The Republic of Abkhazia<\/strong><\/p>\n Many of Abkhazia\u2019s main issues in 2023 carry over from last year. But at the centre of everything seem to be the questions how to improve Abkhazia\u2019s economy, and, directly related to that, how much access can be given to Russian money and to the Russian state before Abkhazia is engulfed. Right at the start of 2023, Abkhazia\u2019s long-term energy crisis worsens as water levels drop at the Inguri power station. In February, rolling blackouts<\/span><\/a> are extended. Following public protests, the government initiates a task force to combat the illegal yet popular crypto-mining<\/span><\/a> which has been exacerbating the crisis<\/span><\/a>. Thousands of devices are seized through February, another large crypto-mining farm<\/span><\/a>is found in December. Spring floods in April bring unexpected relief<\/span><\/a>, allowing the Inguri HPP to resume normal operation, and blackouts to be cancelled. But supply deficit issues remain. In November, it emerges that Russia, which following a 2020 agreement has partially covered Abkhazia\u2019s energy deficit and counted it as humanitarian aid, is now demanding payment<\/span><\/a>, estimated to be 2 million USD. In a show of internal tensions regarding foreign investments, the parliament adopts a law<\/span><\/a> whereby the leasing of any hydroelectric power plant exceeding the capacity of 5MW \u2013 whether operational or not \u2013 would require parliamentary approval. The aim is to stop any administrative decisions regarding privatization that might be unprofitable to the republic.<\/p>\n Abkhazians face an intensifying cost-of-living crisis, although minimum wage doubles<\/span><\/a> from January for private sector employees. Russia\u2019s temporary ban<\/span><\/a> on exporting petrol and diesel fuel, issued in September due to domestic shortages, causes further price hikes in Abkhazia. Tourism season, usually a significant contributor to the economy, is also a bust<\/span><\/a>: while the overall number of tourists is on a comparable level to previous years, they are staying for shorter periods, and spending less. In July, unusually heavy downpours flood the coastal areas<\/span><\/a>, destroying roads and railways and disrupting power and water supplies. Resort areas in Gagra and Pitsunda are among the most affected.<\/p>\n Housing costs have also gone up significantly since 2022, due to increased demand from foreigners. While they are forbidden to buy property, the law is virtually ignored, and many properties go to foreigners, mainly Russians, illegally. The government attempts to fix the situation by proposing a new law<\/span><\/a> on apart-hotels and apartments. In a proposal much favourable to Russian demands over the past years, vacation apartments would be classified as commercial real estate, thus subject to sale. The draft law contains restrictions on citizenship and voting rights, reflecting Abkhazians\u2019 fear of being outnumbered in their own country. The government envisions that 30,000 new apartments would be built over 10 years, the sale of which could be a considerable boost to the economy. But parliament is hesitant to approve the bill. Critics of the proposal worry that high levels of corruption would lead to best lands, including conservational areas, being allocated for these newbuilds, and to an influx of Russian financial groups and capital that pushes out local entrepreneurs.<\/p>\n In another controversial step, a Russian-Abkhaz agreement to reopen the Sukhumi airport is signed in June. According to the deal, a private Russian investor, later revealed to be<\/span><\/a> Rashid Nurgaliyev Jr, the son of the deputy secretary of the Russian security council who has no prior experience in aviation industry, would invest about 84 million USD to restore the airport that has been out of use for 30 years, in exchange for various concessions like exemption from customs duties on all construction materials, equipment, and aviation fuel, a waver on property and income taxes during the payback period of up to 25 years, and the most favourable rate on electricity prices, plus a priority facility status<\/span><\/a> during power cuts. While the government assures that the state would retain ownership of the airport, critics worry<\/span><\/a> that the deal will somehow end with the airport transferred to Russia.<\/p>\n However, the parliament ratifies the agreement<\/span><\/a>, and the airport should be ready for reopening by the end of 2024. Bzhania also announces that the Government House in Sukhumi \u2013 burned down at the end of the Georgian-Abkhazian war in 1993 and to many a symbol of defeat of Georgians \u2013 might be reconstructed and turned into a hotel<\/span><\/a>with the help of a Russian investor. Opposition criticises the idea, claiming<\/span><\/a> it should rather be turned into a cultural centre chronicling the war and offering community services. In November, the government reveals a full plan<\/span><\/a> for attracting large-scale investments by offering tax benefits like exemption from income and property taxes for 25 years for those investing more than 20 million Euros to Abkhazia. Opposition claims this is another step on the way of allowing Abkhazia to be completely overtaken by Russian capital and might turn Abkhazia into an offshore zone that is blacklisted for allowing laundering of illegally earned capital.<\/p>\n Abkhazia\u2019s self-isolation<\/span><\/a> from anyone other than Russia grows, as minister of foreign affairs states the need to fight anti-Russian sentiments<\/span><\/a> in the Abkhazian society. In February, Geneva international discussions (GID) co-chairs from the EU, the UN, and the OSCE, intending to visit Abkhazia for meetings with officials, are denied entry<\/span><\/a> on grounds of the postponement<\/span><\/a> of the next planned round of the GID. In June, the minister of foreign affairs claims in an interview to a Russian channel that Abkhazia is expecting provocations<\/span><\/a> from the US that would be aided by the local NGOs \u2013 \u201cas happened in Ukraine\u201d. The ministry of foreign affairs later clarifies that the minister meant to criticise the foreigners working in the NGO sector, and not Abkhazians themselves. Still, NGOs face increasing restrictions<\/span><\/a>, and in December, USAID is outright banned<\/span><\/a> in Abkhazia due to their activities being perceived as supporting Georgia. The head of the USAID mission to the South Caucasus is declared persona non grata. Local NGOs as well are accused of engaging in subversive activities<\/span><\/a> by conducting projects that promote national interests of Georgia.<\/p>\n All these developments lead to constant tension between the government and the opposition. In April, the opposition issues the president demands<\/span><\/a> to dismiss the government and to abolish or suspend a number of bills<\/span><\/a>, including the agreements to transfer the Pitsunda estate to Russia. At the end of May, the opposition organises a people\u2019s rally<\/span><\/a>, which draws<\/span><\/a> about two thousand people; a pro-government counter-demonstration takes place at the same time. The opposition also gathers signatures for organising a referendum on confidence in the president<\/span><\/a>, but ultimately cancels the plan, claiming that as the process of \u201cselling off\u201d Abkhazian resources has accelerated, there isn\u2019t enough time anymore to organise the referendum.<\/p>\n Regarding relations with Moscow, a certain hesitancy is observable. In February, a visit to Russia by presidents of Belarus, Abkhazia and South Ossetia creates speculation<\/span><\/a> that a new milestone in the Union State project would be declared. Alas, Lukashenka rejects the idea of new members, nor is he in a hurry to recognise Abkhazia\u2019s independence. But when Dmitry Medvedev states in an opinion piece to commemorate the 15th anniversary of Russia\u2019s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in August that Russia would not hesitate to annex<\/span><\/a> the two de facto states \u201cfor their own protection,\u201d\u00a0Abkhaz take issue<\/span><\/a> with his claim that the idea of joining Russia is very popular in Abkhazia. But in September, the foreign minister of Abkhazia embarks on a tour of the regions, where he agitates for even closer relations<\/span><\/a> with Russia. In a meeting between Bzhania and Putin in October, the former once again expresses readiness to participate in Russian integration processes<\/span><\/a>. A day later, Abkhaz president reveals the agreement to establish a new Russian naval base<\/span><\/a> in Ochamchira. While Kyiv indicates<\/span><\/a> it will attack Russian warships even if they are located in Abkhazia, Abkhazia cannot risk saying no to Russia regarding the establishment of the base. Additionally, Abkhazians are simultaneously worried about the Russian-Georgian rapprochement, as well as about a possible change of government in Georgia<\/span><\/a> that would lead to the opening<\/span><\/a> of a second front<\/span><\/a> against Russia. Thus, Abkhazia plans to reform their own armed forces<\/span><\/a>, and to test their mobilization capacities.<\/p>\n Despite mass protests, the Abkhaz parliament renews discussions on transferring the Pitsunda estate<\/span><\/a> to Russia at the very end of 2023, after Bzhania assures that previous issues with the coordinates \u2013 that would have transferred ownership of not just the dacha itself, but also large parts of the surrounding resort area \u2013 are fixed. On December 27, the agreement on the transfer of the estate is ratified and signed into law<\/span><\/a>. Thus, around 180 hectares of the estate<\/a>, including the coast, a pine reserve, and the town itself, will be transferred to Russia on a lease for 49 years, with a symbolic annual payment of one Ruble for each land parcel. For Abkhazia, 2023 ends with yet another public protest<\/span><\/a>.<\/p>\n The Autonomous Region of Bougainville<\/strong><\/p>\n In 2023, Papua New Guinea\u2019s Autonomous Region of Bougainville continues its quest for full independence. The process is structured by the 2019 referendum<\/span><\/a>, where 97.7 percent of the participants voted in favour of independence, and the Era Kone Covenant<\/span><\/a> signed in 2022 with commitments to table the referendum results at the PNG parliament by no later than 2023, and to implement the decision made between 2025 and 2027. Bougainvilleans expect that the results will be tabled at the parliamentary session<\/span><\/a> commencing on June 6. At the start of the session, however, it is announced that the results will be tabled \u201clater in the year\u201d due to some additional parliamentary procedures<\/span><\/a> that need to be put in place. The PNG minister for Bougainville affairs then lays out<\/span><\/a> the parliamentary process, but also acknowledges that there is still no consensus on the meaning of \u201cratification\u201d and \u201cdecision\u201d in the proposed constitutional regulation. The key issue is that while Bougainville argues that the tabling is just a formal acknowledgment, the PNG central government views the referendum as non-binding<\/span><\/a>. Further tensions rise regarding the tabling procedure: first, PNG decides to set the threshold for the vote<\/span><\/a> on referendum results to an absolute majority, a few months later, they also push for a secret ballot<\/span><\/a>. Both proposals undermine<\/span><\/a> the Bougainvilleans\u2019 confidence in the PNG government. Both plans are discussed at the Joint Supervisory Body, and while the representatives of the sides agree that the voting threshold will remain set at the previously agreed upon simple majority<\/span><\/a>, the second issue remains unresolved before the end of the year. The PNG government fails to table the referendum results in 2023, and Bougainville requests that for a moderator to be appointed<\/span><\/a> for moving forward.<\/p>\n Bougainville also grapples with several natural disasters throughout 2023. In June, heavy rains cause floods around the site of the Panguna mine, exacerbated by the mine tailings waste<\/span><\/a> \u2013 a liquid slurry of fine mineral particles left over after extraction \u2013 building up in rivers, and causing water supplies and food crops to be compromised. In July, while the heavy rains continue<\/span><\/a>, the Mt Bagana volcano begins to erupt in the centre of the island, emitting ash and lava for the first time in 11 years. A state of emergency is declared, and later extended<\/span><\/a> through October. The villages around the base of the volcano are evacuated, the eruption contaminates all water sources and affects food and medical supplies, and the heavy volcanic ash leads to the collapse of many traditional rural homes with sago leaf roofs. Tens of thousands<\/span><\/a> of people<\/span><\/a> are affected by the floods and the volcano eruption. The international community<\/span><\/a> steps in with aid, and for the first time since the end of the 2001 civil war, the PNG Defence Force<\/span><\/a> enters the region to deliver aid.<\/p>\n Considering the global copper shortage, discussions on reopening the Panguna copper mine<\/span><\/a> receive renewed attention. Revival of the mine is also seen as critical to the economic survival of Bougainville, whose government takes over the majority ownership of the Bougainville Copper Limited in 2023. Almost USD 90 billion of return is estimated<\/span><\/a> to still be in the pit by the government. New exploration licence is expected to be issued in 2024, but a partnership with a global company is likely needed for operation. The selection of this partner is also a geopolitical issue, as several countries, including the US and China, vie for dominance in the region. In November, Bougainville\u2019s president Toroama, who has appointed himself the mining minister, visits Washington<\/span><\/a> to garner support<\/span><\/a> for independence, and to seek cooperation on the mine, taking an anti-Chinese stance.<\/p>\n The Republic of Kosovo<\/strong><\/p>\n For Kosovo, 2023 is characterised by renewed tensions with the Serb communities in the country\u2019s north, leading to some of the most violent clashes in years. The year starts promisingly: in February, an <\/span>EU-mediated 11-point plan<\/span><\/a><\/span>, endorsed by France, Germany, and the US, is tentatively agreed upon, foreseeing Kosovo granting rights to Serb municipalities in the north, while Serbia agrees to Kosovo\u2019s accession to international institutions. Although seen as a \u201cbreakthrough,\u201d\u00a0critics still point out that while talking about normalisation, the plan distinctly <\/span>avoids<\/span><\/a><\/span> the topic of mutual recognition. In March, <\/span>implementation talks<\/span><\/a><\/span> follow in North Macedonia. Both sides agree to the plan <\/span>only orally<\/span><\/a><\/span>; the EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell tweets \u201cWe have a deal.\u201d\u00a0But Serbian president Vu\u010di\u0107 <\/span>backtracks<\/span><\/a><\/span> almost immediately, blocking Kosovo\u2019s membership in the Council of Europe in April. Kosovo remains vary as well: prime minister Kurti points out that as minority rights are embedded in Kosovo\u2019s constitution, no special regime for Serb municipalities is needed. At the next negotiation round in May, both sides are now <\/span>openly against<\/span><\/a><\/span> signing the deal.<\/span><\/p>\n Image: NONEWBR \u2013 Kosovars have rearranged the letters of their famous NEWBORN statue to protest the planned creation of Serb municipalities in the country\u2019s north (Source: Eiki Berg)<\/p>\n \u00a0<\/p>\n On April 23, Kosovo holds snap local elections<\/span><\/a> in four Serb-majority municipalities in northern Kosovo to fulfil mayoral places that Serbs vacated in protest<\/span><\/a> in 2022. Turnout<\/span><\/a> is only 3.47% due to Serbs\u2019 boycott, and ethnic Albanian candidates are declared as winners. As the mayors attempt to head to their posts at the end of May, Serbs block the entrances<\/span><\/a> at three of the four town halls. Clashes break out<\/span><\/a> between the protesters, and the Kosovar police accompanying the mayors to their offices and KFOR mission soldiers, aiming to guard the town halls. More than 30 KFOR soldiers and over 50 Serbs are injured, amidst accounts that the demonstrators included masked men with guns and explosives<\/span><\/a>.<\/p>\n In response to the clashes, Serbia raises its army\u2019s combat readiness to the highest level. International community also reacts quickly and strongly: NATO Secretary-General calls for Pristina to de-escalate the situation<\/span><\/a>, promising to send 700 extra troops<\/span><\/a> for KFOR as back-up. Other international allies, leading with the US, strongly rebuke<\/span><\/a> Kosovo for using force to gain entry to the town halls, and call for the removal of the new mayors. The US annuls Kosovo\u2019s involvement in the upcoming NATO exercises and puts diplomatic meetings on hold. EU leaders echo the call<\/span><\/a> for early elections<\/span><\/a>. While Kurti initially rejects these calls as appeasement of Serbia, other government members are open<\/span><\/a> to early elections.<\/p>\n In mid-June, the EU organises crisis talks<\/span><\/a> with Serbian and Kosovar leaders in Brussels, following Serbia\u2019s arrest of three Kosovar police officers a few days before. Both sides claim the officers were on their side of their border. The crisis talks achieve no breakthrough<\/span><\/a>, although Borrell calls once again for new elections in northern Kosovo. On 28 June, the EU Commission announces new sanctions<\/span><\/a> against Kosovo, including putting on hold the work of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement bodies, and suspending funds and high level events and bilateral visits to Kosovo. In mid-July, Kurti presents the government measures for defusing the tensions, including the reduction of the number of special police officers at the municipal buildings under boycott, and holding new elections. The opposition criticizes<\/span><\/a> Kurti for taking months to react at the cost of Kosovo\u2019s international reputation, and a brawl breaks out<\/span><\/a> after an opposition MP throws water on him.<\/p>\n But Kosovo also receives some international support<\/span><\/a> when influential politicians, including the chairs of the US, German and British parliamentary foreign affairs committees, urge the US and EU leaders to reconsider their approach to Kosovo and Serbia. The group criticizes both the EU and the US for the lack of pressure placed on Serbia in easing the tensions \u2013 essentially seen as siding with Serbia in attempts to keep them away from Russia \u2013, and the EU-facilitated dialogue for failing to yield positive results. EU leads yet another round of talks<\/span><\/a> in September, which breaks down as Kurti, echoing the public criticism, declares the process to have reached a deadlock<\/span><\/a>, and accuses the EU special envoy of having lost neutrality. In response, the EU criticises Kurti for breaching the confidentiality of the negotiation process; and Borrell warns<\/span><\/a> that the parties \u201crisk losing opportunities for progressing on their European paths.\u201d<\/p>\n Shortly after these talks, tensions in Northern Kosovo flare up once again, when unidentified militants ambush Kosovar policemen during patrol, killing one. About 30 militants then retreat to a nearby monastery<\/span><\/a> in Banjska, where an hours-long gun fight ensues. Kosovo police manages to subdue the attackers, killing at least three<\/span><\/a>, and arresting several more, although some members of the militia escape to Serbia. A large weapons cache<\/span><\/a> is recovered by Kosovo police, including heavy weapons, anti-infantry weapons, explosives, as well as equipment for barricades and food for \u201cseveral hundred\u201d people. Considering the types of weaponry found, Pristina accuses Belgrade<\/span><\/a> in supporting the paramilitary group. The deputy leader<\/span><\/a> of Serb List \u2013 a party representing Serbs in Kosovo \u2013 who is a close ally of Vu\u010di\u0107, openly admits<\/span><\/a> to being involved. He flees from the ambush site to Serbia, where he is later detained<\/span><\/a>, but then released<\/span><\/a>.<\/p>\n But Serbia also begins an \u201cunprecedented\u201d build-up of troops<\/span><\/a> near the Kosovo border, with Vu\u010di\u0107 claiming the attack<\/span><\/a> a response of \u201cdesperate local Serbs\u201d that have been terrorised by Kurti for months. Some are pulled back after the US warns of \u201cmeasures against Serbia\u201d if they do not de-escalate. NATO authorises a further reinforcement of the KFOR troops in Kosovo. Kosovo\u2019s president states that Kosovo ![\"overview20231\"](\"https:\/\/sisu.ut.ee\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/398\/overview20231-300x225.jpg\")
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