![\"Presidential](\"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/398\/picture1_01-300x149.png\")
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Source: Taiwan News<\/a><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n Tsai\u2019s party, the DPP, also retains a significant majority of 61 out of 113 seats in the Legislative Yuan.<\/p>\n Source: Taiwan News<\/a><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n Early Setbacks for Tsai\u2019s Re-election<\/strong><\/p>\n President Tsai\u2019s journey to re-election was not smooth sailing during the early stage. After she first took office on 20 May 2016, relationship between Beijing and Taipei soon fell into to a new low <\/a>because Tsai rejected the China\u2019s demand to recognise the so-called \u201c1992 consensus\u201d<\/a>. Out of dissatisfaction, Beijing suspended governmental contacts<\/a> with Taipei, and intensified its efforts to sabotage Taiwan\u2019s diplomatic relations. From December 2016, a total of 7 countries have switched diplomatic ties to Beijing, leaving Taiwan with only 15 diplomatic allies <\/a>by October 2019. In addition, China has adopted tougher political rhetoric and military pressures toward Taiwan.<\/p>\n Related: China, Taiwan spar over Chinese diplomat\u2019s invasion threat<\/a><\/p>\n Related: Chinese official says military drills intended to deter Taiwan<\/a><\/p>\n Domestically, Tsai\u2019s approval rating declined quickly due to the stalemate across the Taiwan Strait, stagnant economy as well as a series of reform and policy controversies. Her growing unpopularity led to an estounding defeat<\/a> for the DPP in Taiwan\u2019s mid-term local elections held on 24th November 2018. Tsai resigned immediately after as Chairperson of the party. Her chance of being elected for a second term became uncertain for a while, as her leadership and nomination within the DPP faced serious challenges<\/a>. Other inroads include the dramatic rise of Han Kuo-yu who won the 2018 mayoral election for KMT in Kaohsiung, Taiwan\u2019s second largest city and traditionally a DPP stronghold. During the mayoral election campaign, Han promised to stand with the \u201cordinary people\u201d, as well as provide a better relationship with China and economic prosperity for Kaohsiung. He became a national phenomenon and presidential hopeful<\/a> for many KMT and pro-China supporters to displace Tsai Ing-wen in 2020. Tsai and her party\u2019s defeat in the mid-term local elections had also been interpreted as Beijing\u2019s growing readiness and capabilities to manipulate and interfere in<\/a> Taiwan\u2019s democracy.<\/p>\n China\u2019s \u201cOne Country, Two Systems\u201d Flops and Tsai\u2019s Comeback<\/strong><\/p>\n Although China mainland and Taiwan has been under separate rule across the Taiwan Strait since after 1949, Beijing continues to see the island as an integral part of its territory. Under Xi Jinping, China not just makes sure that Taiwan does not pursue de jure independence, but it has been more proactively promoting unification. On 2 January 2019, Xi delivered a speech to commemorate the 40th anniversary of issuing Message to Compatriots in Taiwan. In that speech<\/a>, he said that the long-standing differences across the Taiwan Strait \u201ccannot be dragged from generation to generation\u201d, and called upon Taiwan to joint efforts in completing the \u201chistoric task\u201d of peaceful \u201cnational reunification\u201d that can be best implemented under the \u201cone country, two systems\u201d formula. However, he warned that China does not rule out the option to use force against the interference of external forces<\/a> and Taiwan-independence separatism. Shortly after, Ms. Tsai responded in a steadfast fashion, that \u201cTaiwan will never accept \u2018one country, two systems\u2019. The vast majority of Taiwanese public opinion also resolutely opposes \u2018one country, two systems\u2019, and this is also the \u2018Taiwan consensus\u2019.\u201d She then introduced Guidelines<\/a> to counter \u201cone country, two systems\u201d and China\u2019s attempts to further eroding Taiwan\u2019s democracy, freedom and sovereignty. Subsequent polls showed that Tsai\u2019s stance and her approach toward the \u201cone country, two systems\u201d were widely supported<\/a> by the Taiwan population.<\/p>\n The Hong Kong protests<\/a> since June 2019 further boosted Tsai\u2019s rating. The protests began as a demonstration in Hong Kong to halt a draft bill that could allow criminal suspects to be extradited to mainland China in the future. Opposition to the bill feared that this could further undermine Hong Kong\u2019s autonomy under \u201cone country, two systems\u201d. The standoff between the protesters and the Hong Kong government who introduced the bill escalated into months of violent confrontations. Concerns with the implications<\/a> the extradition bill could have for Taiwan also drew demonstrations on the island to support Hong Kong\u2019s protests and against China\u2019s influence operations against Taiwan. From very early on, Tsai Ing-wen has been consistent in criticizing the bill and how the crisis in Hong Kong proved the failing of China\u2019s \u201cone country, two systems\u201d, and expressing empathy and support for the protest campaigns in Hong Kong, unlike most of her presidential rivals. This helped her greatly, not only in terms of turning her poll ratings upwards<\/a> and securing her party nomination, but also consolidating her image in the run-up to the election day as the leader that could better defend Taiwan\u2019s sovereignty and liberal democratic system under the shadow of China.<\/p>\n A Stronger Democratic Taiwan Identity<\/strong><\/p>\n Despite an eventful and tumultuous process, Taiwan\u2019s general elections in January 2020 ended in a peaceful and orderly manner. This shows growing maturity in Taiwan\u2019s democracy, and a shared commitment of its people to uphold the liberal democratic values<\/a>. As many Hong Kong citizens joined in celebrating Tsai Ing-wen\u2019s election win<\/a>, they also saw Taiwan as an aspiration for Hong Kong\u2019s democracy and freedom. Moreover, the record high number of ballots casted for Tsai should send a sober message to Beijing \u2013 namely, the vast majority of the Taiwan people do not resonate with an allusive \u201c1992 consensus\u201d, which Beijing increasingly uses it as a political tool to pressure and divide Taiwan. Even more, they oppose to unification by threat or force, or be imposed upon any alternative political formula that would divest the independence, civil liberty and democracy Taiwan has been savouring for decades. For this reason, despite the concerns for better wage and economic life, the voters, many under 45 years of age, are willing to take another chance with the president who has not been Beijing\u2019s favor, yet who asks Beijing to face the reality of the existence of ROC Taiwan<\/a> and enter into talk on an equal footing; and who promises to defend Taiwan\u2019s de facto sovereignty, democracy and freedom<\/a>. It remains to be seen<\/a> how China will conduct its relations with Taiwan in the next 4 years of Tsai\u2019s second and final term.<\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n Author: Anne H. Hsiao<\/em><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 On 11 January 2020, Taiwan, officially calls itself Republic of China or ROC (Taiwan), held a general election for the island\u2019s 15th President and Vice President, as well as all 113 members of the 10th Legislative Yuan, …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":66,"featured_media":1388,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"inline_featured_image":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[5],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-113","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-dfsrublogposts"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/defactostates\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/113","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/defactostates\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/defactostates\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/defactostates\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/66"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/defactostates\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=113"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/defactostates\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/113\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1882,"href":"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/defactostates\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/113\/revisions\/1882"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/defactostates\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/1388"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/defactostates\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=113"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/defactostates\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=113"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/defactostates\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=113"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}![\"Legislature](\"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/398\/picture2_02-300x166.png\")
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