The Republic of Abkhazia<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n Internal power struggles and political crises shape the year 2021 in Abkhazia. The energy crisis continues throughout 2021, forcing the state to use energy blackouts. The Ingur hydroelectric power plant (HPP), previously the sole energy provider in Abkhazia, is shut down for renovations from January to May, electricity is bought from Russia during that time. The renovated HPP is still unable to fulfil the demand, drive up sharply by <\/span>cryptocurrency mining<\/span><\/a>. In the summer, the government announces a <\/span>deal with Gazprom<\/span><\/a> to build a gas supply network by mid-2022. Privatization of smaller, currently unused HPPs is discussed, but the topic of Russian investments, as well as allowing Russian citizens to buy real estate, remains <\/span>sensitive<\/span><\/a> and <\/span>politicized<\/span><\/a>. Overall, the implementation of the December 2020 roadmap for increased integration with Russia seems to be <\/span>lagging<\/span><\/a>, but two <\/span>key positions<\/span><\/a> in the government \u2013 the ministers of foreign and interior affairs \u2013 are filled with people previously working for the Russian administration. In May, Bzhania is <\/span>forced to remove<\/span><\/a> from Abkhazia\u2019s Foreign Policy Concept a paragraph declaring openness to multilevel negotiations with Georgia outside of the Geneva discussions after considerable pressure from the opposition and the parliament. Covid-19 pandemic brings further criticism to the government over their <\/span>inability to enforce<\/span><\/a> public safety rules, to promote and to <\/span>secure<\/span><\/a> vaccines. In late September, <\/span>a confrontation<\/span><\/a> between law enforcement and two MPs during the Victory Day, triggers a long wave of opposition protests. Protests grow over the next months, with the energy crisis, Covid-pandemic, and impartiality of law enforcement agencies and justice system named as key issues. Protesters demand the resignation of various officials (including the president), constitutional changes, and postponement of parliamentary elections to be held in March 2022. On December 21, protests turn <\/span>violent<\/span><\/a>, although <\/span>storming<\/span><\/a> of the presidential palace \u2013 which brought current president Aslan Bzhania to power in 2020 \u2013 is avoided. For the first time ever after such protests, some opposition figures are <\/span>arrested<\/span><\/a>, and the year ends in a crisis. <\/span><\/p>\n The Autonomous Region of Bougainville<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n While the non-binding referendum of 2019 sees 98% support for independence, Covid-pandemic slow talks with the government of Papua New Guinea (PNG) in 2020, as well as in 2021. Still, several consultations with the PNG central government do take place in 2021. In July, PNG\u2019s prime minister Marape and Bougainville\u2019s president Toroama agree on a <\/span>timetable<\/span><\/a> for the transfer of most powers to Bougainville by 2023, and to achieve a full political settlement by no later than 2027. However, <\/span>disagreements<\/span><\/a> remain over the powers of the PNG parliament in the process. Toroama believes the parliament can only ratify the results of the referendum and\/or the consultations. Marape insists that the parliament retains the ultimate power in allowing Bougainville\u2019s secession, irrespective of the referendum results. At the heart of this issue is <\/span>fear<\/span><\/a> that Bougainville\u2019s secession might lead to the breakup of the entire PNG, and Marape is thus looking for a solution that would give Bougainville everything short of actual independence. In a significant victory for Bougainville, mining giant Rio Tinto commits in mid-summer to funding an environmental study on the <\/span>Panguna mine<\/span><\/a>. What was once among the world\u2019s largest copper and gold mines that brought much profit to the company (but contributed less than 1% of its profits to Bougainville), was abandoned by the company in 1989, when community anger over the environmental damage and profit distribution sparked the civil war. This is seen as an important first step towards remedying the damage caused by the mine. <\/span><\/p>\n Donbas (Luhansk and Donetsk People\u2019s Republics)<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n With Donbas in the middle of Russian and Ukrainian\/NATO tensions, active fighting between Ukrainian government forces and Russian-backed rebels along the Line of Contact, as well as Russia\u2019s gathering of troops near Ukraine\u2019s borders gain most attention <\/span>throughout the year<\/span><\/a>. In March, Ukraine officially acknowledges the end of the July 2020 ceasefire. European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations office in Kyiv <\/span>estimates<\/span><\/a> that about 3.4 million people in Eastern Ukraine need humanitarian aid, many are unable to relocate as the border between Ukraine and the breakaway territories has been <\/span>closed<\/span><\/a> to civilians since 2020. While the initial closure was related to Covid, it seems to have become more permanent by now. People in Donbas region are <\/span>increasingly turning to Russia<\/span><\/a> for their needs, from medical services to education to leisure. Passportization has become a competition: both Donetsk and Luhansk People\u2019s Republics are trying to prioritize their documents, planning to <\/span>phase out<\/span><\/a> Ukrainian documents by 2025. People\u2019s Republics\u2019 documents make applying for Russian passport easier; according to <\/span>information<\/span><\/a> released in July, more than 600,000 Russian passports have been issued to Donbas people. In September, about 42% of eligible voters from Donbas participated in <\/span>Russian Duma elections<\/span><\/a>, many of them electronically. Most people supported Russia\u2019s ruling party United Russia, and in mid-July, the <\/span>leader of DPR<\/span><\/a>, Denis Pushilin, announced he would become member of the party himself. <\/span><\/p>\n The Republic of Kosovo<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n The many elections of 2021 promise to bring some much-needed stability to Kosovo\u2019s political scene. Early <\/span>parliamentary elections<\/span><\/a> in February bring an unprecedented win for Albin Kurti\u2019s Vet\u00ebvendosje, forecasting the formation of a strong government with a parliamentary majority, one that might be able to carry out a full term. In April, acting president Vjosa Osmani is elected to serve a full term. However, <\/span>local elections<\/span><\/a> in October \u2013 held despite a spike in Covid-cases \u2013 are a disappointment, as Vet\u00ebvendosje cannot win any municipalities outright. A second round is needed in 21 of the 38 municipalities, further cementing the dominance of opposition parties on local level. In September, serious <\/span>clashes<\/span><\/a> break out in Northern Kosovo, as Kosovo tries to ban Serbian license plates (in a move mirroring Serbia\u2019s own ban on Kosovar plates). Serbia raises the combat-readiness of its armed forces near the Kosovo\u2019s border. On September 30th, an EU-mediated agreement is reached on mutual recognition of license plates, and the situation de-escalates. Overall, however, not much progress is made in the EU-facilitated <\/span>dialogue<\/span><\/a> between Serbia and Kosovo. Kosovo is also still unable to achieve <\/span>visa liberalisation<\/span><\/a> with the EU. <\/span><\/p>\n Nagorno-Karabakh (Republic of Artsakh)<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n Clashes<\/span><\/a> between Armenian and Azeri soldiers break out regularly throughout the year, despite the November 2020 tripartite <\/span>peace agreement<\/span><\/a> and the presence of Russian peacekeepers. There are also <\/span>civilian casualties<\/span><\/a>. Representatives of Armenia and what remains of NKR reiterate throughout the year that the conflict remains unresolved until NKR\u2019s status is settled. <\/span>NKR<\/span><\/a> promises to continue fighting for self-determination and recognition, as coming under Azerbaijani control would be unacceptable. In contrast, Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan <\/span>maintains<\/span><\/a> that the question of NKR\u2019s status is closed. Restoration, reconstruction, and resettlement projects are progressing on both sides. Azerbaijan is sparing <\/span>little expense<\/span><\/a> in developing <\/span>housing<\/span><\/a> and <\/span>infrastructure<\/span><\/a>, including new airports and highways. Experimental <\/span>development plans<\/span><\/a> for the region include \u201csmart villages\u201d, small technologically advanced communities to maximise economic development, as well as \u201cagroparks\u201d, large-scale, government-backed agribusinesses. In NKR proper, <\/span>rebuilding<\/span><\/a> with the aid of Armenia and the diaspora is also underway, with the displaced people still remaining in the territory mostly pooling into the capital city Stepanakert, despite being <\/span>extremely vary<\/span><\/a> of the future. In the summer, a heatwave brings with it <\/span>drought and water shortages<\/span><\/a>, as most of NKR\u2019s water supply is now in the Azerbaijani-controlled territories. <\/span>Protests<\/span><\/a> do break out in June, but in response to Karabakh president\u2019s support for Nikol Pashinyan upon his re-election, as Pashinyan is considered to have capitulated during the war. Responding to protesters\u2019 demands, President Arayik Harutyunyan promises to resign as soon as the situation is stable enough for holding elections. While Azerbaijan is leveraging its success by making additional demands on Armenia, mostly related to opening old transport links between the two countries and securing the Syunik\/Zangezur corridor to its Nakhichevan enclave, Armenia is making additional moves to increase its security. In November, following heavy clashes with Azerbaijan, Armenia claimed it is formally <\/span>applying for Russian assistance<\/span><\/a> per the 1997 bilateral agreement, in December, it was announced that Armenia and Turkey are starting the process of <\/span>normalising relations<\/span><\/a>. Meetings between Armenia and Azerbaijan take place in several formations throughout the year, in the tripartite format with Russia, as well as under the <\/span>aegis of the EU<\/span><\/a> during the Eastern Partnership Summit in December. Yet the OSCE Minsk Group, the previous negotiation format, is declared to be <\/span>in shadow death<\/span><\/a> by Azeris. <\/span><\/p>\n Image: Regional airport in Fuzuli opened in October as part of Azerbaijan\u2019s \u201crevival of the liberated territories\u201d (Source: Trend News Agency)<\/span><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n The Special Collectivity of New Caledonia<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n On the road to possible independence, the island holds its <\/span>third independence referendum<\/span><\/a> in December, with previous rounds having taken place in 2018 and 2020. As Covid-19 arrives in the islands in September, indigenous and pro-independence Kanak community is unable to utilise their preferred campaigning methods of village meetings and tours due to lockdowns. Furthermore, Covid-deaths require many communities to follow traditional, lengthy mourning rituals, while French president Macron refuses to reschedule the referendum. As a result, the Kanak community is largely <\/span>abstaining from the vote<\/span><\/a>, meaning that while 96.5% of voters are against independence in the third round, referendum participation is only 43.9%, significantly down from the 86% of the 2020 referendum. French politicians nevertheless hail the result as marking the end of a 30-year process of preparation and consultation. For Kanaks, the boycott is more about the breakdown of dialogue and recalibration, rather than giving up on their fight for independence; they promise to resume dialogue after the French presidential elections in 2022. <\/span><\/p>\n The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n With a new president favouring a two-state solution to the conflict over a federated settlement at the helm, TRNC\u2019s relations with the Republic of Cyprus (ROC) continue to deteriorate in 2021. In July, Turkish president Erdo\u011fan visits on the anniversary of the Turkish invasion to Cyprus, and once again <\/span>pledges<\/span><\/a> to open up and potentially resettle a part of Varosha \u2013 a move in contradiction with UN resolutions. The speech draws criticism from the international community, as it is feared it might flame ethnic tensions on the island. In August, the Greek Cypriot government announces that in light of TRNC\u2019s steps and rhetoric, it will <\/span>rescind the passports<\/span><\/a> of 14 senior Turkish Cypriot officials. The move angers TRNC\u2019s government, but also draws criticism from ROC\u2019s own opposition forces. Relations between Northern Cyprus and Turkey sour in the second half of the year. In October, a <\/span>blacklist<\/span><\/a> of 42 Turkish Cypriots banned from entering Turkey emerges \u2013 all those on the list are critical of Erdo\u011fan and favour reunification of the island. The <\/span>destabilisation<\/span><\/a> of the Turkish lira hits the economically dependent TRNC hard, raising support for the <\/span>unilateral adoption<\/span><\/a> of the EURO. By early 2022, <\/span>public protests<\/span><\/a> are mounting over Turkey\u2019s oversized influence on the island, and support for reunification of the island is once again growing. This, however, comes at the time when the UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres <\/span>warns<\/span><\/a> that the possibility of securing a negotiated settlement in Cyprus, or even to have meaningful negotiations, is at a low point. <\/span><\/p>\n Image: Boulevard of \u201cBroken Dreams\u201d in Varosha (Source: Eiki Berg)<\/span><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n The State of Palestine<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n Both Israel and Palestine are supposed to hold <\/span>elections in 2021<\/span><\/a>. Israel\u2019s parliamentary elections \u2013 fourth in two-year\u2019s time \u2013, do take place in March, allowing for a new, if somewhat unlikely <\/span>coalition<\/span><\/a> to finally oust political heavyweight Benyamin Netanyahu in June. Palestine\u2019s president Mahmoud Abbas, however, \u201cindefinitely postpones\u201d, first the legislative elections, then the presidential elections. <\/span>Local elections<\/span><\/a> do take place in the West Bank in December, although many are angry about the election organisation and Hamas is blocking the vote. In April and May, <\/span>tensions<\/span><\/a> between the Jewish and Arab communities in Jerusalem start to ramp up, culminating with a two-week bout of <\/span>conflict<\/span><\/a> in May. In response to the initial conflict between Muslims and the Israeli police, militants in Gaza start firing rockets into Israel. Israeli Defence Forces respond with operation \u201cOperation Guardian of the Walls\u201d, heavily bombing what are claimed to be HAMAS targets in Gaza. International community repeatedly calls for a ceasefire, a deal is brokered by Egypt, Qatar, and the UN on May 20th. The conflict <\/span>kills<\/span><\/a> about 260 Palestinians and 13 Israelis, World Bank <\/span>estimates<\/span><\/a> from July show that Gaza sector would need up to 485 million dollars over the next two years for recovery. The international community is increasingly critical of Israel\u2019s actions towards Palestine, prominent domestic and international NGOs are openly framing the situation as <\/span>apartheid<\/span><\/a>, as there is no functional Palestinian self-rule against Israel\u2019s primary authority. In February, the International Criminal Court\u2019s Pre-Trial Chamber rules that the ICC has the jurisdiction to hear <\/span>war crimes cases<\/span><\/a> against Palestinians and Israelis; in May, the United Nations\u2019 Human Rights Council approves an <\/span>open-ended investigation into Israeli war crimes<\/span><\/a>. In October, Israeli Defence Minister labels six Palestinian civic organisations as terrorist entities, another move <\/span>criticised by the international society<\/span><\/a>. The US re-establishes ties with the Palestinian Authority, holding <\/span>a virtual meeting<\/span><\/a> to renew the joint Economic Dialogue (USPED).<\/span><\/p>\n![\"Fuzuli](\"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/398\/vits_1-300x200.jpg\")
<\/p>\n![\"Boulevard](\"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/398\/vits_2-300x225.jpg\")
<\/p>\n