <\/span>extended<\/span><\/a> multiple times. This company contributes considerably to Transnistria\u2019s state budget. From August, Moldova <\/span>requires<\/span><\/a> Transnistrian officials to notify them before work trips abroad that use the Chisinau airport, and <\/span>blocks<\/span><\/a> Russian troop rotations in Transnistria-based Operative Group of the Russian Troops that now also need to travel via Chisinau instead of Ukraine. About 1,700 soldiers are based in Transnistria, divided between Russian peacekeepers and the Operative Group, although they are de facto the same, of these, about 70 to 100 are Russian officers, the rest being locals employed by Russia. In response to Moldova\u2019s EU accession application, Transnistrian authorities <\/span>demand recognition<\/span><\/a> as they had not been consulted on the plans. At the end of April, a <\/span>series of attacks<\/span><\/a> in Transnistria raise concern: first, Ministry of State Security headquarters are hit by portable anti-tank grenade launchers, followed by explosions at radio towers broadcasting in Russian, and shots fired around the Cobasna ammunition depot, and <\/span>further attacks<\/span><\/a> on a fuel depot and a conscription centre. Ukraine is accused of the attack by the authorities (and Russia), while Moldova claims <\/span>infighting<\/span><\/a> within Transnistria to be behind them. Among the Transnistrians, rumours of being <\/span>mobilised<\/span><\/a> by Russia raise further anxiety, prompting <\/span>many<\/span><\/a> to leave. Authorities <\/span>declare<\/span><\/a> a red-level terror alert, and announce new <\/span>security measures<\/span><\/a>, such as military checkpoints at the entrances of cities, and the cancellation of the 9 May victory day parade. At the end of May, a new <\/span>prime minister<\/span><\/a> is appointed by president Vadim Krasnoselsky, but the move is considered no more than a formality as the president holds full political power, and the prime minister is a technocrat close to Sheriff corporation. Towards the end of the year, Russian <\/span>gas delivery cutbacks<\/span><\/a> also affect Transnistria, although people blame Moldova for the shortage. Despite all difficulties throughout the year, Transnistria maintains that its goal of <\/span>joining<\/span><\/a> the Russian Federation remains unchanged.<\/span><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/p>\n

Author: Kristel Vits<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 The De Facto States Research Unit looks back at the developments in the lesser recognised world in 2022. In last year\u2019s blog, we noted the world becoming more unstable and unsafe for de facto states over 2021. …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":66,"featured_media":1215,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"inline_featured_image":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[5],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-42","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-dfsrublogposts"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/defactostates\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/42","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/defactostates\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/defactostates\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/defactostates\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/66"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/defactostates\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=42"}],"version-history":[{"count":5,"href":"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/defactostates\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/42\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1788,"href":"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/defactostates\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/42\/revisions\/1788"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/defactostates\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/1215"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/defactostates\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=42"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/defactostates\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=42"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/defactostates\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=42"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}