![\"taiwan](\"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/398\/taiwan_1-300x200.jpg\")
<\/p>\n
Image: Taiwan\u2019s President Tsai Ing-wen bidding farewell at the airport of Palau during her Maritime Democracy Tour, March 2019 (Source: Makoto Lin, Office of the President https:\/\/flic.kr\/p\/Rx95ck<\/a>)<\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n To begin with, Palau\u2019s relations with Taiwan need to be considered against the backdrop of its relationship with the U.S. Being a fully sovereign nation in free association<\/a> with Washington since 1994, Palau is granted access to the U.S.\u2019s defence umbrella and social services as well as financial assistance for a period of 15 years. Since the passing of the TAIPEI Act in Washington in 2020, however, the Compact of Free Association (COFA) has become a tool of geopolitical significance. The Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act<\/a>, passed under the Trump administration, effectively supplements the original 1979 Taiwan Relations Act<\/a>. Following persistently deteriorating relations between China and the U.S., Washington started to swiftly edge closer to Taiwan, allowing for the passage of the Taiwan Travel Act<\/a> in 2018 and facilitating<\/a> bilateral official exchanges on U.S. soil. Whereas previously the COFA had partially lost its intended meaning following the end of the Cold War, the U.S.\u2019s shift in policy vis-\u00e0-vis Taiwan now acts as a cohesive between Palau, Taiwan, and the U.S. After all, the U.S. ambassador to Palau, was the first senior diplomatic envoy<\/a> to visit Taipei, together with Whipps.<\/p>\n Nevertheless, the COFA in combination with the TAIPEI Act should not be seen as a mere top-down means of control employed by Washington to serve its own security interests and to preserve Taiwan\u2019s diplomatic space. Indeed, it appears that the legislation has had the positive side effect of elevating Palau\u2019s status and allowing for the island nation to leverage both Washington\u2019s and Taipei\u2019s concerns to its advantage. Whipps has time and again reiterated his predecessor\u2019s offer<\/a> to host more U.S. soldiers, fully realizing the geopolitical potential of Palau\u2019s geography. While this definitely serves American security interests and implicitly bolsters Taiwan\u2019s defence, Whipps did not conceal<\/a> that more stationed soldiers could offer some relief for the ailing post-Covid economy<\/a>.<\/p>\n Yet, if anything, the pandemic\u2019s devastating consequences had the surprisingly positive effect of visualizing what motivates the mutual diplomatic recognition between Palau and Taiwan beyond the realm of great power politics. Initial unofficial contacts and financial assistance kickstarted relations but only truly flourished when Palau extended full diplomatic recognition in 1999. Then-president Kuniwo Nakamura tied the knot with Taipei shortly after signing the COFA agreement with Washington in an effort to expand Palau\u2019s diplomatic clout post-independence. A recently revealed statue of Nakamura in Palau\u2019s Peleliu state and donated<\/a> by the Taiwanese government now stands symbolical for his personal efforts paving the way to officialise ties between the two islands. Ultimately culminating in the first<\/a> Taiwan-Pacific Allies summit, Nakamura thereby not only bolstered his nation\u2019s national interests but inadvertently supported Taiwan\u2019s aim to regain recognition among the international community.<\/p>\n Image: Taiwan\u2019s President Tsai Ing-wen posing with former Palauan President Tommy E. Remengesau Jr. in 2016 (Source: Taiwan Presidential Office; https:\/\/flic.kr\/p\/Hkojq7)<\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n Taiwan has since been able to consolidate its ties with Palau by expanding diplomatic efforts on the ground in the form of targeted economic assistance. Even though Taiwanese developmental aid funds pale<\/a> in comparison to Chinese funds for the region, the small-scale approach has arguably been highly effective. The International Cooperation and Development Fund (ICDF<\/a>), manages niche development projects, primarily in horticulture<\/a> and aquaculture<\/a> in the case of Palau. These projects are targeted at building local capacities in the long-term, either through material or financial donations or through educational opportunities, such as Mandarin classes<\/a> or expert workshops<\/a>. Tellingly, the Taiwanese side recently resumed Mandarin high school classes to be held remotely due to ongoing restrictions. The move once again underscored just how important continuity and foresight are for both sides.<\/p>\n These seemingly miniscule Taiwanese efforts, in addition to being far more manageable than larger projects, directly tap the Palauan government\u2019s goal<\/a> to increase his nation\u2019s self-sufficiency. Besides avoiding unnecessary hiccups for the rather fragile island economy, it seems unequivocable that this bottom-up strategy works best to maintain bilateral relations \u201cthrough thick and thin<\/a>.\u201d<\/p>\n This last element appears particularly imperative for the Palau-Taiwan connection. Diplomatic recognition and supporting Taiwan\u2019s claims to statehood in the case of Palau, invariably requires long-term commitment. The Covid-19 pandemic and the ensuing health care difficulties have proven particularly enlightening. While Taiwan\u2019s Covid-19 diplomacy certainly also aimed at showing off its ability to act swiftly, for Palau it was the swift response that made the difference. Apart from quickly providing<\/a> Palau with medical and personal protective equipment, the Taiwanese embassy unveiled<\/a> a considerably generous stimulus package in March 2022. Jessica Lee, Taiwan\u2019s diplomatic envoy in Koror, in her speech, reiterated the need to \u201cboost the local economy,\u201d and to \u201cpromote people\u2019s quality of life.\u201d<\/p>\n Perhaps the strongest signal that Palau is able to send in support of Taiwan\u2019s statehood is via international organizations. Just days ahead of this year\u2019s 75th World Health Assembly (WHA), Palau was<\/a> among the thirteen remaining diplomatic allies, in addition to U.S. calls<\/a>, that advocated for Taipei\u2019s inclusion in the Geneva get-together. Although a formal invitation is still pending and it is highly likely that China will veto Taiwan\u2019s participation, such lobbying efforts go beyond overt symbolism.<\/p>\n For Palau, it offers an opportunity to reaffirm its own nationhood unhindered, voicing concerns, and calling for collective action. An act that the island nation had not been granted prior to gaining independence in 1994. A sentiment that is, of course, also shared by Taiwanese officials. More importantly, however, it presents a strong counter-narrative to China\u2019s claims to Taiwan.<\/p>\n Although not entirely uncontroversial<\/a>, the political and economic bond is now increasingly supplemented by a narrative of common cultural and historical roots that underpin Taiwan-Palau relations. Often referred to as a mutual \u201cAustronesia heritage,\u201d this element of the Taiwan-Palau connection has become particularly pronounced with Tsai Ing-wen taking up office in 2016. Following a ten-year hiatus, Taiwan\u2019s president brought back<\/a> the \u201cAustronesian Forum<\/a>\u201d in 2018, an annual get-together of political leaders and cultural envoys from the linguistically close islands that make up \u201cAustronesia.\u201d Palau had been the first Pacific nation to not only host the inaugural meeting but also house the headquarters of its secretariat since its establishment. In hindsight, Palau played a critical role in advocating for, and actively walking the walk on, recognizing Taiwanese statehood. A fact that current president Whipps regularly reinvokes as a symbol<\/a> of Palauan resolve and courage in the face of foreign pressures.<\/p>\n In fact, the thick web that makes up Palau\u2019s embrace and diplomatic recognition of Taiwan appears ever more undeterred by geopolitical pressures these days. After all, at this point, it appears safe to say that China is actively squeezing Taipei on the diplomatic front whenever possible. And up until now, Beijing\u2019s attempts have proven unsuccessful, at least in the case of Palau. The long-term benefits of recognizing Taipei simply outweigh the costs and risks of establishing diplomatic relations with China. At least for now, it is not in Palau\u2019s own interest to sever ties at this point in time.<\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n Author: Larissa St\u00fcnkel<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 The tiny Pacific nation of Palau caught headlines when it co-hosted the seventh \u201cOur Ocean Conference\u201d in mid-April this year. For Palau\u2019s president, Surangel Whipps Jr, the hybrid gathering certainly was a moment of pride. In many …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":66,"featured_media":1262,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"inline_featured_image":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[5],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-32","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-dfsrublogposts"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/defactostates\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/32","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/defactostates\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/defactostates\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/defactostates\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/66"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/defactostates\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=32"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/defactostates\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/32\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1806,"href":"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/defactostates\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/32\/revisions\/1806"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/defactostates\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/1262"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/defactostates\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=32"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/defactostates\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=32"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/defactostates\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=32"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}![\"taiwan](\"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/398\/taiwan_2-300x200.jpg\")
<\/p>\n