{"id":162,"date":"2021-04-04T22:05:56","date_gmt":"2024-04-04T02:34:20","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/defactostates\/why-western-sahara-losing-recognitions\/"},"modified":"2024-04-18T12:07:53","modified_gmt":"2024-04-18T09:07:53","slug":"why-western-sahara-losing-recognitions","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/defactostates\/why-western-sahara-losing-recognitions\/","title":{"rendered":"Why Is Western Sahara Losing Recognitions?"},"content":{"rendered":"

\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0<\/p>\n

Even though decolonisation is widely associated with the second half of the 20th century, it is <\/span>not <\/span>yet <\/span>an issue of the past<\/span><\/a>. The<\/span> struggle for self-determination in the Saguia el-Hamra and Rio de Oro areas, better known as Western Sahara<\/span>, speaks in itself. After having<\/span> declared the independence of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) on <\/span>27 February 1976<\/span><\/a>,<\/span> the Frente Popular de Liberaci\u00f3n de Sagu\u00eda el Hamra y R\u00edo de Oro (POLISARIO front) has been fighting for liberation during the last 45 years. Most recently, it<\/span> caught in a war against Morocco that erupted on <\/span>13 November 2020<\/span><\/a>. <\/span>This<\/span> violent conflict is just one element of its <\/span>liberation <\/span>struggle. Another element is SADR\u2019s pursuit for recognition, also described as the <\/span>ultimate goal<\/span><\/a> for each entity seeking to be an equivalent member of the international society. Since declaring SADR\u2019s independence, over <\/span>80 UN-member states<\/span><\/a> have <\/span>recognized it. However, this cannot hide <\/span>away a<\/span> fundamental problem. Starting <\/span>from<\/span> 1980 with <\/span>Equatorial Guinea\u2019s derecognition<\/span><\/a> it <\/span>has <\/span>lost half of its <\/span>previously gained <\/span>recognitions<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

The area of Western Sahara, colonised by Spain in <\/span>1884<\/span><\/a>,<\/span> is listed as a non-self-governing territory by the UN since <\/span>1963<\/span><\/a>. Located in the <\/span>partly desolate and unforgiving<\/span><\/a> desert between Morocco, Algeria and Mauretania, <\/span>its barren lands contain <\/span>phosphate<\/span><\/a> deposits,<\/span> and coastal waters are rich in<\/span> fish<\/span><\/a>, both currently exported by Morocco globally. Since 1975 POLISARIO front has been administering six camps for displaced Sahrawi people and their descendants, located in Algeria and supported by aid. Estimations assume that between <\/span>100,000 and 165,000<\/span><\/a> people reside there. Besides the camps POLISARIO front also controls the so-called \u201cliberated territory\u201d east of the <\/span>berm<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

\"Western<\/p>\n

Image: Expansion of Moroccan walls in <\/span>Western Sahara <\/span>(<\/span>Source<\/span><\/a>:<\/span> Rob984 <\/span>CC BY-SA 3.0<\/span><\/a>)<\/span><\/p>\n

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As stated<\/span> above<\/span>, recognition is of paramount importance for any entity seeking admission to the international community, irrespective of whether one follows a <\/span>declarative<\/span><\/a> or a<\/span> constitutive view<\/span><\/a>. The first interprets recognition as a compelling logical consequence of fulfilled statehood criteria. In the latter, only states are holding power to decide which entity can join their club. As different as these two concepts are <\/span>in <\/span>derecognition perspectives. This includes questions of whether <\/span>derecognition<\/span><\/a> is possible at all and, if so, what its effects are. Nevertheless, <\/span>understudied derecognition practices<\/span><\/a> are part of today\u2019s international society and often linked to severe conflicts. Furthermore, it is essential to keep in mind that derecognition <\/span>only relates to the relationship between the derecognising state and the derecognized subject<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

In the reality of today\u2019s international system, there is not a general answer fitting for all cases of recognition. While the conflict between the <\/span>Republic of China (Taiwan) and the Peoples Republic of China<\/span><\/a> (PRC) is a one of sole exclusivity of recognition claimed by <\/span>both \u201cChinas\u201d,<\/span> leading to the unavoidable derecognition of <\/span>one of them<\/span>, this is not necessarily true for conflicts like the one between <\/span>Israel and Palestine<\/span><\/a>. Here both parties disagree on many aspects but do not deny each other\u2019s right to exist in principle. Likewise, the conflict between Morocco and SADR is not one of absolute exclusivity. Although Morocco had left the African Union\u2019s predecessor organisation after SADR became a member in <\/span>1984<\/span><\/a>,<\/span> both are now members<\/span> \u2013<\/span> SADR since its <\/span>foundation<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>and<\/span> Morocco <\/span>joining<\/span> in 2017<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

Countries recognising SADR, in general, recognise Morocco too. Nevertheless, the perspective of exclusivity is relevant, as well. Because the territory claimed by POLISARIO front is entirely within the one Morocco claims, full recognition of the latter leaves no alternative <\/span>than <\/span>to denying SADR\u2019s existence. Therefore, many UN-member states do not make explicit statements concerning SADR but support Morocco`s claims, like, for instance, <\/span>Bahrain<\/span><\/a> and the <\/span>US<\/span><\/a> did <\/span>in December 2020.<\/span><\/p>\n

Although <\/span>it may be hard to find accurate<\/span> information<\/span> about the <\/span>SADR\u2019s (de-)recognition status, the <\/span>Universidade de Santiago de Compostella lists<\/span><\/a> an overall number of 84 recognitions<\/span> since 1976<\/span>. Of these<\/span> documented acts<\/span>, 39 states have frozen, suspended, or withdrawn <\/span>their recognitions <\/span>until today, with currently <\/span>exposing <\/span>no indications of a reversal. <\/span>It<\/span> is essential to note that the termination <\/span>of diplomatic relations <\/span>is not equivalent to a withdrawal.<\/span><\/p>\n

Starting in <\/span>1976 with ten recognitions<\/span><\/a> and <\/span>then progressing with<\/span> a further increase until the mid-1990s, <\/span>only<\/span> about <\/span>ten additional ones<\/span><\/a> were recorded<\/span> since 1994, including four by Malawi, which withdrew them in <\/span>2001<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>2002<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>2008<\/span><\/a> and <\/span>2017<\/span><\/a>.<\/span> For all derecognitions received till March 2021, the years with the most extensive changes are 1997, 2000 and 2010, while there is one individual case in 1980 and the ones by <\/span>St. Lucia<\/span><\/a> and the <\/span>Solomon Islands<\/span><\/a> in 1989. These three most comprehensive years will be in focus below.<\/span><\/p>\n

\"Western<\/p>\n

Image: The derecognition <\/span>of Western Sahara <\/span>(Sources<\/span>: primary data basis <\/span>Universidade de Santiago de Compostella<\/span><\/a>, supplemented for the individual cases <\/span>Chad 1997<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>Costa Rica 2000<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>Tuvalu 2000<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>Afghanistan 2002<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>Malawi 2002<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>Sierra Leone 2003<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>Albania 2004<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>Ecuador 2004<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>Burundi 2006<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>Chad 2006<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>Seychelles 2008<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>Barbados 2013<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>St. Vincent and the Grenadines 2013<\/span><\/a> and<\/span> Zambia 2018<\/a>)<\/span><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/p>\n

Various factors influence derecognition. <\/span>G\u00ebzim Visoka<\/span><\/a> summarizes them as the following five: geopolitical interests, economic benefit, domestic political dynamics, conflict resolution and statehood capacity. Nevertheless, all of them include various expressions and are not necessary conditions. In contrast to Visoka, <\/span>Emile Badarin<\/span><\/a> includes some more specific elements<\/span> such as symbolism related to derecognition<\/span> and the international consensus level.<\/span><\/p>\n

In<\/span> 1997<\/span><\/a> four out of the seven derecognising countries were West African ones, complemented by two Central African states and El Salvador. Compared to the breadth of potential derecognising countries, a regional focus is discernible. <\/span>However,<\/span> there are other important reasons. <\/span>Benin<\/span><\/a>, for instance, <\/span>has given the following reasoning:<\/span> SADR\u2019s recognition was <\/span>seen as <\/span>a remnant of the <\/span>Cold War; security-related interests and that SADR\u2019s derecognition<\/span> would <\/span>ideally<\/span> prevent a further Balkanisation of Africa.<\/span> Furthermore, the necessity of SADR\u2019s recognition was contested as<\/span> the <\/span>Houston Agreement<\/span><\/a> foreseeing a referendum was signed<\/span> in 1997.<\/span><\/p>\n

2000<\/span><\/a> was the year with the highest combined number of withdrawals and freezings of diplomatic relations. The regional <\/span>factor played<\/span> a role again since four of the five derecognising states <\/span>were<\/span> so-called micro-nations from <\/span>Oceania<\/span>. As <\/span>being challenged by <\/span>small states diplomacy<\/span><\/a>,<\/span> these countries <\/span>have, on several occasions, used<\/span> recognition as a <\/span>bargaining resource<\/span><\/a>.<\/span> Nevertheless, in<\/span> Vanuatu\u2019s case<\/span><\/a>, it is also possible to link the <\/span>derecognition <\/span>decision to the Houston <\/span>Agreement\u2019<\/span> conflict resolution<\/span> framing<\/span>. The same <\/span>argument also applies <\/span>to <\/span>India<\/span><\/a>. Nevertheless, economic benefits could also be a factor for <\/span>India\u2019s<\/span> decision since <\/span>it signed the<\/span> economic agreement<\/span><\/a> with Morocco<\/span> in time proximity. For the five Latin American countries that froze their recognition, related factors seem to be relevant. For instance, <\/span>Nicaragua<\/span><\/a> and <\/span>Honduras<\/span><\/a> were referring to the referendum and, in Nicaragua\u2019s case, to the strengthening of economic relations with Morocco.<\/span><\/p>\n

Five out of the seven countries which derecognised in <\/span>2010<\/span><\/a> were Caribbean ones. This regional <\/span>factor<\/span> is especially relevant since Morocco is investing <\/span>a lot in efforts<\/span> to cooperate with the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). For instance, it supported some <\/span>member states<\/span> with <\/span>humanitarian aid<\/span><\/a> in the years after the derecognition. Even if the direct consequence is not beyond doubt, many other links are traceable. <\/span>Just like in<\/span> Burundi<\/span><\/a> and <\/span>Guinea-Bissau<\/span><\/a>,<\/span> many in <\/span>the Caribbean region <\/span>support<\/span> Morocco\u2019s so-called autonomy initiative<\/span><\/a>, linked to conflict resolution and international consensus. The close ties between Morocco and the CARICOM started at the end of the 1990s and include, for instance, cooperation concerning the <\/span>energy industry and water management.<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n

Morocco is actively involved in derecognition campaigns. It has used<\/span> economic incentives<\/span><\/a> and <\/span>diplomatic<\/span> bribery<\/span><\/a> to reach these goals<\/span>.<\/span> Partly this could be observed in the years described above. Other factors, <\/span>such as SADR\u2019s (<\/span>lack of<\/span>) qualifications to <\/span>statehood criteria, <\/span>have<\/span> not <\/span>played<\/span> a dominant role, at least in the presented cases. Nevertheless, <\/span>one may still wonder<\/span> whether different tipping points related to international consensus exist. These tipping points thereby describe the situations in which an assumed majority of the relevant others\u2019 opinion leads to the inevitable appearance of its own decision to derecognize.<\/span> Therefore, the factor of international consensus could contribute to a chain-reaction. <\/span><\/p>\n

<\/a>Based on the looming derecognition-trend, one may conclude that SADR\u2019s perspective for the future becomes meagre: every single act of questioning sovereignty by approving Morocco\u2019s or freezing SADR\u2019s is a sign of shifting sides. The loss of SADR\u2019s de jure recognition combined with POLISARIO front\u2019s role as primarily a government-in-exile with deficiencies of possessing empirical sovereignty jeopardises its perspectives even more. Therefore, SADR\u2019s overall viability is rapidly shrinking. This process could only be stopped by a U-turn made by many actors, which is currently unforeseeable.<\/span><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/p>\n

Author: Tina Rosner-Merker<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 Even though decolonisation is widely associated with the second half of the 20th century, it is not yet an issue of the past. The struggle for self-determination in the Saguia el-Hamra and Rio de Oro areas, better …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":66,"featured_media":1308,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"inline_featured_image":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[5],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-162","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-dfsrublogposts"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/defactostates\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/162","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/defactostates\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/defactostates\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/defactostates\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/66"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/defactostates\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=162"}],"version-history":[{"count":10,"href":"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/defactostates\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/162\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1836,"href":"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/defactostates\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/162\/revisions\/1836"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/defactostates\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/1308"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/defactostates\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=162"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/defactostates\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=162"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/defactostates\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=162"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}